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 This dissertation, an ethnographic and sociolinguistic case study of Israeli
feminist practices, investigates the relationship between language use, language
ideology, and the socio-cultural construction of gender and gender identity.
Taking the definition of language use presented by McConnell-Ginet (1988) as a
guide, I analyze both the linguistic behavior and the metalinguistic discourse of
fifteen self-identified Israeli feminists, to determine how ideologies related to
language, gender, and philosophies of social change interact with the structural
and sociolinguistic facts of Modern Israeli Hebrew (MIH) to shape these women’s
intentional and habitual practices of language use.  I used the theoretical concepts
of “indexicality” (Ochs 1992) and “community of practice” (Holmes and
Meyerhoff 1999) to examine how the participants in my study used the linguistic
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resources in their socio-culture repertoire to negotiate a coherent social identity in
both feminist and mainstream Jewish Israeli contexts.
To date, most of the literature on feminist language practice has examined
these issues in English or other Indo-European language speaking contexts.  This
dissertation contributes to the discussion on the relationship between language
and gender by examining these issues in a Hebrew-speaking context.  Hebrew, a
root-and-pattern language, has a binary system of gender based noun
classification in which agreement is marked on predicates as well as pronouns and
adjectives.  Thus, avoiding gender pre-specification of animate referents in
language use, particularly spoken language, is extremely difficult.  Furthermore,
the association of cultural gender characteristics with the grammatical categories
of MASCULINE and FEMININE, through the processes of iconization and
erasure (Gal and Irvine 2000), has more implications for meanings of gendered
forms.
Feminist Hebrew is distinguished from the contemporary and the
prescribed standard uses of Modern Israeli Hebrew in three specific ways:  (1) the
use of hyper-standardized FEMININE forms for referential and indexical marking
of feminine gender in sex-specific contexts, (2) the use of FEMININE forms for
ambiguous generic or definite inclusive reference, and (3) the overt double
gendering of nominal or predicate forms (the Hebrew equivalent of he/she) in
speaking or writing.  The dissertation includes a detailed quantitative and
qualitative sociolinguistic analysis of my informants’ practices to explain how
they used variables from feminist and conventional varieties of MIH to express
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both referential and social-indexical meaning.  I discuss the possible social
meanings of inter-speaker and intra-speaker variation.  I explore what these
meanings can (or cannot) tell us about each woman’s status in the community as
well as the overall relationship between language use and the constitutive nature
of the Israeli feminist community.  Finally, I examine the sociolinguistic
strategies employed by two women, an Israeli feminist politician and a Jewish
feminist activist married to an Arab man, to explore how they use the full range of
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Guide to transliteration of Hebrew
Hebrew utterances in this text are represented in transliterated form using
the conventions set out in the tables below.   Transliteration is appropriate because
my analysis of the utterances focuses on morpho-semantic and lexical variation,
rather than the “sounds” in my subjects’ speech.  I chose to use transliteration for
the representation of the Hebrew utterances, rather than phonetic transcription
using IPA symbols, in an effort to make the text accessible to communities not
familiar with the IPA symbols.  I created a system based on a survey of existing
practices for transliterating Hebrew consonants into Roman orthography.  In
creating this system, I prioritized the ability of a Hebrew-speaking reader to
understand the use of Hebrew “words” and “morphemes” in representations of my
subjects’ speech.  Non-Hebrew speakers can rely on the literal translations and
glosses provided.
It should be noted, however, that this is a representation of spoken
language.  Variation in the pronunciations of words, particularly loan words from
non-Semitic languages, as well as allophonic variation in the pronunciation of
certain vowels or morphemes is apparent in my subjects’ speech.  For example,
the English words “feminism” and “feminist,” which have been borrowed into
MIH, figure significantly in the conversations with my subjects.  While the
Hebrew Language Academy may have issued a ruling regarding the
pronunciation, spelling, and assignment of grammatical gender to these words,
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there is clear variation in my subjects’ use of them.1  I have chosen to maintain
this type of variation, where it does not interfere with the interpretation or
intelligibility of the Hebrew, to facilitate the reader’s recognition of these
utterances as spontaneous speech rather than prepared remarks or written texts.  I
feel this recognition is important to the central issue in the dissertation, namely
the relationship between language ideology and linguistic behavior.
Vowels in the Hebrew language are connected to the root and pattern
system of morphology.  In written Israeli Hebrew, the vowel markings are
generally absent.  Culturally, they are understood as guides for vocalization of the
consonantal roots in the different morphological patterns and considered
unnecessary for the recognition of Hebrew words.  The majority of native Hebrew
speakers would have considerable difficulty correctly using the diacritic markings
that represent the vowels in Hebrew orthography.  These diacritic vowel markings
are based on historical representations of phonological variations that are no
longer present in many cases.  In classical Hebrew texts, there are several
distinctions between vowel sounds that most native speakers of Modern Israeli
Hebrew (MIH) do not realize.  For example, the historical distinction between the
kamets – [  ] and patax – [ a ], has not been maintained.2  In MIH, both are
realized as [ a ], and in this text, I represent both the kamets and patah with the
                                                 
1 The assignment of grammatical gender to loanwords in Hebrew is often problematic, and despite
rulings by the Hebrew Language Academy, many MIH speakers are inconsistent in their use of
gender with non-Semitic borrowings.
2 Note that komets and kamets refer to the same vowel.  The name change is symbolic of the
merging of [  ] and [ a ] for most MIH speakers.  In guides to the pronunciation of classical
texts, the vowel is still referred to as komets, but in MIH contexts, it is usually referred to as
kamets.
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single symbol ( a ).  The vowel sere is realized sometimes as [] and sometimes
as [i].  For example, the initial vowel in the Hebrew word rpes 	 ‘book’ is
represented by the sere while the second vowel is represented by the segol.  Some
Hebrew speakers will pronounce the word as [sfr] and some will pronounce it
as [sifr].  The variation does not appear to follow any particular rule and may
be idiosyncratic for each speaker.  In the table below, I have included both
allophonic variations of the sere vowel in my transliteration practices.  There is
also variation in the realization of elided vowels that occur in pre and post-lexical
clitic morphemes.  For example the clitic preposition b ‘in’ or ‘with’ is realized
as [ba], [b], or [b] depending on whether it is used with the definite article (i.e.
‘in the’ as opposed to ‘in’ ) and/or the phonetic influence of surrounding vowels
and consonants as well as idiosyncratic practices of particular speakers.  Nor does
there seem to be a unified standard for the representation of these vowels in the
transliterations by Israeli sociolinguists.  As with the variation in pronunciation of
non-Semitic loan words, representing the variation of vowel pronunciation in the
transliterated texts helps maintain the feel of spoken language without
compromising the intelligibility or interpretation of the utterances.  Note also, that
in the table showing the conventions for representing Hebrew vowel sounds, the











[ i ] i )i hirek
 [  ] e )e )	 segol & sere
 [  ] a )a )f patah & kamets
[ o ] o )o wO) holem
[ u ] u )u w%) kibbuts & shuruk
[  ]  ); shewa
[ i ] ai y)a patah +yud
[ i ] ei )	 y)	 sere (+yud)
[ oi ] oi ywO) holem +yud
[ ui ] ui yw%) shuruk +yud
Table 1: Representation of Modern Israeli Hebrew vowels:
It is important to note that, as with the vowels, several Hebrew
consonantal sounds, represented by different orthographic symbols and names,
have merged in standard MIH.  Most contemporary speakers of MIH, particularly
native-born speakers, do not consistently realize the historical phonetic
distinctions between xet and xaf, kaf and kuf, tet and taf, or alef and ayin.  Nor are
these distinctions maintained in most transliteration practices.  Within this text,
each pair is represented by a single symbol, as noted in the table below.  It should
also be noted that the alef and the ayin are both represented by the symbol (  ),
which should not be confused with an IPA symbol for glottal stop, stress mark, or
any other consonantal sound.  In syllable-final position, the Hebrew consonants
hey, aleph and ayin are not articulated; word finally, they can result in the
lengthening of the final vowel sound, but they are not articulated as separate
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phonemes.3  Thus, only intervocalic occurrences of these consonants are
represented in the transliterations of my subjects’ speech.  When the alef or ayin
occur word initially, for example in the Hebrew words dxa)e ‘one’ and twOnwOrq(e
‘principles,’ they will appear in the transliterations as exad  and ekronot
respectively, without the initial consonantal symbol.  The Hebrew consonants
named bet, kaf, and pey vary phonologically according to their position within a
linguistic unit.  They are realized as stops, [b], [k], and [p] respectively, syllable
initially, but as fricatives post-vocalically or word finally.  The fricative variants
have distinct Hebrew names, vet - [v], xaf – [x], and fey – [f].  The existence of
specific Hebrew names for each of these allophonic variants should not lead
readers to think of them as separate phonemes in the Hebrew phonological
inventory.  Each pair is represented by a single “letter” in the Hebrew
orthographic system.  The allophonic variation can be marked in written Hebrew
texts by the use of the dagesh; a dot that appears in the stop variant of the letter
but not in the fricative.4  One final note, in the transliteration tables above and
below, I do not use the term “letter” because Hebrew vowels and the allophonic
variants vet - [v], xaf – [x], and fey – [f] are not “letters” in the conventional sense
of the word.  Each of these “sounds” has a specific Hebrew name related to its
                                                 
3 In classical Hebrew and some written representations of MIH, the word final h@,@ called hey
mapik, is distinguished from regular word final hey.  As I stated, diacritics are not generally used
in written texts and most speakers do not realize the distinction in speech.  Even in cases of
minimal pairs such as between h#f@)i isha ‘woman’ and h@#f$y) isha ‘her man,’ most native MIH
speakers rely on semantic contextual clues rather than phonetic distinctions to convey the
difference between the two words.
4 As with vowel markings and the difference between hey and hey mapik noted above, the use of
the dagesh to distinguish between the stop and fricative variants is derived from classical Hebrew
and not used by most MIH speakers in written texts.
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orthographic representation, but they are not “letters” of the Hebrew alphabet in









[  ]  ) ( aleph and ayin
[ b ] b b@ bet
[  ]  g gimel
[ d ] d d daled
[ h ] h h hey
[ v ] v w b vav and vet
[ z ] z z zayin
[ t ] t + t tet and taf
[ j ] y y yud
[ k ] k k@ q kaf and kuf
[   ] x k x xaf and xet
[ l ] l l lamed
[ m ] m m mem
[ n ] n n nun
[ s ] s s  #& samex and sin
[ p ] p p% pey
[ f ] f p fey
[ ts ] ts c tsadi
[ % ] r r reysh
[ s& ] sh #$ shin
Table 2: Representation of Contemporary Hebrew Consonants:
There are some additional notes regarding the use of symbols in the
glossing of the Hebrew.  In the literal translation of the Hebrew texts, I use the
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following symbols for reference to the relevant grammatical function or meaning









(D.O.) Direct Object Marker
The symbols are employed to provide the reader with the necessary grammatical
information to understand the difference between FEMININE and MASCULNE
variants of different predicate or nominal forms.  For example the literal
translation of the Hebrew amart would appear as: ‘you said(F, S).’  The meaning
of (F,S) following the English gloss of the word is that this form is the
FEMININE, singular form of the predicate  lomar ‘to say.’
The transliterated text is presented in SILDoulos IPA font.  Italicized
portions of the transliterated texts represent reported speech of others.  Instances
of code-switching to English are presented within the text using American
English spelling.  The exceptions to this practice are loan words that have been
incorporated into the MIH lexicon.  Square brackets, [ ], around text in the
transliterations indicates an overlap in speakers turns.  The use of ... in the
transliterations indicates that text has been omitted; generally the omitted portions
of the original speech are hesitation markers or discursive “asides” within an
utterance that are not relevant to the analysis of the variables being examine in a
particular example.
1
AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE AND GENDER
IDEOLOGY AMONG ISRAELI FEMINISTS
Chapter I:  ze nora ma	aliv lihiyot nekeiva, ‘it is very insulting to
be FEMININE’
The statement in the title of this chapter, uttered by my informant Neta,
contains an implicit question: Why is it “very insulting to be FEMININE” in
Israel?5  In essence, my dissertation is an attempt to answer this question through
an examination of the way Israeli feminists’ use language to negotiate their
feminist identities in the complex socio-cultural context of mainstream Israeli
Jewish society.6  I analyze both the linguistic behavior and the metalinguistic
discourse of fifteen self-identified Israeli feminists to determine how ideologies
                                                 
5 Unless otherwise noted, all names used in this dissertation are pseudonyms.  Furthermore, I have
provided limited demographic and ethnographic details about individual informants to protect
their identities.
6 Throughout the dissertation, I refer to the dominant socio-cultural context within which my
informants acted as “mainstream Jewish Israeli society” or Hebrew-speaking Israeli society.  I use
these terms interchangeably because the focus of this work is the relationship between language,
ideology, gender, and identity among native speakers of the Modern Israeli Hebrew language in
the Israeli socio-cultural context.  My use of these terms is meant to highlight the fact that
mainstream Israeli society is dominated by native Hebrew-speakers who are also Jews, according
to the Israeli definition of Jewish identity as both national and religious.  My study is limited to the
language-use practices of native Jewish Israeli Hebrew speakers, which serve as the norms for
language-use conventions and prescriptive standards for all of Israeli society.  I recognize that
non-Jewish residents and citizens of Israel speak Hebrew as a second language, but they, as well
as Jewish immigrants, are rarely native speakers.  Obviously the issues raised in this work affect
both the non-Jewish residents and citizens of Israel and the Jewish immigrants, but these groups
are not explicitly represented in it because their members are not native speakers of Hebrew.
Clearly they are participants in Hebrew-speaking Israeli society and their language practices no
doubt influence how Hebrew is spoken in Israel.  However, the Israeli national ideology views the
non-Jews as foreign, and Jewish immigrants must learn to speak Hebrew to become fully vested
members of mainstream Israeli society.  Even then, issues of authenticity related to linguistic
competence arise.  The complex relationship between language, Israeli national identity, and
ethno-religious centrism in Israeli society will be addressed in chapter two of the dissertation.
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related to language, gender, and philosophies of social change interact with the
structural and sociolinguistic facts of Modern Israeli Hebrew (MIH) to shape
these women’s intentional and habitual practices of language use.  The primary
theoretical question of my research concerns the relationship between language,
gender, and ideology.  What can an examination of linguistic innovation by Israeli
feminists, which is characterized by variations in the use of the Hebrew system of
grammatical gender for reference to male and female social agents in the socio-
cultural context of male-dominated Israeli society, tell us about the nature of this
relationship?  To answer this question, we must look at the practices themselves
and the “conditions of discourse.”
Let us return to Neta’s comment and the implicit question I believe it
posed.  To address the question meaningfully, we must first understand what Neta
was saying when she declared, “ze nora ma	aliv lihiyot nekeiva,” ‘it is very
insulting to be nekeiva.  What is the meaning of the term “nekeiva” in her
statement?  In my gloss, I translated the word as ‘FEMININE,’ but nekeiva can
also mean ‘female’ or ‘feminine.’  Furthermore, the term “feminine” can refer to
either a socio-cultural category or a grammatical category.  Throughout my
dissertation, I use orthographic conventions to distinguish between the various
meanings of the words “masculine,” “feminine,” “male” and “female.”
‘MASCULINE’ and ‘FEMININE,’ in uppercase, refer to the formal grammatical
categories in the noun classification system of Hebrew.  ‘Masculine’ and
‘feminine,’ written in lowercase, refer to the culturally defined categories of
gender and the characteristics that these categories are ascribed.  ‘Male’ and
3
‘female’ are used interchangeably with ‘man’ and ‘woman,’ and their respective
plurals, to refer to humans as they fit into the cultural and grammatical categories.
Thus, my gloss of Neta’s statement reveals that she was speaking about the
grammatical category.  We could rephrase her statement as follows: it is very
insulting to be grammatically FEMININE or in the FEMININE grammatical
category.
The rephrasing of Neta’s statement raises a slightly different questions:
How is it insulting to be FEMININE?  The question of how is bound up with
questions such as, to whom is it insulting to be FEMININE and in what contexts.
To answer these questions, we must look at the situation within which Neta made
this comment.  The first level of context was the meta-topic of discourse within
which she uttered the statement itself.  The topic of discourse was Neta’s response
to a question about the relationship between conventional practices of language
use and women’s status in Israel.  Her statement occurred in the context of a
larger utterance, which began with her description of an interaction with a male
instructor who consistently used MASCULINE language to give examples in a
management-styles course that had mostly female students.  Neta confronted her
instructor and requested that he use FEMININE language to address her.  She
reported that he did not understand her request; then she proceeded to connect this
incident to the issue of language and gender.  (I have highlighted the statement,
which occurs at the end of the longer utterance, with bold text and underlining.)
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vehu lo hivin bixlal ma ani rotsa memenu.  zot omeret eh ze kol kax
mushrash sheani keisha nimtset keilu betox ish.  velo, ein, ani lo
nifredet mimenu beshum texum.  vehaxi matsxik ze sheze, ze lefi ha,
eh hayom, kvar sheyesh rov shel nashim, hu tsarix ledeber banekeiva.
vehaxi matsxika, sheam nashim lo osot et ze., ki hen poxodot shehem
yealvu.  ma kol kax maaliv shemedabrim benekeiva? zot omeret,
keshevarim medebrim el nashim bezaxar az anaxnu beseder.  aval
keshenashim medabrot eleihem kenekeiva ze nora ma	aliv lihiyot
nekeiva. bixlal hamila nekeiva. hashoresh shela ze nekev ze xor! nora!
And he did not understand at all what I want from him.  That is to say, this
is so clear that I, as a woman, reside seemingly within a man, and do not,
there is not, I cannot separate from him in any context.  And the really
amusing (thing) is that this, according to, today, already, when there is a
majority of women, he must speak in the FEMININE.  And the most
amusing is that even women don’t do this, because they(F) are afraid that
they(M) will be annoyed.  What is so insulting that (they) speak(M,P) in
the FEMININE?  That is to say, when men speak to women in the
MASCULINE, so we are okay.   But when women speak to them(M) like
feminine, it is very insulting to be FEMININE.  At all, the word nekeiva,
the root of it is nekev.  This is “hole!”  Terrible!
Reading the whole of her utterance, it is clear that, in general, Neta used
the word nekeiva to refer to the FEMININE category.  Thus the answer to the
question to whom and in what contexts “it is insulting to be FEMININE” is that it
is insulting to men.  The immediate meaning of her statement referred to the
reaction of Israeli men when they were addressed (or rather not addressed) by
speakers who used FEMININE forms.  At this point in my analysis, it is important
to clarify that Neta was not speaking about the direct address of a single speaker
to a specific addressee.  She was speaking about the use of FEMININE plural
terms of address or FEMININE generics.  Her statement reflects the fact that
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males in Israeli society are not socialized to find themselves included in
FEMININE collective or generic forms.  Thus, it is insulting for them to be forced
to do so by speakers who use language in unconventional ways.
However, Neta’s comment includes some very important clues that the
meaning of the term nekeiva in this context was associated with both the
grammatical and social gender categories.  At the beginning of her utterance, she
stated that the experience of being address by MASCULINE language made her
feel, “that I, as a woman, reside seemingly within a man, and (…) I cannot
separate from him in any context.”  It seems likely that this statement refers to the
contrast between Neta’s sense of self as a woman and the way in which
conventional uses of MIH socialize her to see her SELF (as an Israeli, a person,
etc…) as masculine. 7  Indeed, in response to her own question “ma kol kax
maaliv shemedabrim benekeiva?” ‘what is so insulting that they speak in the
FEMININE?’, Neta points to the gendered difference in Israeli language
socialization.  Women are used to being addressed in the MASCULINE, but men
are not used to being addressed in the FEMININE.  Men have the privilege of
being associated with the normative SELF in Israeli culture by virtue of the
metaphorical relationship between the socio-cultural masculine category and the
grammatical MASCULINE category, which is, in turn, associated with the
unmarked category of human in prescribed and conventional uses of MIH.
                                                 
7 Throughout the dissertation, I contrast “SELF” and “OTHER” with “self” and “other” to
differentiate these concepts in the mainstream context with these concepts in context of the
marginalized sub-communities.
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According to Neta’s comment, this feminist attempt to address the
gendered asymmetry of “symbolic privilege” (e.g. Eckert & McConnell-Ginet,
1992) through innovative language use is rejected by both men and women.  The
problem is the perceived slight that using the FEMININE forms could be taken as
signaling to men.  However, the source of the perceived slight is somewhat
hidden.  It could be understood as an artifact of the reality that men are not
socialized to see themselves in the FEMININE language forms.  It could also be
interpreted as men’s discomfort in being expected to find themselves in the
feminine social category, which is represented in language by the FEMININE.
Herein, lies the essence of the question raised by Neta’s statement.  How do
practices of language use interact with ideological processes and cultural concepts
of gender such that, in the Israeli context, using FEMININE forms for impersonal
or inclusive reference to males and females becomes kol kax ma	aliv “so
insulting” to men?  In this dissertation, I will address the issues raised by this
question from a feminist perspective.
1.2  STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation, a detailed ethnographic and sociolinguistic case study of
Israeli feminist practices, is divided into three major sections.  The first section of
the dissertation, “An introduction to language and gender ideology among Israeli
feminists,” includes this introductory chapter and chapters two and three.  In
chapter two, I present the theoretical frames within which I locate my analysis of
the data and the socio-cultural contexts within which the data was produced by
my informants.  Chapter three describes the sociolinguistic methods I used to
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collect and analyzed that data.  Included in chapter three are also (1) a description
of the Israeli organizations and institutions where I collected the data and (2) an
introduction to the fifteen women whose sociolinguistic practices are analyzed.
The second major section of the dissertation, entitled “Grammatical
gender in use: Feminist Israeli Hebrew” includes chapters four, five, and six,
which present a detailed quantitative and qualitative sociolinguistic analysis of my
informants’ use of grammatical gender as elements of a feminist variety of
Modern Hebrew.  In these chapters, I examine the use of linguistic forms in five
morpho-semantic contexts to define the grammatical variables that differentiate
feminist Hebrew from prescribed standard and mainstream conventional varieties
of MIH.8  The analysis of the data focuses on my informants’ observed and
reported linguistic behavior to explain how they used variables from feminist and
conventional varieties of MIH to express both referential and social-indexical
meaning.
The third section of the dissertation “Negotiating identity and the use of
feminist Hebrew,” is comprised of chapters seven, eight, and nine.  In chapter
seven, I discuss the possible social meanings of inter-speaker and intra-speaker
variation.  I explore what these meanings can (or cannot) tell us about each
woman’s status in the community as well as the overall relationship between
language use and the constitutive nature of the Israeli feminist community.
                                                 
8 I refer to the variables as “grammatical” to differentiate between lexical variables of feminist
Hebrew and the innovative use of grammatical gender for semantic referential and indexical
reference to males and females.  Thus, the term “morpho-semantic” refers to the semantic contexts
within which my informants vary their use of morphological gender markers.  See chapter two,
section 2.4.2 for a description of the Hebrew system of grammatical gender classification of
nouns.
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Chapter eight presents my analysis of the sociolinguistic strategies of two of my
informants, an Israeli feminist politician and a Jewish feminist activist married to
an Arab man.  I analyze the content and form of their metalinguistic discourse to
explore how they use new linguistic “meanings” produced within the feminist
context to negotiate their identities in specific socio-cultural contexts.  Chapter
nine, the final chapter of the dissertation, presents the theoretical conclusions that
can be drawn from my examination of Israeli feminist practices.  In this
concluding chapter, I also discuss remaining questions and avenues for further
investigation.
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Chapter II: Between “this house” and the “outside”:
Contextualizing research on Israeli feminist language practice
po she	ani betox habayit haze, az hakol nora me	uran venexmad.
ve	at yotset haxutsa ve	at pit	om nitkelet bashovenizm hasamui haze.
hahityaxsut elayix  kemashehu katan.  ...  kemo ehm shalom banot. ...
lo yagidu shalom nashim, shalom banot  (Neta)
here, when I am in this house, so everything is very ordered and nice and
[then] you go out and you suddenly encounter this latent (or concealed)
chauvinism.  The treatment of you like something small ...  like  eh “hello
girls.” ... they(M) won’t say hello women, hello girls. (Neta)
2.1 THE THEORETICAL AND SOCIO-CULTURAL CONTEXTS OF THE RESEARCH
In the quote above, one of the women in my study, Neta, was responding
to a question about why she located herself within the feminist community.  Her
response included a reference to the way practices of language use in mainstream
Israeli society contributed to the latent or concealed chauvinism she encountered
“outside” her feminist home.9  Feminist language reform or linguistic innovation
is at least the use of language as a tool of feminist social change work.  However,
in this dissertation, I will argue that feminist linguistic innovations must also be
understood as the social acts of women negotiating their identities between “this
house,” that is, the feminist community, and “the outside,” that is, mainstream
(Israeli) society.  I take the theoretical position that a meaningful analysis of
language must address both the linguistic elements themselves and how they are
used to accomplish tasks in specific contexts.  To accomplish the task of this
                                                 
9 The Hebrew word samu	i can be translated as either ‘concealed’ or ‘latent.’  In Neta’s comment,
I believe both English glosses are relevant.
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dissertation, I make use of several current theoretical concepts about the role of
language in the construction and negotiation of social identity.  This chapter
includes a review of the relevant literature on the following topics: the
sociolinguistic construction of gender and identity; communities of practice as the
locus for investing language use with social meanings; the indexical nature of
linguistic behavior; and language ideology, gender and generics.
I also present a description of the socio-cultural and linguistic facts
relevant to understanding my analysis of the specific case of Israeli feminist
language practice.10  Section 2.4.1 presents the socio-cultural issues that shape
gender ideologies and communal practices in the mainstream Israeli context.  This
section includes a brief description the Israeli feminist movement, both its
historical and contemporary make-up as well as its position within the larger
Israeli political landscape. Section 2.4.2 is presents a description of rules for the
use of grammatical gender in standard (prescribed) Modern Israeli Hebrew (MIH)
and conventional practices of use in by contemporary Israeli speakers of Hebrew.
Section 2.4.3 includes an examination of the relevant sociolinguistic facts of
contemporary Israeli society. It also includes a discussion of the ideological
factors that influence the language socialization of members of the Jewish Israeli
community of practice and a review of the literature regarding variation and
grammatical gender marking in contemporary uses of MIH.
                                                 
10 Significant portions of section 2.4 are taken from Jacobs, 1997.
11
2.2 LANGUAGE, GENDER AND THE MAKING OF WOMEN AND MEN
Simon de Beauvoir (1983) stated, “One is not born a woman, but rather
becomes one.”  In her critical examination of the socio-cultural “othering” of
women The Second Sex, she differentiated between biological sex and the socio-
cultural construction of woman and the feminine.  “It would appear, then, that
every female human being is not necessarily a woman; to be so considered she
must share in that mysterious and threatened reality known as femininity” (p. 1).
The orthographic practices that I devised to differentiate between the grammatical
and socio-cultural categories of gender were intended to make salient the feminist
theoretical perspective that gender is a socio-cultural construction to which
practices of language use contribute. Speakers make use of language and
linguistic elements to classify human males and females into gender categories
with culturally associated characteristics.  Neta’s statement at the beginning of
this chapter illustrates that in the Israeli context, the characteristic of “small” or
“child-like” is associated with the cultural category of WOMAN.
Many linguistic conventions index the fact that concepts of masculinity
and femininity are linked to social characteristics that may or may not be aspects
of individual men’s and women’s identities.  The English lexical construct ‘tom-
boy,’ which one of the women in my study used to describe her child-self, is a
linguistic convention used to label girls whose behavior is too ‘masculine’ to fit
within the norms of communally defined “girlish” or “feminine” behavior.11  The
                                                 
11 The woman borrowed the English lexical item, but the concept of “boyish” girls is salient for
Israelis.  The Hebrew word often associated with this behavior is shovav ‘rascal(M)’ or shoveva
‘rascal(F).’  When applied to boys, it means rambunctious or mischievous in a “boys will be boys”
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way language is used to refer to individuals as social beings can be understood to
contribute to the making of biological sex into gender and thus females into
women (and males into men).  An examination of these linguistic conventions
explains the way individual females and males are included or excluded from the
culturally defined social categories of WOMAN and MAN.
The question posed in my research is how does the use of language, as a
system of symbolic reference to “reality,” contribute to the process of creating
and recreating the unequal relationships between MAN and WOMAN in different
cultural contexts. Of particular relevance to my research is the way that
grammatical systems of noun classification that make use of gender as the
organizing principle figure in the social process of gender differentiation.
McConnell-Ginet (1988) offers a comprehensive discussion of the differences
between grammatical gender or gender as an organizing principle in language
(linguistic systems) and the way that social gender is encoded (and produced)
through the use of language
Language (use) involves the production by linguistic agents (speakers or
writers) of linguistic forms; in using these forms, agents are meaning to
express content and to present themselves as social beings and actors in
the world. (p. 78)
Taking the definition of language use presented by McConnell-Ginet as a guide, I
developed a two-part approach to analyze both the linguistic behavior and the
metalinguistic discourse of fifteen self-identified Israeli feminists.  The goal of
my analysis is to determine how ideologies related to language, gender, and
                                                                                                                                      
sort of way, but when applied to girls it has the added connotation of “ungirl-like” behavior
similar to the concept conveyed by ‘tom-boy.’
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philosophies of social change interact with the structural and sociolinguistic facts
of Modern Israeli Hebrew (MIH) to shape these women’s intentional and habitual
practices of language use.  I devote chapters four, five and six to examining the
“production” of specific linguistic elements – grammatical gender in five morpho-
semantic contexts – in the discourse of Israeli feminists and explaining what these
women “mean” by their use of these linguistic forms in particular examples of
their usage.
In a later article, “The sexual (re)production of meaning: A discourse
bassed approach,” McConnell-Ginet (1989) explained that “endowing linguistic
forms with meaning is a socially situated process” (p. 41).  She argued that we
should not be surprised to find sexist meanings attached to linguistic forms used
in sexist societies.  The linguistic analysis of the relationship between language
and gender, or gendered practices of language use, must consider the “contexts”
in which particular practices occur.  I use the principle of socio-culturally
contextualized methodology to further explore the social meaning of both inter-
speaker and intra-speaker variation with regard to the use of grammatical gender
in the Israeli context.  The analysis presented in chapters seven and eight builds
on the description of Israeli feminist practices or “language production” to
explore the “meaning” of my informants’ practices in a variety of socio-cultural
contexts.
McConnell-Ginet (1989) also discussed the way language can be used to
produce new meanings.  “It is possible to produce new meanings in the context of
a community or culture of supportive and like-thinking people” (p. 47).  My
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examination of Israeli feminist language use also explores how my informants’
practices of language produce new meanings within the feminist context and the
relevance of these new feminist meanings for the negotiation of identity in
different socio-cultural contexts.  Other work on the relationship between
language and the (re)production of social inequalities that influenced my
investigation of Israeli feminist practices of language use including that of Ehrlich
and King (1994), Gal (1989, 1991) and Woolard (1985).
2.3 COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE
The exploration of language in use necessitates the development of a
theoretical framework for talking about the way individuals organize themselves
as social beings.  Several concepts have been used to examine the language use of
groups of individuals and the social meaning of their behavior.  Meyerhoff and
Holmes (1999) review the major conceptual frameworks used in sociolinguistic
research.  In their discussion of the different models used, they argue that Eckert
and McConnell-Ginet’s (1992) adaptation of the concept of “community of
practice” (Lave & Wenger, 1991) is particularly useful for examining the social
meaning of language use in context.  The Eckert and McConnell-Ginet definition
emphasizes the way in which individuals engaged in a particular socio-cultural
endeavor develop a shared set of “practices” that are related to the
accomplishment of that specific endeavor.  Thus, these individuals constitute a
“community of practice” which is both defined by and defines the social identity
of these individuals as members of their community.
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I found this dynamic model of “community” to be the most useful of the
conceptual models of social relationships between groups of speakers for
investigating the relationship between language use, ideology and identity in
Israeli context.  I used the model of “community of practice” to define the
different socio-cultural contexts within which my informants used language to
enact their social identities and feminist ideological stances.  The women in my
study are members of the Israeli feminist community, which is engaged in the
social endeavor of working for gender equality.  The work of feminist social
change involves numerous shared practices and ideologies oriented toward
affecting change in the Israeli socio-cultural institutions and practices that
perpetuate gender discrimination and the oppression of individual Israelis based
on their sex and/or sexuality.  Thus, the Israeli feminist community can be
considered a community of practice.  The Israeli feminist community of practice
is defined, in part, by its opposition to the social practices and ideologies that
support the male-dominated social hierarchy of mainstream Israeli society.  The
community of Israelis engaged in the business of continuously defining and
creating the dominant Israeli socio-cultural norms and the conceptualization of
Israel as the national homeland of the Jews must also be viewed as a community
of practice, within which members of the Israeli feminist community live and act
as social beings.
I use the concept of a “speech community” to refer to the macro-
sociolinguistic context of all speakers of MIH within which the specific
communities of practice relevant to my informants’ social behavior are located.
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On the following pages are graphic representations of the schema I developed to
represent the complexity of the context(s) within which the women in my study
acted as sociolinguistic agents.12  Figure 2.1 locates the Israeli feminist
community of practice as one of many sub-communities that exist within the
larger community of practice identified as the Jewish Israeli community of MIH
speakers. (Referred to throughout the dissertation as ‘mainstream Israeli society,’
‘mainstream Jewish Israeli society,’ and  ‘larger community of Israeli Hebrew-
speaking society’).  I also included some of the other sub-communities of practice
that were specifically relevant to my research.  The macro-community of Jewish
Israeli society is located within the speech community of all speakers of MIH,
which includes non-Jewish speakers in and outside of Israel as well as non-Israeli
Jewish speakers of MIH.
                                                 
12 The relative size of each circle in figures 2.1 and 2.2 is not intended as a representation of the
relative size or social power of the “communities” represented by those circles.
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Figure 2.1 Locations of Israeli feminist community of practice and other relevant sub-communities within the
Mainstream Israeli Jewish community of practice and the Modern Israeli Hebrew speech community.
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The Israeli feminist community of practice is also a macro-community that
includes several feminist organizations that constitute local communities of
practice in and of themselves.  In figure 2.2, I have included the organizations
where I conducted research.  Most of the data in my study represent the language
practices of women who were full-time staff members at one of these
organizations; I refer to these women as “professional feminists.”  The five
smaller circles in figure 2.2 represent the women in my study who were not full-
time staff members of any of the feminist organizations where I conducted my
research; I refer to these women as “feminists at large.”  Smaller circles that
overlap with specific organizations represent women who either volunteered or
otherwise interacted with these organizations.  I also included the Israeli feminist
magazine Noga as a social institution that contributes to the development of
Israeli feminist culture.
2.4 THE CONTEMPORARY ISRAELI SOCIAL CONTEXT
The socio-cultural context of language use must be examined to make
sense of the both the referential and social meanings of linguistic elements used in
discursive interactions.  In this section of the chapter, I present aspects of the
gendered landscape of contemporary Israeli society relevant to understanding the
social meanings of my informants’ linguistic practices.
2.4.1 Gender in the socio-political landscape of contemporary Israel
Zionism, the mainstream Israeli Jewish national ideology, has shaped
Israeli culture and social institutions, including the construction of “normative”
Israeli identity, since the late nineteenth century pre-state periods of Jewish
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settlement in the region (Kimmerling, 2001; Segev, 2000).  With respect to issues
of cultural gender ideology, Zionism is heavily colored by gendered imagery of
the distinction between the “old Jew” of the Diaspora and “new Jew” of the
emerging Jewish Israeli nation (Boyarin, 1999; Boyarin, 2000).  In his review of
literature from the pre-state period of Zionist settlement of Palestine, Segev
(2000) quotes several descriptions of these new Israeli Jews that are heavily
invested with gendered imagery.  “He is erect, brave, handsome, physically well-
developed, loves work, sports, and games; he is free in his movements, devoted to
his people and its patrimony” (p. 258).  Even allowing for the use of the
MASCULINE as the generic, this description of the young Jewish people who
came to settle Palestine is clearly laden with images of a strong male figure.
Segev titled the chapter in which this quote appears, A New Man, in it he
discusses the influence of socialist and even fascist images of the ideal
worker/farmer/citizen on the development of the Zionist image of the Israeli Jew.
The gendered imagery of this early period of Zionist activity is not
accidental.  It is related to the conceptual association of agency with masculinity
and passivity with femininity. 13   The “old Jew” of the Diaspora was not capable
of autonomous agency because “he” was subjected to the laws and customs of the
nation-states of other “peoples.”  The Jew of the Diaspora is the feminized Jew
without control over even the most basic aspects of life.  The imagery of a
feminized Jew in exile from the land of Israel can be traced back to the latter
                                                 
13 The categories of active/agent and passive/object also correspond to the origins of the proto-
Semitic noun-classification system.
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books of the Hebrew Bible. 14  For example, in Gender reversal and cosmic
chaos: A study on the Book of Ezekiel, Kamionkowski discusses the
representation of Jewish exiles and the relationship between gendered images of
men, women, and the divine.  She argues that the use of images of rape and sexual
violence are metaphorical images of the desolation of the Jewish people (men) in
exile.  Their separation from divine favor and the promised land of Israel places
them in the position of the female vis-à-vis agency and power.  In contrast, the
“new Israeli Jew” as a member of a Jewish nation with his own land (and
language) is the agent of his destiny.  He is the SUBJECT of the Israeli national
story, and the work of his life is in the service of his own nation.  The historical
dichotomy between the feminized Jew of the Diaspora and the redeemed and
“(re)masculinized” Jew of Zionist ideology is still evident in construction of the
normative Israeli citizen-self.
This historical dichotomy also interacts with ideologies regarding the roles
of men and women in the ongoing creation and support of the Israeli national
project.  Several feminist scholars have discussed the way that national ideologies
and research on the construction of nationality reproduce essentialized notions of
male and female citizenship roles.  In these constructions, women’s contributions
are conceived of as supportive, service roles, i.e. mothers and wives.  They are at
                                                 
14 One might argue that the association of person = male in the Israeli context, (or all of Western
culture for that matter), is ultimately derived from the representation of the individual Jew as
masculine in the Hebrew biblical and rabbinic texts.  I believe there is some validity to this
argument particularly when we consider that these texts were written in Hebrew and thus subject
to the problem of associating the unmarked MASCULINE grammatical category with the social
category masculine.  However, I caution readers from moving too far down this road, which can
lead to blaming all of patriarchy in Western societies on the Hebrew Bible.  See Frymer-Kensky
(1992) for a discussion of what I will call the Hebrew Bible patriarchy fallacy.
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once the care-takers of those who do the “real work” of nation building and the
ones who actually produce the nation through procreation (Yuval-Davis, 1997).
The gendered construction of Israeli citizenship and identity is also shaped by the
militarized nature of mainstream Israeli society.  On the ideological level, Jewish
Israeli women are “mothers,” and Jewish Israeli men are “solider-citizens”
(Bernstein, 1992; Weiss, 2003). There are several Israeli scholars who argue that
military service is a means of enacting Israeli citizenship for Jewish men, but
Jewish women enact Israeli citizenship primarily as wives and mothers
(Bernstein, 1987 and 1992; Kimmerling, 2001; Yishai, 1997).  Furthermore, many
feminist scholars view the pro-natalist and family-first policies as evidence that
women’s ability to birth new Israeli Jews is their most valuable contribution to the
ongoing reproduction of Israel as the Jewish national homeland (Kahn, 2000;
Safir, 1993; Solomon, 1993).
The ideological conception of Israel as the Jewish national homeland also
has significant practical implications regarding the legal, political and civil status
of women in mainstream Israeli society.  Several of the social and legal
institutions that shape mainstream Israeli Jewish society are committed to
honoring the authority of Orthodox Jewish religious law, halakha.  The
patriarchal values of halakha are evident in cultural and legal concepts of
normative masculine and feminine roles in society (Kadish, 2002; Swirski &
Safir, 1993b).  Halakha directly and indirectly shapes legal decisions by the civil
law making bodies regarding issues such as equal employment, reproductive
rights, family law, domestic violence, and women’s participation in public bodies
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(Eilam, 1993; Izraeli, 1993a; Kahn, 2000; Kamir, 2003 and 2004; Raday, 1983
and 1993a; Swirski, 1993b).  In spite of civil laws guaranteeing equal
employment, Israeli women are still expected to adhere to modes of behavior that
compromise their access to economic and political power (Agassi, 1993; Izraeli,
1993b; Pope, 1993; Raday, 1993b).
The state also grants religious law and legal institutions explicit authority
over issues of personal status; in the case of Jews, this means Orthodox Jewish
institutions.15   Orthodox Jewish laws, which do not construct women as full adult
members of Jewish communal society, constrain women’s agency with regard to
marriage and divorce, reproductive rights, legal status, and personal freedom
(Swirski & Safir, 1993b; Safir, 1993).  In the religious court system, women
cannot serve as primary witnesses or as judges because they are not included in
the definition of Jewish legal adult (Biale, 1984).  There are several significant
consequences of the laws that grant sole authority over marriage and divorce to
religious courts.  For example: (1) Jewish women are at the mercy of the religious
court system when they seek a divorce, even from abusive partners and (2) Jews
and non-Jews cannot marry legally in Israel.16
The Israeli feminist movement has developed in response to and in
negotiation with multiple aspects of the whole Israeli context including: language
                                                 
15 The decisions of civil bodies regarding gender equality affect all citizens and residents of the
state regardless of religious affiliation.  With regard to issues of personal status such as marriage,
the state recognizes the authority of the specific religious institutions to which a citizen belongs,
by birth or through accepted conversion.  For more information regarding the relationship between
civil and religious authority in Israel, see Samet, 1979.
16 Civil marriages performed in another national state, between men and women only, are
recognized as legally valid in Israel.  In chapter eight, I discuss how Israeli marriage laws
influenced one of my informant’s linguistic practices for reference to her non-Jewish husband.
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and gender ideologies in mainstream Hebrew-speaking culture, social structures
and institutions, legal and political policies, and identity politics.  The history of
the feminist movement in Israeli can be divided into at least two eras.  The pre-
state women’s movement for equal rights, which began in the early twenthieth
century with the second aliyah, was influenced by Zionist and socialist ideologies
(Azariyahu, 1980; Bernstein, 1987; Izraeli, 1981) and struggled against the way
women’s roles in the building of the state were limited to traditional feminine
endevours (Berstein 1992).  The modern women’s movement, which was initially
led by American and European immigrants, came into existence as an organized
socio-political movement in the late 1970’s and focused on fighting for women’s
rights in the modern era of gender equality (Ben Zvi, 1989; Freeman, 1990;
Swirski, 1993a, Yishai, 1997).
In Between the flag and the banner, Yishai (1997) wrote:
The political lives of women in Israel have been shaped by an acute
dilemma, a choice between their desire to foster national progress and
their quest for feminist self-fulfilment.  Women who wanted to play an
equal part in building the new homeland rejected sex as a basis for poltical
mobilization and interest aggregation; but those subject to sex
discrimination found themselves shut out of the national effort. (p. 1)17
The above statement addresses one of the primary forces in shaping the Israeli
feminist movement, the tension between participating in the Zionist project and
advancing women’s rights. The early women’s movement began with the
                                                 
17 In this passage and throughout Yishai’s book, the author often uses the term “Israeli women” to
refer to Jewish Israeli women.  Although she does occasionally address issues of ethnicity or
national identity, the use of the terms “women” or “Israeli women” to represent the dominant
cultural and political group is evidence of the way that Israeli mainstream ideologies of identity
are often limited to the Jewish citizens of the state.
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founding of agriculture and urban women workers’ collectives.  Their goal was to
create institutions that would support equality between male and female
contributions to the national project of creating the new Jewish State.  These early
feminist efforts had to combat essentialist concepts of male and female forms of
citizenship as well as the commitment of the early male political leaders to
honoring the status of Orthodox religious authority over personal status issues.
Although early Israeli feminists succeeded in guarrentteeing women the vote in
Israel, they did not succeed in preventing several policies that constrained the
women’s legal status in other contexts.  In Between the flag and the banner,
Yishai discusses how these early feminist initiatives were subsumed into the
larger national project and how Israel’s status as a “visionary democracy”
contributes to the ongoing struggle of Israeli women to negotiate between
Zionism and feminism as ideological frameworks for social change.
Israeli feminist ideologies and practices, particularly in the contemporary
women’s movement of the later twentieth century, also are shaped by the global
feminist agenda, which has been influenced significantly by North American and
European feminist communities.  In the early 1970’s there was a resurgence of the
Israeli women’s movement with a highly politicized vision of gender politics in
the Jewish State.  The contemporary Israeli feminist movement prioritizes a
feminist agenda, but it was, and continues to be, marginalized by the ideological
stance that until issues of national security are fully resolved, other social issues
must remain on the political back burner.  In addition, there is a pervasive
ideology within mainstream Israeli society, that the contemporary Israeli feminist
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movement is an imported social movement rather than a “homegrown” movement
addressing local issues.  Indeed, the Israel Women’s Network, the primary
independent feminist political policy and advocacy organization, was founded in
1984 by immigrant British feminist Alice Shalvi.  The first and only woman to be
elected as the representative of a women’s political party was also an English
speaking immigrant from the United States (Freeman, 1990).  These facts reify
the dominant ideological stance vis-à-vis feminism; however, most of the
grassroots organizations that engage in feminist consciousness raising have
always been informed by the agendas and ideologies of both immigrant and native
Israeli feminist women.  Over the last two decades, the leadership and staff of
many Israeli feminist organizations have slowly shifted towards native Israelis
and away from immigrant women.  Nonetheless, the impression of feminism as an
irrelevant and inauthentic ideological movement continues to shape attitudes
towards Israeli feminist practices to this day (Swirski & Safir, 1993a, Yishai,
1997).  This national ideological stance on the authenticity of Israeli feminism has
particular relevance to the issue of language reform.
2.4.2 Relevant facts of MIH grammar and contemporary practices of use
Modern Israeli Hebrew has a morphologically based system of gender
agreement with a semantic core.18  All nouns in Hebrew are assigned to either the
MASCULINE or FEMININE category; there is no neuter category.  The gender
categorization of nouns is reflected phonologically and morphologically in the
vowel and final consonant patterns.  Nouns assigned FEMININE gender usually
                                                 
18 See Corbett (1991) for a discussion of the different types of noun classification systems based
on grammatical gender.
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end with either a stressed /a/, /it/, /ut/, or /et/ and take the plural markers /ot/ or
/iyot/, e.g. dira – dirot, ‘apartment – apartments’ and parshanit – parshaniyot
‘commentator(F) – commentators(F).’  All other nouns in Hebrew are
MASCULINE and take the plural marker /im/, e.g. bakbuk – bakbukim ‘bottle –
bottles,’ sefer – sfarim ‘book – books,’ and parshan – parshanim
‘commentator(M) – commentators(M).’
The semantic assignment rules of Hebrew dictate that the apparent sex of
the referents of animate nouns determines their grammatical gender (Coffin &
Bolozky 2004, pp. 132-133).  Gender is assigned to the nouns in the semantic
residue, i.e. all nouns that have non-animate referents, according to the
phonological shape of the word and the morphological rules stated above.  Nouns
with male referents are always MASCULINE, and nouns with female referents
are always FEMININE, regardless of their morphological and phonological
forms, e.g. nashim  "women" is FEMININE despite its MASCULINE plural
ending. The MASCULINE is the unmarked grammatical category, thus referents
whose assigned gender is unknown or intentionally unspecified condition
MASCULINE gender agreement. Gender agreement on plural nominal and
pronominal forms used to refer to a group of animate or inanimate referents that
include members from both MASCULINE and FEMININE categories is
MASCULINE.
In reference to humans as social actors, speakers’ use of the rules for
grammatical gender assignment is complicated by associations between cultural
concepts of femininity and masculinity, on the one hand, and gender marking of
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nouns used to refer to types of social actors, on the other.  Exceptions to the rule
of MASCULINE = unmarked = generic demonstrate the manner in which social
meanings are embedded in the relationship between gender categories and
markedness in the use of the MIH system of grammatical gender.  In
contemporary (and earlier) uses of Hebrew, generic reference to many “types” of
social actors is FEMININE, for example, axot ‘nurse’ and zona ‘prostitute.’  The
generic use of the FEMININE for these nouns is conditioned by the social
experiences of Hebrew speakers and the cultural association between the work of
these social actors and “women’s work.”  These associations have consequences
for the use of many derived Hebrew nouns when referring to male social actors
engaged in the same work, because MIH is based on a root and pattern
morphological system.19  (See table 2.1 for an example of grammatical patterns
used to derive nouns from consonantal semantic roots.)
Assigning gender to animate nouns based on consonantal roots follows a
set pattern.  In discourse, the apparent sex of the referent(s) determines the
appropriate form according to the rules stated in the previous section.20  Table 2.1
shows examples of the derivation patterns for agentive nouns derived from verbal






















                                                 
19 See Jacobs (1997) for an examination of discussions within the Hebrew Language Academy
regarding the appropriate lexical term for reference to men engaged in sex-work.
20 See Coffin & Bolozky (2004), chapters five and six, for a more detailed explanation of how

















































Table 2.1 Derivation patterns for Hebrew nouns
The system of grammatical gender in Hebrew is not limited to assignment
of nouns to gender categories; it includes a set of rules that govern gender
agreement.  All verbs and adjectives must agree with their subject in gender.  The
exceptions to this rule are the plural form of the imperative, the second and third
person plurals in future, and the third person plural past forms of the verb.  The
third person past tense plural paradigm was reduced to one form prior to the
Biblical period of Hebrew.  In modern Israeli Hebrew, the imperative and future
plural FEMININE forms have all but dropped out of use, and the MASCULINE
forms are generally accepted as gender neutral.21  Finally, with respect to
pronouns, the second and third person pronouns must agree in gender with their
antecedents, and verbs and adjectives used with first person pronouns must agree
with the intended referent.  The agreement rules of gender marking in Hebrew
determine that the system serves a referential/predictive function as well as an
indexical function in discourse (Silverstein, 1985, p. 224).
                                                 
21 In chapter five, I discuss the use of the historical FEMININE forms by Israeli feminists.
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2.4.3 Contemporary practices and ideologies of language use in Israel
The “rules” governing the system of grammatical gender in MIH go a long
way to describing practices of language use observed in Israel, but certain gender-
based language reforms are slowly challenging the status quo.22  In my research, I
observed or had reported to me numerous instances when a mixed group of males
and females were addressed in the FEMININE, although this practice was
primarily limited to progressive institutions of learning and/or consciously
feminist settings.   Some speakers are beginning to take the relative number of
males and females into account when choosing how to address an audience.  The
fact that some speakers even perceive a choice is relatively new.  Nonetheless, the
majority of Israelis follow the rule that one male in a group of hundreds of
females dictates that the audience should be addressed or referred to in the
MASCULINE.23
Another difference between the rules for gender agreement in MIH and
their use by contemporary speakers of MIH occurs in conversational definite
reference to males and females.  In standard MIH, reference to females should
always be with FEMININE grammatical forms; however, I have noted the use of
                                                 
22 I use “rules” rather than rules without quotations in reference to the principles governing the
system of grammatical gender in MIH to highlight the relationship between the most descriptive
grammars of MIH and the prescriptive rules for the STANDARD use of MIH.  Given that my
dissertation is an examination of variation from the standard use of grammatical gender in MIH,
this issue is particularly salient to this work.  The Coffin & Bolozky (2004) grammar, cited in the
previous section, does include commentary regarding variations from the STANDARD.  If I were
to write a grammar of MIH based solely on data collected from the feminist community, it would
look very different, but it would nonetheless be a descriptive grammar of MIH.  I will return to the
ideology inherent in this issue vis-à-vis the social meaning of innovative uses of grammatical
gender in section 2.6 of this chapter.
23 The use of grammatical gender for reference to mixed gender groups is discussed in detail in
chapters five and six.
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MASCULINE forms, particularly plurals, in several contexts.  Most job titles are
in the MASCULINE regardless of the gender of the individual e.g. orex din
‘lawyer’ is used for both male and female lawyers in many contexts.  With regard
to plural reference, groups of females are often addressed or referred to with
MASCULINE forms, unless the fact of their gender is relevant to the task in
which they are engaged.  Thus, a classroom instructor is just as likely to use
MASCULINE forms as FEMININE forms to address an all-female group of
students, unless it is, for example, a course for new brides being taught in a
religious institution. In chapter five, I will discuss feminist language practices
regarding definite reference to females.
Tobin (2002) discusses a less widespread variation regarding gendered
terms of address in MIH.  The article presents examples of grammatical gender
indexing emotional solidarity or distance between speakers, of either gender, and
female addressees.  Tobin’s examples come from recorded conversations between
family members and language use in popular literary texts.  In all of his examples,
the MASCULINE grammatical terms were used to index emotional closeness and
the FEMININE terms were used to index emotional distance.24  In chapters five
and six, I demonstrate how Israeli feminist engage in a similar practice, but as the
reader might expect, the indexical meanings associated with the grammatical
                                                 
24 In the Israeli context, it is not surprising to find the metaphorical associations of MASCULINE
= unmarked = SUBJECT and FEMININE = marked = OTHER extended to include MASCULINE
= solidarity/inclusion and FEMININE = distance/exclusion.  These preexisting associations also
limit the use of the FEMININE to address males to a derogatory social meaning, except within the
Israeli gay community.  In section 2.6, I will return to Tobin’s sociocultural analysis of this
phenomenon in the context of research on language, gender, and ideology.  In chapter seven, I
discuss the my own analysis of indexical meanings of FEMININE and MASCULINE in the
mainstream and feminist Israeli social contexts.
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categories are reversed.  There are many other examples of variations between the
rules of MIH described in the previous section and contemporary uses of Hebrew
grammar, but these were the most relevant to my research.
In addition to the variations discussed above, I noted several changes in
public uses of language regarding gender agreement and a general trend in
advertising and service messages to use the "least gender specific" or "least
gender-biased" construction possible.  The motivation for these changes seems to
be a consciousness that as social roles shift and change, both male and female
consumers must feel that they are being addressed by the relevant literature.
Another factor in the push for using "non-gender specific" language came from a
section of the xok shivyon hizdamnuyot baavoda ‘Equal Employment
Opportunities Law’ passed in 1988, which stated that advertisements for jobs had
to explicitly include masculine and feminine terms of address.  Both the legislated
and market driven changes in language use can be seen as responses to feminist
activism around the issue of gender equality.  Below are four examples of
grammatical strategies employed to avoid gender pre-specification and the
contexts in which they are used.
1. Existential construction with the infinitive. Used mostly on product
labeling in instructions for use.
yesh   lehosif   avkat   marak    lemayim   rotxim
it is      to add   powder  soup         to water      boiling
‘one should add the soup mix to boiling water’
2. MASCULINE plural forms to address to singular referent of unknown
gender.  Used mostly for public service announcements, answering
machine messages, and written instructions for completing forms.
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shalom   hiatem         labayit    shel andrea
hello  (you)reached(M,P) the house of Andrea
‘Hi, you have reached Andrea's house’
na      lehashir hodaatxem
please to leave  message your (M,P)
‘please leave your message’
3. MASCULINE and FEMININE forms together with a slash much like the
he/she strategy in English.  Used in “help wanted” advertisements and
some official documents.25
darush/ah    meltsar/it   laavod bishot haerev
wanted(M/F) waiter/ress to work in hours the evening
‘Wanted. Waiter/ress to work evening hours.’
4. Using the construction “please” + infinitive, mostly found in written texts
or public service announcements.
na       lo     lizrok     niyarot   basherutim
please   NEG   to throw    paper       in the toilet
‘Please do not throw paper in the toilet’
As is evident, each of the above examples has fairly limited applications except
strategy two, using the MASCULINE plural.  Avoiding gender pre-specification
or the use of the MASCULINE as the generic is still difficult in most uses of
MIH, especially spoken discourse.
Prescriptivism and language ideology play significant roles in the
language socialization of Israelis.   Ideologies about grammatical correctness and
authentic Israeliness place a high premium on ivrit yafa ‘beautiful Hebrew.’
Articles lamenting the degradation of the Hebrew language by contemporary
                                                 
25 Note that in many cases the use of the SLASH form can result in the incorrect pronunciation of
the FEMININE form, as in “darusha” rather than “drusha.”
34
speakers are found regularly in the Israeli popular press.  For many years, those
who worked as broadcast journalists were subject to training courses on the
proper use of Hebrew grammar and censored for “mistakes.”  Gold (1989)
provides an historical overview of the sociolinguistic issues regarding language
policy and planning and linguistic rights of non-Hebrew-speaking minorities in
Israel, (though some information about programs for new immigrants was dated
vis-à-vis the sociolinguistic context within which I conducted my research).
Kuzar (2001) discusses in detail the ideological relationship between Jewish
Israeli nationalism and the revival of Hebrew as the modern language of Israel.
There have been a few important studies that examined the relationship
between language use and identity construction from a sociolinguistic perspective.
The works of Tamar Katriel (1986, 1991) and Daniel Lefkowitz (1995) present
detailed sociolinguistic analyses of the relationship between language use and
identity construction in the Israeli context.  These works create vivid picutres of
the ways that language use, language ideologies, and inter-ethnic linguistic
variation contribute to the creation of marked and unmarked Israeli identities.
Although neither researcher, examined the interplay of gender with other aspects
of social identity, their work helps to describe the primacy of language and
practices of language use in Zionist ideology and the construction of individual,
communal, and national identities in the Israeli context.
The rulings of the Hebrew Language Academy regarding “proper use of
Hebrew” as well as history of the institution itself also illustrate the power of
ethno-nationalist and prescriptivist ideologies in contemporary Israel (Jacobs
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1997).26  Ha’akademiya Lalashon Ha’ivrit ‘The Hebrew Language Academy’
(hereafter HLA or the Academy) was founded by the Israeli Government in 1953.
The Academy consists of a number of committees, whose members include
prominent Hebrew scholars, sociologists, and linguists.  The HLA is the official,
publicly funded, and government mandated institution charged with making
grammatical rulings on usage, coining new terms, and clarifying other linguistic
and sociolinguistic issues.  Regarding the issue of grammatical gender agreement
and innovative practices for reference to animate (human referents), the Academy
takes the position that agreement paradigms should be consistent regardless of
whether the referents are animate or inanimate.
One cannot give power to issues of grammar over the manner in which the
community thinks.  Looking at Finish, Swedish and Turkish with respect
to gender in the language tells us nothing about the status of women in
those cultures.  There can be changes in language and changes in society,
but one has nothing to do with the other. (HLA letter quoted in Jacobs
1997, p. 67)
The rulings of the HLA do not necessarily affect speakers’ daily use of language,
but they are reflected in the pedagogical texts, such as lamed leshonxa ‘teach(M)
your (M) language’ a text used in elementary schools, and other social contexts in
which the proper use of language is expected or encouraged.27
To date there has been some sociolinguistic examination of issues of
language and gender in the Israeli context from a feminist sociolinguistic
                                                 
26 The HLA website, http://hebrew-academy.huji.ac.il/,  contains information on the various
committees of the Academy, its rulings, the journal Leshonaynu ‘Our language,’ and a history of
the institution.
27 Note the use of the singular MASCULINE forms in the title of the text.  The use of language in
this book and other education texts was the topic of debate within the Education ministry during
the tenure of the former Member of Knesset Shulamit Aloni, in the mid-1990’s.
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perspective.  A “Lakoffesque” early article by Shalva Weil (1983) detailed
impressionistic data on male and female differences in language use.  More
theoretical examinations of language and gender issues, particularly the use of
grammatical gender and masculine generics have primarily, though not
exclusively, focused on written uses of language (Ariel 1986, 1988; Ariel & Giora
1998; Muchnik 1992). Some of these studies used psycholingusitic experiments to
test the affect of MASCULINE generic reference on male and female learning
(Avrahami-Einat, 1989; Meir, 1979).  The results of these studies do not differ
significantly from research done with English speakers regarding the failure of
speakers to interpret consistently generic uses of HE as inclusive (Ervin, 1962;
McConnell-Ginet, 1979; MacKay & Fulkerson 1979; Martyna, 1978 and 1980;
Mathiot, 1979).
The issue of gender, generics and language use in Israeli textbooks was
also the subject of discussion and research by the Israeli Ministry of Education
and the Israel Women’s Network.  These two institutions, influenced by feminist
academics, issued reports on the male-bias of many educational materials used in
the Israeli public school system (Malchiel & Pradkin 1980; Shachar & Avrahami-
Einat 1993).  Language, gender and gender-bias in the use of Modern Israeli
Hebrew has also slowly been raised as a topic of debate in the Israeli press.  At
first, the issue was mostly addressed in popular feminist periodicals (Ariel, 1989),
but more recently it has gained attention in mainstream magazines and
newspapers (Harel, 1996; Mor, 2004; Na’or, 1996; Oryan, 1997).
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2.5 INDEXICALITY AND CONTEXTS OF USE
As demonstrated in the previous section, the social meaning of gender and
contemporary Israeli practices of language use has been the topic of discussion in
both the feminist and mainstream Israeli communities of practice.  However
changes in practices of language use, such as those described in 2.4.2, index
different social meanings in the Israeli communities of practice outlined in figures
2.1 and 2.2.  Thus, the concept of indexicality (Ochs 1992) was central to my
analysis of the quantitative data.  To understand the pragmatic and social
relevance of my informants’ linguistic practices, it was necessary to investigate
the indexical meaning of their behavior in the socio-cultural contexts described in
the previous sections.  Cameron’s (1990) theoretical critique of the quantitative
analytical paradigms of early sociolinguistic research, such as those presented in
Labov (1972), Trudgill (1978), and Milroy (1980), pushed me to look beyond
demographic correlation in my investigation of the social meanings of language
variation within the feminist community.  Thus my research is theoretically closer
to more recent work on gender-based sociolinguistic variation (Bucholtz & Hall
(Eds.), 1995; Bucholtz, Liang, & Sutton (Eds.), 1999; Eckert, 1999).  This more
recent work has come problematize the assumption that speakers’ identification
with a community of practice can be “read” in a direct fashion from their
consistent or inconsistent use of the ideologized linguistic elements or practices
associated with that community.
In her article “Indexing Gender,” Ochs (1992) presents a model of how
speakers make use of their repertoire of linguistic and social practices to enact
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gendered stances or social identities.  She explores how particular practices
become linked to cultural concepts of femininity or masculinity within a
community and become part of a shared repertoire of gender associated practices.
Speakers enact their gender identities in the context of social interactions, in part,
through the use of these shared linguistic and communal practices linked to
specific stances and/or social identities.  A speaker makes use of her full linguistic
and cultural repertoire to perform a particular identity or stance.  Her interlocutors
use the shared set of associations to “read” her performance of the particular
stance or identity it indexes.  Ochs’ model is an important theoretical advance in
the context of language and gender studies.  It is one of the theoretical models that
moved sociolinguistic research beyond essentialist views of female and male
language use by actualizing the theoretical claim that gender and gender identities
are socially constructed and can be continuously negotiated.
Ochs addresses the importance of the shared nature of the sociolinguistic
repertoire in terms of speakers and hearers ability to interpret “correctly” the
social meaning of linguistic and social practices.  In my research, I use Ochs’
model to explore the complexity of indexicality in a multi-level society where
there are intersecting but not always mutually meaningful associations between
specific linguistic practices and socio-cultural stances or identities.  My approach
considers that the women in the Israeli feminist community are members who
must negotiate their social identities in the multiplicity of contexts active in any
given sociolinguistic act or interaction.  I developed a set of socially meaningful
criteria that I used to evaluate the relative indexical “value” of each morpho-
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semantic variable as a marker of feminist identity or ideology in the different
communities of practice in which Israeli feminists participate.  These criteria
consider the sociolinguistic meanings and relative salience of the linguistic
practices associated with feminist Hebrew and gendered socio-political stances
for both feminist and mainstream Contemporary Israeli Hebrew (CIH) speakers.28
I use this expanded model of indexicality to address the fact that the women in my
study are members of multiple communities of practice and they use language to
skillfully negotiate issues of identity as they move in and between these
communities.  I stress the importance of examining the multiplicity of the possible
associations available to both speakers and hearers when we attempt to define the
relationship between the collective social identity of a community of speakers and
the language use practices of its members.
This approach allows me to explain the social meaning of the observable
variation between conventional and feminist practices of language use rather than
simply describe the social identities of those who are identified as feminists by
their use of a particular set of linguistic practices.  My approach also provides a
vehicle for examining the socio-communal meaning of observable intra-speaker
and inter-speaker variation within a particular community of practice that does not
                                                 
28 Following the practice used by Hebrew scholars to distinguish between different historical and
socio-cultural periods of language use, I use the term “Contemporary Israeli Hebrew” to
distinguish between the grammar of Modern Israeli Hebrew as it was developed in the late
nineteenth century and the Hebrew language as it has developed over the one hundred plus years
of use as the primary language of the State of Israel.  The grammar of Contemporary Israeli
Hebrew (CIH) includes several changes to the syntax and lexicon as well as the simplification of
many grammatical agreement paradigms such as those described in this chapter and elsewhere in
the dissertation.  Throughout the dissertation, I use both MIH and CIH.  MIH refers to the
prescriptive grammar taught in schools, which adheres to the rules as they were developed by Ben
Yehuda and those who reinvented Hebrew as a modern spoken language.
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assume that those who use specific features more than others are more feminist
than those who do not.
In chapter eight, I combine these theoretical perspectives on language use
and identity construction with W.E.B. DuBois’ (1903) concept of double
consciousness to analyze the sociolinguistic strategies and ideological claims of
two of my informants.  The goal of this analysis is to develop a theoretical
framework for examining the relationship between linguistic innovation and
ideologically motivated movements of social change.  As such, I questioned the
practice of labeling certain types of language change or linguistic variation as
“natural” and others as “ideological.”
Eckert and McConnell-Ginet’s (1992) synthesis of power and difference
based approaches to issues of language and gender, in “Think practically and look
locally: Language and gender as community based practice,” also informed my
understanding of Israeli feminist Hebrew as both a form of socio-political protest
and a means of creating and supporting Israeli feminist culture and community.  I
used the concept of “symbolic privilege,” as they defined it, to discuss the
relationship between MIH conventional practices of language use and Israeli
concepts of normative masculinity and femininity (pp. 483-487).  My analysis of
this data was also heavily influenced by the concept of language use as social act.
In particular, Cameron’s (1990) discussion of American feminists language
practices helped me to move from the discussion of language as a symbolic tool
of social change to a recognition of my informants’ strategic uses of language as
acts of feminist resistance in and of themselves.
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2.6 LANGUAGE IDEOLOGY, GENDER AND FEMINIST PRACTICE
My analysis of this metalinguistic data was also influenced by research on
the processes of language ideology and theories regarding the relationship
between linguistic categories and cultural concepts.  The manner in which Israeli
feminists use language to negotiate their identity and talk about the relationship
between language use and women’s status revealed a great deal about the
processes by which grammatical categories are linked to socio-cultural concepts.
In his foundational work on language and thought, Whorf (1956) spoke of the
relationship between two types of grammatical categories: covert and overt.  He
went on to develop a set of terms to explain the relationship between these two
types of grammatical categories and how they convey grammatical meaning.29
Whorf called overt categories phenotypes because their grammatical meaning
(function) is available to analysis by speakers of a language.  The covert
categories are cryptotypes because the grammatical meaning of these types is
hidden, distinguished only in contrast with other forms.  Regarding our ability to
understand the meanings of linguistic forms related to overt and covert categories,
he made the following observation:
The meaning of a PHENOTYPE, though ostensibly plain, can really not
be understood in all its subtlety until the crytptypes that go with it have
been dredged up from their submerged state and their effective meanings
to an extent brought into consciousness.  Thereupon the same phenotype
with different cryptotypes, and vice versa, result in a more pronounced
consciousness and clearer understanding of the phenotype itself.  (Whorf
in Carroll, 1956, p. 109)
                                                 
29 See Jacobs 1993 (especially pp. 9-67) for an indepth discussion of Whorf’s foundational work
and its relationship to research on grammatical gender, generics, and language ideology.
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The question inherent in Whorf’s description of the relationship between
phenotypes and cryptotypes is how might these associated meanings be “dredged
up from their submerged state …[and] brought into consciuosness.”  Certainly
Whorf’s focus was on the function meaning of forms in a grammatical sense of
the word “functional.”  However, I use his discussion of phenotypes and
cyrptotypes to discuss the social indexical and referential function of linguistic
forms in different contexts.  I ask what types of socio-cultural phenomena might
create the right conditions for this consciousness raising about the full “meanings’
of grammatical forms.
Irvine and Gal (2000), in the article “Language ideologies and linguistic
differentiation,” argue that “linguistic differentiation crucially involves
ideologically embedded and socially constructed  processes,” (p. 74).  They
identify three semiotic processes, iconization, fractal recursivity, and erasure, by
which speakers ideologize relationships between practices of language use and
communities of speakers.  Their empirical examples focused on the manner in
which language change occurred as a result of contact between colonial and
indigenous peoples.  I found that the semiotic process of iconization and erasure
were very useful for discussing how Israeli feminists and other CIH speakers
related to feminist and standard varieties of MIH.  The manner in which different
concepts of masculinity and femininity become linked to MASCULINE and
FEMININE forms in the prescribed standard variety of MIH supports the iconic
relationship between the phenotypes and cryptotypes  associated with gendered
linguistic forms and the socio-cultually defined categories of masculine and
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feminine.  This process of iconization then serves to erase (1) the conditions in
which these associations were formed, (i.e. sexist societies) and (2) other possible
indexical meanings of gendered forms (e.g. the Hebrew word ‘ozeret’
‘aide/helper(F)’ through the iconic relationship between the FEMININE and the
feminine categories and the differentiation between men’s and women’s ways of
helping, leads most Israeli Hebrew speakers to understand the term as “domestic
helper/maid”; thus, the possibility of using it as the parallel title for a woman
working as a political aide is erased).
With respect to the social meanings encoded in the use of grammatical
gender, I want to briefly return to Tobin’s examination of “gender switch” in
contemporary Israeli Hebrew.  In his analysis , Tobin used Hofstadter’s (1997)
concept of “freeness envy” (which was developed to explain the use of
MASCULINE terms associated with camaraderie for reference to women, e.g.
guys), and  Morris’s (2000) concept of the greater spatial/physical power
associated with the MASCULINE category, (based on an examination of the
inanimate nouns associated with MASCULINE pronouns in English), to explain
why the MASCULINE category in the Hebrew system was more likely than the
FEMININE category to be used to index solidarity.  However, in his discussion of
these theories and his own synthesis of them to explain the phenomena in
Hebrew, he does not overtly discuss the sexist context of Israeli society within
which these gender reversals take place.  When I asked whether Tobin thought the
gender switch I found in feminist uses of Hebrew might be related to the
phenomena he studies, his response was that he did not see a direct parallel.
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The gender switch that I discuss is fundamentally individual and
unconscious: people are not always aware that they are doing it and they
may even be surprised when you point it out to them.  And, oftentimes, if
they are aware that they are doing it, they think it is totally idiosyncratic:
i.e. they are the only ones who are doing it.  Furthermore, it is done
naturally by children and adults alike for emotional reasons without any
conscious ideological motivations or implications.  On the other hand, the
phenomena you are discussing are much more conscious and ideologically
motivated in their origin, function  and purpose for society in general as
perceived by a specific socio-political group.  (Y. Tobin personal
communication, August 2004.)
What is of interest to me is this distinction between “unconscious” linguistic
behavior and “ideologically motivated” linguistic behavior.  Certainly, Israeli
feminist practices of language use are ideologcially motivated in so far as the
women who engage in these practices are connected by a common ideological
stance regarding the reproduction of sexism in Israeli society.  However, in this
dissertation, I will argue that this ideological motivation conditions my informants
habitual uses of language in the same ways that cultural ideological associations
between the masculine (socio-cultural) and the normative Israeli SELF condition
phenomena such as the one that Tobin (2001) investigated.  The primary
difference between the two phenomena is the symbolic privilege that conventional
and standard practices enjoy which erases their connection to the ideological
stance of male=SELF and female = OTHER.
Many discussions about innovative uses of language differentiate between
the “natural” or “unconscious” variation in language use and “conscious” or
“ideologically motivated” language variation, such as the practices I found in the
Israeli feminist community.  The latter are often dismissed as imposed changes
not related directly to the linguistic systems themselves but to ideology and its
45
misplaced blame of social inequality on the referential systems of language.
Silverstein (1985) discusses the manner in which native speaker ideologies about
the relationship between language and the “real world” resulted American
feminists wrongly locating the linguistic index of social gender stratification in
the pronominal system of English rather than in what he called the “indexical
statistical tendency of language use” (p. 252).  The statistical tendency of
language use is not, as the reader might guess, the statistically higher use of
MASCULINE forms for generic reference; rather, it refers to the sociolinguistic
variation between male and female uses of language as reported in the work of
sociolinguists such as Labov(1972) and Trudgill (1978).
Silverstein’s analysis accounts for the feminist “mistake” by discussing
the way speakers misanalyze the asymmetrical use of the gendered pronominal
forms as a representation of the power differential between men and women.  He
explains that it is actually the interaction between the phenotypes  and cryptotypes
(to use Whorf’s language) of gender and their interaction with the cryptotype of
animacy markedness as a related grammatical system of classification that leads
to the asymmetrical use of MASCULINE forms and the metaphorical association
of the social status of males with the unmarked status of the MASCULINE
grammatical category.  He goes on to state that “the ideological location of the
cause of this metaphorical relationship demonstrates perhaps the most
characteristic ‘distorting’ effects in the mode of operation of ideologies of social
forms like language” (pp. 240-241).  Silverstein’s analysis certainly applies to
much of the early feminist writing on the issue of language and gender (Spender
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1980; Penelope 1990) that blamed aspects of sexism on the inherent male-bias of
language.  However, I would argue that Silverstein’s analysis of feminist practices
is flawed because he too fell victim to the process of erasure when he failed
compare the ideological implications of standard practices with those used by the
American feminists.  He focused too much on form and not enough on the
function of feminist innovative practices.30
In my analysis, I considered the metalinguistic discourse of the women in
my study to examine the ideological “rationalizations” they have for language use
but also to reevaluate theoretical concepts regarding the limits of awareness that
govern a speaker’s understanding and use of her language.  As many linguistic
theorists have remarked, it is not surprising to find that within communities that
are dominated by male-biased concepts of gendered social relationships, the
MASCULINE forms are prescribed for generic or inclusive reference.  Therefore,
I will argue that it should not be surprising to find that within feminist
communities speakers use language to enact an ideology that values gender
equality and/or attempts to address the second-class status of women in the
dominant socio-cultural milieu.  Furthermore, I will argue that linguistic
innovation is likely to be an inherent aspect of social change movements because
language use is a social act in and of itself.  Feminist language practices are not
simply “reflections” of feminist ideology and consciously guided uses of language
to enact that ideology, but rather the use of language to negotiate the
                                                 
30 See Jacobs 1993, pp. 39-67 for a detailed discussion of Silverstein’s (1985) analysis of
American feminist language practices.
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representation of a coherent feminist social self within sexist socio-cultural
contexts.
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Chapter III: Defining Israeli feminist language practice: Methods
of investigation and analysis
3.1 DEVELOPING A RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
At the earliest stages of developing my research agenda, I was guided by a
desire to test the conclusions of those who had examined the generic uses of
MASCULINE forms in American English.  In particular, I was influenced by the
psycholinguistic research of Crawford and English (1984), MacKay and
Fulkerson (1979), MacKay and Konishi (1980), and Martyna (1980) on the failure
of generic HE to function as a true generic in American English.  Their findings
shaped my initial thoughts about how to investigate the relationship between the
use of grammatical gender in MIH and sociolinguistic practices related to issues
of gender equality.  I was interested in the ways that the structural differences
between English and Hebrew might affect speakers’ use and interpretation of
MASCULINE generics.  I also wanted to investigate how the grammatical
parameters of MIH and conventional practices of language use might shape a
speaker’s understanding of his/her language and strategies for expressing her/his
individual experience of lived reality.  Thus, I chose to use sociolinguistic and
ethnographic methods to collect data on language use practices and attitudes
among CIH speakers, with a particular focus on feminist attempts at language
reform.
I used models of quantitative and qualitative sociolinguistic research on
language variation to develop the initial methods for research and data collection.
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As noted in chapter two, feminist critiques of language and linguistic research
methods, which have guided empirical and theoretical investigations of language
and gender over the past twenty years, also informed my methodology.  I
designed a research program that would locate Israeli feminist practices in the
larger sociolinguistic context of mainstream Israeli society.  As described in
chapter two, I identified several interconnected sociolinguistic contexts that were
relevant to my research.  Of these communities, three were immediately relevant
to the collection of sociolinguistic data in the Israeli context.  These were the
macro-community of Israeli Hebrew-speaking society, the larger community of
the Israeli feminist movement, and the micro-communities of local feminist
organizations or centers.  (See section 2.3 for representation of how these
communities were defined.)
As I describe in sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4, defining these three levels of
sociolinguistic contexts as communities of practice helped to determine the
methods and stages I used for data collection.  At each stage of data collection, I
was interested in both linguistic behavior and metalinguistic discourse on
language and gender.  At the macro-level of mainstream Hebrew-speaking Israeli
society, I was concerned with developing a realistic picture of conventional
practices of language use and commonly held Israeli language ideologies.  The
second stage of my research took place in the micro-context of a local feminist
organization.  I used participant observation to develop a preliminary description
of the differences between conventional practices of language use and the
linguistic behavior that marked feminist language practices.  The final stage of my
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research was an in-depth study of feminist language use practices and the role of
language within the large Israeli feminist community.  In this stage, I recorded
conversations with members of several different micro-communities of local
feminist communities as well as women engaged in feminist work with national
reach.  (The analysis of this recorded data, which includes linguistic behavior and
metalinguistic discourse, is the primary focus of the analytical chapters of this
dissertation.)
The remainder of this chapter is divided into six sections.  Sections 3.2
through 3.4 contain descriptions of the methods I used to collect data at each stage
of my research.  In section 3.5, I introduce the reader to the fifteen women who
were interviewed during the final stage of research and data collection. The
introduction to my informants is followed by a description of the protocols used
to interview the study participants.  The final section presents the methods I used
to analyze the behavioral and ideological data collected from these sixteen
women.
3.2 DATA COLLECTION AT THE MACRO-LEVEL OF HEBREW-SPEAKING
ISRAELI SOCIETY
The Hebrew Language Academy, an institution designed to promote the
continued development of Israeli Hebrew, was the perfect place to begin my
research on conventional language practices and discourse regarding language
and gender in the meta-context of Israel society.31  In the spring of 1996, I began
my field research by examining how the Hebrew Language Academy (HLA) dealt
                                                 
31 See chapter two, section 2.4, for a description of the HLA’s history and its role in language
prescription in contemporary Israel.
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with the issue of grammatical gender, language use, and perceived gender
discrimination.  As discussed in 2.4.3, the HLA consists of a number of
committees, whose members include prominent Hebrew scholars, sociologists,
and linguists.  The Academy also serves as a resource for individuals or
institutions researching the development of Modern Israeli Hebrew or looking for
the best way to express a concept or name a new object, such as the answering
machine.  Its archives are open to the public and accessible to anyone interested in
researching the role of the Academy and its rulings on language use in Israel.  The
HLA publishes a journal Leshoneinu, ‘Our Language,’ that includes selected
responses to particularly interesting inquiries and new rulings of the Academy.
My initial motivation for meeting with members of the HLA was to
investigate a rumor that the Academy had issued a ruling allowing the
FEMININE plural to be used in reference to groups in which females out
numbered males.  Though I had not observed this practice in actual speech, I was
interested in speaking with members of the HLA about the motivation for this
change.  I discovered that the HLA had not made any such ruling and had in fact
issued a retraction in response to the rumor. (I subsequently learned that this
rumor had been circulating in one form or another since the mid-1980’s and that
despite a printed retraction by the HLA, the rumor continued to circulate.)  Dr.
Gabriel Birenbaum of the HLA spoke with me and offered to allow me to search
the Academy’s archives for examples of queries from the public regarding issues
of grammatical gender and sexist practices of language use.  I also had several
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conversations with Dr. Birenbaum’s staff, those responsible for responding to
questions about language use.
I collected samples of the correspondence between the HLA and the
public regarding the use of grammatical gender.  Several of the letters addressed
the “inherent sexism” (the letter writers’ wording) of using MASCULINE plural
forms for inclusive reference, particularly when there were more women than men
in the referent group.  There were also requests, from both men and women, about
the best way to avoid the implication of sexism in texts.  Some of the letters
advocated that the HLA officially support the explicit use of both MASCULINE
and FEMININE forms for generic reference in educational texts and other
institutional state settings.  Letters requesting clarification about the “correct” use
of gender terms for specific nouns included an impassioned plea from one woman
for the HLA to issue an official ruling that would replace the word baal with the
word ish for reference to male marital partners.32  I also examined the minutes
from some meetings of the committee on language and sociology during which
queries related to language and gender had been discussed.  My research at the
HLA gave me a clear sense of the types of issues that were being raised regarding
language and gender as well as the attitude of the establishment.33   The response
of the HLA to questions from the public provided me with valuable insight into
                                                 
32 The literal meaning of the Hebrew word baal, which is used conventionally for ‘husband,’ is
‘owner’ and both meanings are productive in contemporary Israeli Hebrew usage.  As the reader
might imagine the connotations of the word are problematic for many women.  (See section 3.3
for a discussion of the way this term was ideologized by members of the feminist community.)
The term ish literally ‘man’ is the parallel to the word isha used to mean both ‘woman’ and ‘wife.’
In Hebrew Biblical texts ish is the primary word used to mean ‘husband.’
33 See Jacobs (1997) for an examination the HLA’s response to questions regarding sexist
practices of language use.
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the way Modern Israeli Hebrew speakers must depend on cultural knowledge to
interpret the use of MASCULINE forms as inclusive or exclusive.  The data I
gathered indicated that the use of MASCULINE generics and inclusive plurals
was a publicly debated issue in Israeli society, or at least segments of the
population.
After researching the issue of language and gender at the Hebrew
Language Academy, I turned to examining how the Israel Women’s Network
(IWN), a national feminist advocacy and watchdog organization, dealt with issues
related to language use and sexism. 34  The archives and library of the IWN served
as a resource to the public for research on feminist issues.  I collected samples of
correspondence between the IWN and other agencies regarding issues of language
use, as well as campaign and promotional literature produced by feminist
organizations.  The IWN had a program of monitoring feminist issues in the
media.  Among the various examples of sexism within the media were articles and
editorials that discussed language use and the treatment of women.  These articles
helped me to gain a picture of how the issue of language use and women’s status
was treated by the popular press.35  All of these materials contributed to my
developing sense of how the Israeli feminist community viewed the issue and
gave me a starting point for my investigation of feminist language use practices.
In addition to data collected from the archives of the HLA and the IWN, I
also examined natural language use in the macro-community of Israeli Hebrew
                                                 
34 The Israel Women’s Network website www.iwn.org.il/iwn.asp provides a comprehensive
survey of the various research and policy programs that the organization undertakes.
35 Chapter two cites some of these articles.
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speakers.36  As a fluent Hebrew speaker, I conducted most of my daily life in
Hebrew.  My everyday interactions in Israel provided me with many opportunities
to observe language use in mixed-gender and all female contexts. The data
collected at this stage of the research consisted of field notes on both men’s and
women’s use of MASCULINE generics and the construction of gender-neutral
expressions by speakers of CIH.  I looked for evidence of variations from the
prescriptive standard in the use of grammatical gender by observing language use
in conversations at supermarkets, bus stations, shopping malls, museums,
university campuses, and other public places of interaction.  I also observed
language use in more formal contexts, such as primary and elementary school
classrooms, university lectures, public lectures, and radio and television
broadcasts.  I did not conduct a systematic sociolinguistic study of language use in
any of these contexts; rather, I noted overall practices related to the use of
grammatical gender.
My notes and observations focused on those practices that clearly differed
from the prescribed rules for gender agreement as I had learned them.  For
example, I noted that both male and female speakers used MASCULINE plural
forms to address all female audiences in a variety of socio-cultural contexts.  I
also observed that some male and female speakers tried to mitigate the apparent
male-bias of conventional language practices through innovative uses of
                                                 
36 The observations of language use in the larger community of Jewish Israeli Hebrew speakers
took place over the course of four years and two trips to Israel.  The first trip was between 10/93
and 8/94.  I volunteered in two separate educational settings during that period of time.  I returned
to Israel in January of 1996 and continued my research on language use during the three years that
I lived and worked in Jerusalem until December of 1998.
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grammatical gender.37  Several of the innovative practices I encountered in the
mainstream context were ideologically linked to the Israeli feminist socio-
political agenda.  I discussed many of my findings with Israeli linguists,
particularly those practices that seemed to overtly violate the rules for gender
agreement in MIH.  In chapter two, section 2.4, I discuss my findings and
describe the primary differences between prescriptive rules for the use of
grammatical gender and the conventional practices of language use that I
observed.
During this initial period of research, I discussed some of my findings
regarding gender and language use with Dr. Yael Meschler, a native Israeli
sociolinguist.38  She contributed the following story.  Her kindergarten-aged
daughter came home from school one day and began telling her about the day.  In
the context of an impersonal expression, her daughter used ata ‘you (M)’ rather
than at ‘you (F).’  Yael asked her daughter why she had used ata.  She then
corrected her daughter’s usage, instructing her to use at, the FEMININE form of
the second person.  She said that she later realized her daughter had used “correct
Hebrew” and that by instructing her daughter to use at, she had taught her
“feminist Hebrew.” Yael identified this particular linguistic practice – using the
FEMININE form of the singular impersonal – as part of a larger set of language
use practices that appeared to be associated with the Israeli feminist movement.
                                                 
37 Jacobs (2003) “Between meshivon and mazkira elektronit: Mapping the gendered landscape of
contemporary Jewish Israeli society through language use” was a paper on this topic presented at
the 2003 Annual meetings of the Association of Jewish Studies.
38 At the time of my research, in 1996, Dr. Meschler was at Hebrew University.  She is now at the
University of Haifa in the department of communications.  Dr. Meschler gave me permission to
use this story and the content of our conversations in my dissertation.
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Her use of the label “feminist Hebrew” in reference to this practice resonated with
my own observations of a link between certain language practices and women
who identified as feminists.  Women in the feminist community seemed to share a
set of innovative language practices and attitudes that were distinct from
conventional uses of CIH.  At this point, I narrowed the focus of my research to
defining the parameters of these innovative linguistic practices and their
relationship to enacting a feminist social and political identity.
3.3 PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION IN THE FEMINIST COMMUNITY
In July of 1996, after my conversation with Dr. Meschler, I was hired as a
part-time grant writer and overseas development coordinator for a grassroots
Israeli feminist organization.39  This organization ran a women’s resource center,
educational outreach programs, and an art gallery with rotating exhibits that
addressed feminist issues.  It also coordinated local feminist activist efforts such
as vigils against domestic violence at which they publicized the number of women
in Israel who were murdered each week by domestic partners or family members.
The Jerusalem center also provided space and organizational overhead for several
other feminist organizations, including a rape crisis center, a lesbian activist
collective, a women’s empowerment project, and an independently organized
support group for women from local Haredi communities.40   The staff was
ethnically diverse and included women from both working class and middle-class
                                                 
39 In Israel, a significant portion of the funding for non-profit social change organizations comes
from abroad.  Thus, they often hire native English speakers with grant-writing experience to fill
development positions.  My position as the grant-writer at this feminist center allowed me to make
a contribution to the community while observing language use in a feminist context.
40 The term Haredi refers to the ultra-Orthodox Jewish religious communities.
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backgrounds.41  Most of the staff at the center were native Hebrew speakers; thus,
staff meetings and daily interactions took place in Hebrew.  All of the employees
at the center were women between the ages of eighteen and sixty.
As a staff member of this mid-sized women’s organization, I had the
opportunity to observe linguistic behavior as well as metalinguistic discourse
about the role of language in Israeli gender politics.  The executive director was
aware of my interest in language and gender, and we often discussed her
perspectives on the issues.  Most of the other staff members knew that I was an
American graduate student interested in the Israeli feminist movement, but they
did not know the specific topic of my research.  I used field notes as a means of
tracking innovative linguistic practices and recording metalinguistic commentary
about aspects of language use that occurred naturally in the context of conducting
the organization’s business.  Occasionally, my coworkers overtly discussed the
relationship between women’s status and “sexist” practices of language use in
Israel.  In one staff meeting, the issue of language use in the outgoing message on
the organization’s answering machine was raised.  The discussion led to a longer
conversation about voice-mail messages, terms of address, and the specific or
implied inclusion of women in MASCULINE terms of address.  While discussing
the organization’s project on domestic violence issues, a coworker raised the issue
                                                 
41 In the Israeli context, the concept of ethnicity is distinguished from “nationality” such that
“ethnicity” is constructed as variation within defined national/religious communities and
“nationality” is used to differentiate between Arabs and Jews or Jews and Christians.  Thus, when
I state that the staff of an organization was ehtnically diverse, I am referring to the fact that
although all the women were Jewish, they came from Ashkenazi, European Sepharadi, and
Mizrachi backgrounds.  (See Lefkowitz (1995) for a discussion of these terms and the construction
of nationality and ethnicity in the Israeli context.)
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of the language used to refer to women’s domestic partners.  The question was
whether to use the conventional word ba’al ‘husband/owner,’ the term readily
understood by mainstream Israelis, or the alternative ben zug ‘male partner,’ the
term preferred in feminist contexts.  When these conversations took place during
staff meetings, I sometimes offered my opinion, but I primarily observed the
stances taken by the other women on the staff.  These conversations contributed to
my developing sense of the relationship between feminist ideological issues,
issues of intelligibility, and language use choices.
Several aspects of my coworkers’ linguistic behavior appeared as obvious
attempts to avoid using the MASCULINE generic.  I began to collect examples of
the specific practices that marked my coworkers’ use of language as distinct from
that of other CIH speakers I encountered.  The collection quickly became a
catalog of different innovative practices.  They primarily centered on challenging
the practice of using the MASCULINE as the unmarked and/or avoiding
ideologically loaded lexical or grammatical expressions.  I also observed that
women at the organization policed their own language use and that of other
women at the center through overt correction or metalinguistic comments.  For
example, in a conversation about whether to use the term baal or its alternatives,
one staff member stated, “isha she mishtameshet bamila baali az hu beemet
habaal shela.” ‘A woman who uses the word ba’ali (my husband), so he is truly
her owner.”  (See footnote in section 3.2 regarding the dual meaning of the word
baal.)  I also observed women at the center making ideological statements of this
type about the use of FEMININE or MASCULINE forms for job titles and terms
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of address.  In addition, I noted several occasions that other members of the staff
used more feminist alternative forms when the executive director was a
participant in the conversation or was simply present in the room where the
conversation took place.  The executive director used feminist forms fairly
consistently, and it seemed clear that her linguistic practices and ideology
implicitly encourage others to use feminist alternative forms.  These interactions
provided evidence of communal language socialization.
The observable variation in the language use of my coworkers also
demonstrated the extent to which their behavior was influenced by the language
use norms of at least two communities of practice, the macro-community of
Israeli society and the community of the Israeli feminist movement.  For example,
the linguistic choices of the administrative coordinator varied considerably
depending on the person with whom she was interacting and the “work” her talk
needed to accomplish.  In telephone conversations with vendors, bank clerks and
postal workers, she tended to use more conventional forms.  During staff meetings
or in conversations with the organizational director, she tended to use the feminist
alternatives.  Yael’s remark about feminist Hebrew as a collection of innovative
or alternative practices was clearly substantiated by my coworkers’ use of
language.  I decided to expand my research to include a larger sample of women
in the feminist community and to collect recorded samples of their linguistic
behavior.  I used my notes on the behavior of the women at feminist center and
our conversations about language and gender to develop a protocol for the next
stage of my research.
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3.4 DATA COLLECTION IN THE LARGER FEMINIST COMMUNITY
The third and final stage of my research involved conducting interviews
with women from different local and supra-local feminist communities in Israel.  I
conducted most of these interviews between March and November of 1998.42  To
build on my findings at the women’s center, I began the final stage of my research
by examining language use in two other feminist organizations.  I arranged to
spend several days at a feminist center in Haifa and at the office of the Israel
Women’s Network (IWN), a feminist policy center and monitoring organization.
I chose these organizations because they were central institutions in the Israeli
feminist movement that represented two different approaches to social change
work.  They were also located in different regions of the country, which gave me
the opportunity to explore the possibility of regional differences between the
feminist practices of different local communities.43  The Haifa women’s center
focused on providing support and services to local women at the grassroots level.
The IWN had a national agenda focused on changing political and civil culture at
the level of government policy and legislation.  I suspected that the differences in
the agendas of these organizations might effect the types of women I would meet
at each center.  I wanted the opportunity to interact with a diverse sample of
women involved in the Israeli feminist community.  At both organizations, I
observed staff and volunteers in their daily activities.  I also conducted one-on-
one interviews with women from each institution.
                                                 
42 However, my interview with the informant Na’ama occurred in the spring of 1997.
43 There are few regional dialect differences in CIH relative to phonological or syntactic usage but
the differences in local communal priorities and experiences do influence lexical and pragmatic
uses.  Nonetheless, I did not find evidence of regional variation in the use of feminist Hebrew.
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The center in Haifa was the first grassroots women’s center in Israel that
offered a variety of programs, support services, and outreach projects connected
to gender equality, women’s health, and other women’s issues.  The organization
had served as the model for other grassroots feminist centers including the
Jerusalem feminist center where I had conducted my preliminary observational
research.  It was founded by a collective of feminist activists who were looking
for ways raise feminist consciousness nationally while also working to improve
the lives of women in local communities.  The organization had an ethnically and
economically diverse population of paid and volunteer staff members.  At the
time of my research, the organization’s board of directors included some of the
leaders in the Israeli feminist movement.  The Haifa organization was also a
pioneer in bridging the gap between Israeli Jewish and Arab women. It is relevant
to note that this feminist organization defined its community as all women living
in Haifa and the surround Northern Israeli towns and villages.  The inclusion of
Arab and Druze women in the organization’s staff, board, and service populations
was a significant statement that placed the organization on the “left” end of the
Israeli political spectrum.
The IWN is the Israeli equivalent of the National Women’s Organization
in the United States.  The organization was founded to promote women’s equality
and challenge sexist practices in Israeli social and legal institutions.  When I
conducted my research, most of the staff were native-born Israelis, but the
director of the organization and the chair of the board directors were both
European immigrants.  The staff of the IWN tended to be college graduates from
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the Israeli middle class, with educational backgrounds in women’s studies,
sociology, education, and law.  The organization had several departments that
addressed issues such as women’s participation in politics, legislation supporting
gender equality in governmental and social institutions, the representation of
women in the media, and the treatment of women in Israeli military and
educational institutions.  The IWN also provided legal aid to women in cases of
discrimination, petitioned the Israeli courts regarding gender discrimination in
governmental institutions, and collected statistical data on women’s economic and
civil status.
While these two organizations provided me with access to a broad sample
of women engaged in feminist work, most feminist-identified Israeli women do
not work for explicitly feminist organizations or institutions.  As such, it was
important to balance my research at the IWN and the Haifa women’s center with
interviews of women engaged in other forms of feminist activism, feminists-at-
large, so to speak.  Using my network of friends and coworkers from the feminist
community, I contacted a group of native Hebrew-speaking women who were
active in the women’s movement outside the context of a specific feminist
organization.  The group of feminists-at-large included academics, politicians,
legal scholars, journalists, activists in the feminist peace movement, a former
editor of the Israeli feminist magazine Noga, and women engaged in national
organizing around domestic and sexual violence.  My conversations with these
women allowed me to explore whether and how the language practices I had
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identified as feminist Hebrew were used by feminist-identified women outside the
culturally marked and closed contexts of feminist organizations.
I use the term “closed context” to highlight the fact that feminist
organizations are workplaces in which the daily interactions of most staff
members occur with other members of the feminist community.  The closed
nature an organizational workplace supports the development of feminist
socialization practices such as those I had observed at the women’s center in
Jerusalem.  The women in my study who worked outside the context of a specific
feminist organization were not necessarily subject to this type of norm
reinforcement.  In addition, they interacted with a variety of men and women
from all sectors of the Israeli population in their daily activities.  As such, I
expected that they would discuss their experiences of using (or not using)
innovative language in these contexts.  The interviews with these women
contributed to my understanding of how Israeli women incorporated feminist
principles into a variety of social endeavors.
3.5 FIFTEEN ISRAELI FEMINISTS
The fifteen women who participated in this study were all members of the
ideologically based Israeli feminist community and actively engaged in promoting
social change and gender equality.44  The subject population consisted of native
Hebrew-speaking Israeli women between the ages of twenty and fifty, who self-
identified as feminists.  The term “native speaker of Hebrew” refers to individuals
who were raised in Hebrew-speaking environments and whose first and primary
                                                 
44 There was a sixteenth participant, but the quality of the recording from her interview was very
poor, and I was unable to use the data in my analysis.
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language was Modern Israeli Hebrew.  This qualification excluded from the study
recent or first-generation immigrants to Israel as well as Israeli Arabs and other
non-Jewish minority groups.  The study population included married women,
single women, lesbians and heterosexual women, and women with and without
children.  Several of the women had university degrees, and some had spent time
studying at universities abroad.
Ora, Ofra, Nitsan, Merav, Neta, Iris, Edit, Einat, Eti, and Meital were all
what I am referring to as professional feminists, meaning that they were or had
been employed by feminist organizations.45  Within this group were trained
lawyers, educators, librarians, and journalists.  Most of the women had worked in
their trained professions for a period before joining the staff of a feminist
organization.  They used their professional training and experience to fulfill their
duties within the scope of each organization’s mandate.  Other women in this
group began as volunteers with feminist organization while there were students.
They became full-time staff once they completed their university degrees.  The
professional feminists used their education and training in the service of the
feminist organizations that employed them.  As professional feminists, their daily
interactions at work were primarily with women and other feminists.  Many of
these women spoke of a period of socialization as they learned the appropriate
communal practices for their feminist place of employment.  Each of these
women expressed a complex and unique relationship to the feminist movement,
                                                 
45 The pseudonyms of all the informants are Israeli Hebrew names pronounced according to the
key provided in the transliteration guide at the beginning of the dissertation.  Stress in most
Hebrew words is on the ultimate or penultimate syllable.
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feminist gender ideology, and feminist language practices.  Although all of these
women worked for feminist organizations, the issues that brought them into
feminism and their reasons for continuing to work within the feminist context
varied significantly.
As stated, the women who I identified as feminists-at-large included
individuals engaged in a variety of professions.  Michal and Osnat were both
academics who brought their feminist identities and perspectives into their
academic work.  Their status as academics and educators afforded them the
opportunity to use language as a pedagogic tool for educating their students and
colleagues about women’s issues and the status of women in Israeli society.
Dafna was a graduate student in psychology at the time of this study and
volunteered at a rape crisis center that was part of a larger feminist organization.
She was the only participant in the study who did not self-identify as a feminist,
though she did advocate for feminist principles and activism.46  Nurit was
engaged in developing educational materials and lecturing on issues of domestic
and sexual violence at a variety of institutions across Israel.
Na’ama was a former city council woman in a major Israeli city and a
recognized, though somewhat controversial, leader in Israeli feminist movement.
She was also the only participant in my study with strong ties to the American and
                                                 
46 I chose to include Dafna in the study despite her reluctance to self-identify as a feminist,
because her socio-political stances were clearly in keeping with feminist principles and she was an
active volunteer at a feminist organization.  Freedman (2002), in her book No turning back: The
history of feminism and the future of women, noted that many women who “came of age
influenced by feminism to expect equal opportunities” may not identify with the label but embrace
the principles and even the political agenda of feminist movements (p. 5).
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Israeli Jewish feminist movements.47  Na’ama was one of my first contacts in the
feminist community.  We had discussed my research on Jewish American
women’s attitudes towards language and gender in religious contexts on several
occasions.48  My interview/discussion with Na’ama took place at the beginning of
my field research, immediately following my work at the HLA.  I had only begun
to identify the variables that I later associated with Israeli feminist language
practices and I discussed my preliminary findings with her more explicitly than I
did with the other participants.  As I will present in chapter eight, this clearly
influenced Na’ama’s discourse style during the interview.  It is not clear in what
way her knowledge of my research topic may have affected her actual use of
specific variables, but she clearly interpreted the interview as an opportunity to
give “testimony” about her personal and professional battles with practices of
language use she identified as sexist.
Each of the women who participated in my study reported that the issue of
language use and women’s status had become salient to her through life
experiences both within and outside the feminist community.  Some learned to
use feminist alternative lexical and grammatical constructions when they began
working at feminist organizations.  Others had earlier experiences in school or the
                                                 
47 The label “American and Israeli Jewish feminist movements” refers to Jewish women in Israel
and the United States who support feminist reforms within the context of religious Jewish life.
Jewish feminists advocate for changes in ritual and communal religious practices, for example,
allowing women to be counted in the quorum necessary for public prayer services.  In Israel, the
lack of separation between religious and state authority grants control over, personal religious
status, marriages, burials, access to public religious sites and other areas of public and private life
for both Jews and non-Jews to the recognized religious authorities.  The Jewish religious authority
is dominated by those who adhere to Orthodox interpretations of Jewish law.
48 See Jacobs (1993) for a discussion of American Jewish feminists’ linguistic strategies and
attitudes regarding language use in liturgical texts.  See Misra and Rich (2003) for a discussion of
Jewish feminism in Israel.
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army that had highlighted the connection between language use and gender
discrimination in Israeli society.  Their stories of discriminatory treatment by
teachers, army officers, government officials, and peers contained common
themes of alienation and struggles against a rigid set of gender stereotypes.  Their
experiences of marginalization were common to most of the feminist women I
met in Israel.  Although the women in my study are unique individuals, their
experiences, linguistic practices, and language attitudes can also be understood as
representative of the range encountered within the Israeli feminist community.49
3.6 STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH INTERVIEWS
I adopted a modified version of the sociolinguistic interview as the method
for collecting data from the women who served as my principle informants.  My
goal was to examine how my subjects spoke, their actual linguistic behavior
during the interview, as well as what they said about issues of language use,
identity, and feminism.  I conducted all the interviews in Hebrew, though some
bilingual speakers code-switched between Hebrew and English during the
interview.  (The informants initiated all instances of code-switching and most
were limited to individual phrases or borrowed American idioms.  I continued to
speak in Hebrew regardless of the language the informant used.)  My intention
with these interviews was to engage the participants in an open-ended discussion
                                                 
49 I feel the need to restate that my research was limited to native Hebrew-speakers, which in
essence limited the subject population to Israeli Jews.  My informants’ experiences are not
therefore representative of the experiences of other women in the feminist community.  In
particular, I do not claim that my findings apply to the Palestinian, Druze, Bedouin or other non-
Jewish women active in Israeli feminist communities.
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on the issues of feminism, sexism and the Hebrew language, and the status of
women within Hebrew-speaking Israeli society.
In an effort to elicit natural speech as well as relevant ideological data, I
began each interview with questions about the participant’s relationship to the
feminist movement, her attitudes towards the feminist agenda, and how she came
to identify as a feminist.50  If an individual participant did not raise the subject of
language use on her own, I prompted her with questions about her attitudes
towards mainstream practices regarding the use of grammatical gender and
specific gender-linked lexical items.  I did not use written material or ask
participants to read or respond to any visual or physical stimuli.  Each interview
lasted between thirty and ninety minutes, depending on the schedule of the
individual participant and the flow of the conversation during the interview.  The
interviews took place at locations convenient to the participants.  As I noted
earlier, I spent several days at the women’s centers in Haifa and Jerusalem, where
I conducted interviews with different staff members and volunteers.  I also
conducted interviews with women in cafes, on university campuses, and at the
homes of the participants.  The individual women, according to what was most
convenient for them, determined the locations.  The interviews were recorded on
analog audiotape using a hand-held cassette recorder with an external
microphone.
                                                 
50 I use the term “natural speech’ in this context to refer to language produced in the context of
conversational discourse, as opposed to speech produced in response to a set of specific linguistic
cues or prompts designed to elicit the use of the variables under investigation.  I am aware that my
own social identity acts as a contextual or social cue.  I am also aware that an interview, no matter
how loosely structured, creates its own set of contextual cues that may influence language use.
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To ensure that I would gather comparable information from each
participant, I developed a set of general interview questions.  I began by asking
each woman about her marital status, level of education, and age.  I then began
asking a series of questions designed to lead my participants into a discussion
about language and gender, which I hoped, might contain examples of feminist
Hebrew variables.  Below is the list of interview questions:
(1) How do you define feminism?
(2) What is your personal understanding of what it means to be a feminist?
(3) Do you identify yourself as a feminist?  Is it part of your personal
identity?
(4) How did you become a feminist or what brought you into the feminist
movement?
(5) Do you see a relationship between language use – in particular
grammatical gender – and the status of women in Israeli society?
(6) Can you identify any aspects of the Hebrew language or the way it is
used today that are problematic for women and the promotion of women’s
rights?
(7) What role, if any, do language and language use play in the feminist
social change movement?
(8) Do you intentionally use language in a way that you think is less sexist
than conventional practices?  If so how.
(9) Are there specific lexical items that you find particularly offensive and
if so why?  What to you use instead of these words?
(10) How would you compare your own use of language to that of other
women you know? To men you know?
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(11) If you use language in unconventional ways or substitute other terms
for perceived sexist lexical items – do you encounter resistance?  If yes, in
what social or cultural contexts?
(12) Do you feel that you are included in a statement or address that is in
the masculine singular? The masculine plural?
(13) How do you feel about the word baal?
(14) Do you use the historical FEMININE plural forms for imperative or
future tense predicates? Why or why not?
(15) Do you use the feminine singular second person pronoun for the
impersonal? In what contexts? Do you notice when other women do or do
not use it?
(16) Do you think that the way you use language makes a difference in
how others use language or think about women’s issues?
(17) Do you agree with the theory by an Israeli feminist that the problem
with Israeli society and women’s rights stems from the collective Israeli
identity being particularly masculine in nature?
(18) What do you think are the most important changes to be made in how
language is used in Israel?  Where are the most important places to make
those changes – educational institutions, the media, government and
political institutions?
The first six questions from the above list were standard in each interview.  They
were intended to elicit data on a participant’s personal language use practices as
well as her attitudes towards the issue of language use and women’s status in
Israel.  The questions about identification with feminist movement and the label
“feminist” usually sparked a long conversation about language use issues or the
discussion of a particular feature of innovative feminist language practices.  I used
the other questions only when the conversation stalled or a participant did not
address the relevant issues on her own.  Most of the interviews quickly moved
71
from a question and answer style to a more conversational style of interaction.
Several of the participants related long narratives about their efforts to promote
language reform and the reactions of others to their use of innovative linguistic
practices.  As I stated, I let each woman lead the conversation in the directions
that were most meaningful to her.  This looser interview style allowed me to
collect data on some language use practices and ideological stances that I had not
previously encountered.  It also allowed me to connect the personal experiences
of each woman to the collective feminist narrative of women’s experiences in the
Israeli sociolinguistic context.
3.7 ANALYTICAL METHODS
The analytical tasks of this research project, like the collection of the data,
occurred in three different stages.  I analyzed the data collected during the first
two stages of my research while in the field.  At the end of the initial stage of
research in mainstream Israeli society, I reviewed my field notes on observed
language practices as well as the documents collected at the HLA and IWN.  I
identified several sociolinguistic contexts in which speakers’ use of grammatical
gender varied from prescriptive standards.  When possible, I also evaluated a
speaker’s relationship to the Israeli feminist community.  As noted in chapter two,
the evaluation of this data revealed that in some contexts CIH speakers used the
plural MASCULINE grammatical forms for both generic and definite reference
regardless of the gender of intended referents.  I also noted that conventions for
the use of grammatical gender reflected cultural stereotypes regarding the
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gendered division of social roles as well as the association of culturally
MASCULINE or FEMININE characteristics with social institutions or actions.
The analysis of the data from the first stage of research also included
examining the ideological discourse on language and gender apparent in written
texts collected from the HLA, the IWN and the print media.  I relied on feminist
linguistic theories regarding the social and sociolinguistic reproduction of sexism
and existing models of the relationship between language ideologies and practices
of language use to evaluate the connection between conventional practices of
language use and ideological claims regarding the use of grammatical gender in
MIH.  This analysis enabled me to develop a picture of the language ideologies
prevalent within Israeli society.  I also identified specific language practices that
were ideologized within mainstream Israeli culture and appeared to reflect
changes to the gendered landscape of social reality.  (Findings from this stage of
the research are discussed in sections, 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 of chapter two.)
The analysis of the data from the first stage of research laid the framework
for the collection and analysis of the data collected during the participant
observation stage of my field research at the Jerusalem women’s center.  The
description of conventional practices for reference to males and females in a
variety of sociolinguistic contexts together with the prescriptive rules of MIH
served as the standards against which I evaluated my coworkers’ linguistic
behavior.  I examined linguistic behavior from conversational interactions for
evidence of innovative linguistic practices.  The analysis of the data provided a
preliminary sketch of the linguistic elements of feminist Hebrew, which I divided
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into two categories of innovation: lexical and morpho-semantic.  (A list of the
lexical elements can be found in Appendix A.  The morpho-semantic elements are
presented and analyzed in chapters five and six.)  I identified five major morpho-
semantic contexts within linguistic variation occurred.  In each context, I
discovered the use of both conventional variants and one or two possible feminist
variants.
The lexical component of feminist Hebrew included specific lexical forms,
such as the use of meshivon ‘answering machine’ in place of the problematic
mazkira elektronit ‘electric secretary (F)’ and feminized titles and labels, such as
mankalit a feminized version of the acronym mankal which stands for menahel
haklal ‘director (M) general.’51  I considered these forms lexical elements rather
than morpho-semantic because they focused on the titles used for specific social
roles.  It was clear, nonetheless, that these forms were related to the morpho-
semantic practice of using FEMININE grammatical forms for reference to
females.
I also analyzed my field notes for evidence of language ideology and
social practices that connected the use of feminist Hebrew with the development
of feminist culture and communal identity.  Using theories regarding language
socialization and the role of language in creating and sustaining communities of
practice, I examined the metalinguistic discourse and practices of language
socialization I observed at the Jerusalem center.  As noted in section 3.3, the
                                                 
51 The form makalit is an interesting example of the process of grammaticalization.  A
FEMININE ending is added to the acronym to comply with rules of gender agreement.  Also of
note is the fact that the term meshivon has moved into the mainstream lexicon.
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analysis of the discourse revealed a clear pattern of socialization, in which veteran
members of the community overtly corrected the language use of newer members.
The observed metalinguistic discourse and socialization practices constituted the
data on Israeli feminist language and gender ideologies.  The analysis of the data
from the Jerusalem women’s center enabled me to develop a preliminary
description of the elements of feminist language practice and the role of linguistic
innovation in the development of Israeli feminist culture.
As I stated previously, the findings from the second stage of research
guided my investigation of the linguistic behavior and ideological claims of the
fifteen women who participated in the final interview stage of the research.  Two
types of data were extracted from the audio-tapes of the interviews: quantitative
behavioral data on my informants’ use of the linguistic elements and ideological
data from the metalinguistic discourse regarding issues of language and gender.
The data from the interviews were analyzed in a manner consistent with the type
of data and the aims of the investigation.  Quantitative and qualitative methods of
variationist sociolinguistic research were used to analyze the behavioral data.  The
ideological data was examined using methods of narrative discourse analysis,
feminist social theory, and an analytical model combining the theoretical concepts
of double consciousness, communities of practice, and linguistic indexicality.
3.7.2 Quantitative and qualitative analysis of feminist linguistic behavior
The goal of the quantitative and qualitative analysis of my informants’
linguistic behavior was to develop a description of the parameters of feminist
Hebrew and evaluate its use by members of the relevant community of practice.
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Using quantitative sociolinguistic methods, I began by counting my informants’
use of each variable under investigation and comparing reported usage with actual
behavior.  I coded the audiotapes for every use of the relevant linguistic elements,
and I created a “map” of each informant’s interview data that marked the location
of every use of grammatical gender for personal reference to humans – generic,
definite, or impersonal – as well as the relevant lexical items.  This initial analysis
revealed five morpho-semantic variables related to the use of grammatical gender:
1) definite plural reference to females, 2) inclusive definite plural reference to
mixed groups of men and women, 3) gender-agreement on plural future tense
predicates with female agents,52 4) singular and plural ambiguous third-person
generic reference, and 5) second-person impersonal generic reference. 53  After
identifying these five variable contexts, I re-coded the tapes to indicate which of
the morpho-semantic contexts a particular use of grammatical gender exemplified.
I transcribed relevant portions of the verbal data that contained the use of either
feminist or conventional variants of each morpho-semantic or lexical variable.
Using the transcribed utterances and the coded maps of the tapes, I counted every
occurrence of either conventional or feminist variants for each of the five morpho-
semantic contexts.
I defined the quantitative tokens as the use of a nominal or pronominal
form and coordinated predicates within a single syntactic phrase.  For example, if
                                                 
52 There is an historical FEMININE form for this grammatical paradigm that fell out of use in
spoken MIH sometime in the 1950’s.  See chapter five, section 5.4 for the description of this
grammatical paradigm and the feminist “revival” of the historical form.
53 More detailed descriptions of the methods used to identify the tokens for each morpho-semantic
context are presented in the relevant sections of chapters five and six.
76
an informant used the FEMININE pronominal form at ‘you (F, S)’ followed by
the predicate xayevet ‘must (F, S)’ for impersonal generic reference, that
constituted a single token.  Within an utterance, speakers might switch between
conventional and feminist variants for the same referent.  I also counted each use
of alternative lexical items or their conventional counterparts.  In so doing, I
discovered that baali ‘husband, owner’ and its feminist alternatives, ishi ‘my
man’ and ben zugi ‘my partner,’ were the only lexical forms used or discussed by
the majority of my informants.  Hence, I chose to focus the analysis of the
linguistic behavioral data on the use of conventional or feminist variants in the
five morpho-semantic contexts.
The initial counting quantified the behavioral data for each individual
speaker.  I used the quantitative data from each informant to assess the overall
usage of conventional and feminist variants in each morpho-semantic context.  I
compared the use of feminist variants to the total number of tokens used in a
given context.  The percentage of feminist variants used was taken as an indicator
of the productive value of a particular form.  For each morpho-semantic variable,
I also noted whether or not an informant reported using it.  These totals enabled
me to compare the innovations that had been successfully incorporated into the
natural speech of my informants with those that seemed to have a strong
ideological value but were not used frequently.  I also compared each informant’s
behavior to that of the other women in the study and my preliminary sketch of
feminist communal norms.  The results of the quantitative analysis for the use of
each variable are presented in chapters five and six.  In chapter five, I present the
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data on the use of gender in the plural definite and sex-specific contexts.  The data
on the use of gender in generic third-person and second-person contexts is
presented in chapter six.
After completing the quantitative analysis, I examine the utterances within
which the tokens of each variable occurred to determine the “conditions of
discourse” (McConnell-Ginet, 1989).  This qualitative analysis focused on
accounting for the way the syntactic, morpho-phonological, and semantic
environments in which a speaker used a specific variable may have contributed to
her use of grammatical gender in a given utterance or set of utterances.  I
compared the utterances in which my informants used a conventional, usually
MASCULINE, form with those in which they used a feminist variant.  I also
evaluated the grammatical and the pragmatic factors that might predispose a
speaker to use one form or the other.  The findings from the qualitative analysis of
the variables are presented in chapters five and six along with the quantitative
data.
The qualitative analysis of my informants’ behavior provided answers to
some of the questions raised by the degree of intra-speaker and inter-speaker
variation revealed by the quantitative analysis.  Taken together, the results of the
quantitative and qualitative analysis provided a more accurate picture of the
elements of feminist Hebrew and the practices associated with their use.
Nonetheless, the observable gap between my informants’ actual behavior and
their ideological claims presented a challenge to explaining the relationship
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between feminist Hebrew, as an ideologically motivated variety of CIH, and the
enacting of a feminist identity or stance.
3.7.3 Indexicality as an analytical concept
The apparent gap between the actual behavior of my informants and their
reported behavior and attitudes provided an opportunity to investigate theoretical
assumptions about the social meaning of language variation and consciously
motivated linguistic innovation.  As discussed in chapter two, I chose to
problematize the sociolinguistic assumption that speakers’ identification with a
community of practice can be “read” directly from their consistent or inconsistent
use of the ideologized linguistic elements or practices associated with that
community.  I used the concepts of indexicality and communities of practice, as
discussed in chapter two, to evaluate how my informants’ behavior related to their
ideological claims and the enacting of a feminist identity. My approach
considered the multiplicity of linguistic contexts active in any given
sociolinguistic act or interaction.  In “Measuring the relative indexical value of
the variables,” section 7.2, I present of set of socially meaningful criteria by
which I evaluated the indexical “value” of each morpho-semantic variable as a
marked of feminist identity or ideology.  These criteria consider the relative
salience of the linguistic practices related to feminist Hebrew for both feminist
and mainstream CIH speakers.  I address the need to evaluate all of the possible
associations available to both speakers and hearers when we attempt to define the
social meaning of a particular linguistic practice.
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The third section of chapter seven examines the linguistic behavior of four
informants in relationship to their ideological stances regarding the use of
grammatical gender to address callers on the outgoing message of a feminist
organization’s voicemail system.  In this analysis, I am concerned with the nature
of the relationship between a speaker’s ideological stances, her linguistic
behavior, and her position within the feminist community of practice.  Following
the theoretical “advice” of Cameron (1990), I use both the linguistic and
metalinguistic data to offer an account of the social meaning of the degree of
inter-speaker and intra-speaker variation revealed by the quantitative analysis of
the data.
In chapter eight, I combine the theoretical perspectives on language use
and identity construction presented in chapter two, with W.E.B. DuBois’s (1903)
concept of double consciousness to examine the sociolinguistic strategies of two
of my informants.  The data analyzed in this chapter were the metalinguistic
stories told by Na’ama and Merav about their conscious and intentional use of
conventional and feminist practices.  My examination focuses on the way these
women claimed to use language in a specific context and their assessments of the
consequences of their linguistic actions.  I illustrate the way each woman used the
sociolinguistic resources at her disposal to negotiate her performance of a feminist
self in those contexts.  The analysis of the discourse reveals how they represented
their ideological stance and social position vis-a-vis the other social actors in their
stories.  I also look the discourse of my informants’ metalinguistic narratives to
demonstrate how they constructed their identities in context of the interview.  I
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conclude with a discussion of how these narratives illuminate my speakers’
awareness of conventional linguistic practices as social practices that contribute to
the reproduction of sexism within Israeli society.  Furthermore, I show how this
awareness shapes their innovative uses of language as acts of feminist resistance.
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GRAMMATICAL GENDER IN USE: FEMINIST ISRAELI
HEBREW
Chapter IV: Morpho-semantic variation in the feminist
community
tiri, klalei hasafa haivrit, merosh hem bayatiyim.  ma sheani osa ze
yaxol lihyot mexuts laklalim.  ani beetsem yotseret klalim xadashim.
(Ora)
Look, the norms of the Hebrew language are from the start problematic.
What I do, its possible is outside the norms.  Essentially, I am creating
new norms.  (Ora)
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The chapters in section two of the dissertation present the analysis of my
informants’ linguistic behavior from quantitative and qualitative sociolinguistic
approaches.  The analytical goals of this section include: (1) defining the
parameters of feminist Israeli Hebrew through an analysis of variables that
distinguish feminist language practices from prescribed or conventional practices
of language use, (2) evaluating the relative value of these variables as indexical
markers of feminist identity or ideology, and (3) investigating how speakers
negotiate the meaning of linguistic elements in various contexts.  The variables
that mark feminist practice can be divided into two categories, morpho-semantic
variables and lexical variables.  In chapters four through six, I examine the
linguistic behavior and metalinguistic discourse related to the morpho-semantic
variables.  I have limited my analysis to the morpho-semantic variables because
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they were more productive in the context of the interviews.54  The morpho-
semantic variables also present the more interesting context for examining how
speakers use grammatical elements to construct and deconstruct socio-cultural
gender ideologies.
The morpho-semantic class consists of those variables for which the
morphological expression of gender agreement for definite or generic animate
referents varies in different syntactic/semantic contexts.  My examination of this
class of variables is designed to investigate how Israeli feminists deploy
grammatical gender and how their use of the morphology differs from standard
MIH and conventional mainstream practices of use.  Inherent in this investigation
of feminist language practices is a general examination of the various indexical
meanings embedded in the MIH system of grammatical gender.  How do Israeli
feminists and other speakers of Israeli Hebrew employ the grammatical system of
gender, with its set of binary distinctions, to convey socio-cultural meaning and
create new social distinctions within Israeli society?  I use the term “morpho-
semantic” to highlight that referential and indexical semantic considerations seem
to motivate the innovative feminist uses of the morphological markers associated
with the gender based system of noun classification.  The syntactic environments
within which these variables appear also exert some constraints on use; however,
the strategic use of the morphology is more connected to semantics than syntax.
Multiple factors influenced my informants’ use the morpho-semantic
variables.  The conditioning factors included socio-cultural associations between
                                                 
54 Appendix A contains a list of the lexical variables that occurred in my informants’ discourse.
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contexts and gender roles, structural parameters of the Hebrew system of gender
agreement, language socialization in both mainstream and feminist communities,
ideological and identity issues, and issues of speech production.  Through a
contextualized examination of my informants’ linguistic behavior, I intend to
demonstrate that our existing assumptions about the manner in which speakers
understand and use the system of grammatical gender to express social meaning is
incomplete.
Previous discussions of grammatical gender and ideology, particularly
those critical of feminist language use, have relied heavily on abstracted
relationships between gender categories, referential meaning, and the theory of
markedness. (See especially Silverstein, 1985.)  Many of these studies have
ignored the ways that standard or prescribed practices of language use are
naturalized through communal practices.  These analyses also tend to ignore the
way in which socio-cultural gender norms are embedded in these naturalized
communal practices and effect the referential and indexical meanings of
grammatically gendered forms.  The structural models of gender based systems of
noun classification are usually presented as simple reflections of these prescribed
or standardized practices, as though they were void of social meanings.  Instead,
these writers have focused on an explanation of feminist language reforms as
“misguided” misanalyses of the asymmetrical relationship between the
grammatical forms and their referential and/or indexical meanings.  My analysis
of the data from the Israeli feminist community will show that although feminist
linguistic innovation is motivated by ideological principles, actual usage also is
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governed by numerous other factors, some of them below the level of conscious
awareness.  I will demonstrate that linguistic, sociolinguistic, and ideological
factors all contribute to the ways that Israeli feminists use grammatical gender to
convey referential and indexical meaning.  Studies critical of feminist language
practice have also made much of inconsistency in women’s use of feminist
alternatives to the generic MASCULINE as “proof” of the status of generic HE as
the accepted, and often structurally underlying, unmarked form. In response to
these analyses, I also will discuss the possible social meaning of “inconsistent”
behavior vis-a-vis the use of linguistic variables.
The examination of the informants’ behavior also addresses the concept of
indexicality and how indexical meanings are negotiated by speakers who must
“travel” between communities with different and often conflicting language
practices.  Hebrew-speaking feminists must make use of the linguistic resources at
hand to convey their innovative and, at times, radically different concept of social
reality.  It is my assertion that language reform and linguistic innovation are social
acts intended to extend or subvert the metaphorical relationships between
linguistic signs and the aspects of socio-cultural reality that they signify in order
to enact social change.  The specific manifestation of linguistic innovation within
the Israeli feminist movement gives us a lens through which to examine how
linguistic elements, specifically binary systems of grammatical gender, are
exploited by speakers to convey a multitude of related but distinct social
relationships and concepts.
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4.2 MORPHO-SEMANTIC MARKERS OF FEMINIST LANGUAGE PRACTICE
As I explained in chapter two, the use of gender as an organizing principle
for noun classification in MIH is based on the grammatical system of earlier
periods of Hebrew and those used in other Semitic languages.  During the one
hundred plus years since Hebrew was revived (or reinvented) as the modern
language of Israeli Jewish society, the language has undergone significant
changes.  The area of change with which I am concerned is the simplification of
grammatical gender paradigms and innovations or changes in the use of gender
agreement between nouns and predicates for reference to animate, primarily
human, referents.  One “change in progress” between standard MIH and the CIH
is related to the simplification of many of the paradigms for gender agreement and
a reduction in the use of many FEMININE plural predicate and pronominal
forms.
The simplification of grammatical paradigms is not surprising given the
parameters for the use of gender agreement in standard MIH, which identifies the
MASCULINE grammatical category as the unmarked.  As noted earlier, MIH
speakers are taught to use the MASCULINE forms for ambiguous generic
reference to any referent that falls in the personal category (e.g. humans and
deities).  For example, a form letter addressed to the customers of a bank will
make use of the MASCULINE singular phrase lakoax yakar shelanu ‘customer
(M, S) valued (M, S) ours’ even if the letter is being sent to a female customer.
On the one hand, this is a generic use of the second-person, since it occurs in the
context of a form letter.  On the other hand, each individual recipient must read it
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as a term of personal address; thus, a female recipient might understand it as an
instances of being individually addressed with a MASCULINE form.55   Speakers
also learn to use MASCULINE forms for inclusive definite reference to mixed
gender groups.  A lecturer addressing an audience of university students, in most
contexts, is likely to use MASCULINE forms of address because the assumption
is that the audience is likely to include both males and females.  These
prescriptive rules and related discursive practices result in limiting the contexts
within which the average MIH speaker uses FEMININE plural forms, particularly
second-person and third-person forms of address and agreement on predicates
coordinated with first, second and third-person forms.56  A consequence of this
pragmatic limitation seems to be the loss of some FEMININE plural forms in
informal speech contexts.  In the plural, some of the agreement paradigms are
being simplified to the MASCULINE form alone.57
In contrast to the ongoing loss of FEMININE plural forms in the speech of
most MIH speakers, women within the Israeli feminist movement have adopted
language practices that entail, among other things, an effort to maintain the use of
FEMININE plural forms in those contexts that the prescriptive grammar identifies
as appropriate.  In the case of one variable, the feminist commitment to
maintaining FEMININE grammatical forms has encouraged the reinsertion into
                                                 
55 In chapter eight, I discuss how Na’ama’s experience of being addressed in the MASCULINE
led to one of her campaigns for institutional language use reform.
56 In the first person context, gender agreement is only marked on present tense verbal forms and
predicate adjectives.
57 Shifts in the gender agreement paradigms have been noted by several Israeli linguists and
language teachers; however, to date there is no empirically documented description of this change.
Private correspondence with MIH linguists engaged in the collection and analysis of a corpus of
spoken CIH support my assertion that these changes are taking place.
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informal speech of historical FEMININE plural forms.  Related to the underlying
ideological objective of these maintenance efforts are several other innovative
uses of grammatical gender that mark the speech of Israeli feminists as different
from mainstream and standard practices of language use.  A basic description of
the difference between conventional and feminist practice is that the feminist
variant reflects an apparent rejection of the MASCULINE as the unmarked and
thus inclusive category on ideological grounds.  This rejection generally manifests
in three specific ways:  (1) The hyper-standardized use of FEMININE forms for
referential and indexical marking of gender in sex-specific contexts, (2) the use of
FEMININE forms for ambiguous generic or definite inclusive reference, and (3)
the overt double gendering of nominal or predicate forms through the use of the
SLASH convention, the Hebrew equivalent of he/she, in speaking or writing.  In
spoken language the SLASH variable often takes the form of using MASCULINE
plural or singular predicates, with overt reference to the inclusion of males and
females on the nominal or pronominal forms, e.g. hem, evarim venashim, osim
kaxa ‘they (M, P), men and women, do (M, P) as such.’  Overall, the speakers of
feminist Hebrew pay attention to and use grammatical gender in ways that either
extend or subvert the prescribed parameters of the standard MIH noun
classification system.
The three general ways in which Israeli feminist practice differs from
standard language use can be further divided into the specific syntactic and
pragmatic contexts within which feminist linguistic innovations most often occur.
In each context, I am concerned with whether the women in my study, as
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representatives of the Israeli feminist community, use MASCULINE,
FEMININE, or when appropriate, double-gendered forms and the factors that
contribute to their choices.  The term “variable,” therefore, refers to the use of
gendered forms in specific contexts rather than to the forms themselves.  For
example, the manifestation of gender agreement in definite 3rd person reference
for feminine subjects/referents is one variable.  In the context of defining each
variable, I present examples of the standard and feminist variants.  For some
variables, such as 3rd person ambiguous generic reference, there are two feminist
variants, the FEMININE and the SLASH or double gendered forms.  In cases
where there are two competing feminist variants, each variant is defined as an
innovative option within the specific context and in relation to the other feminist
choice.  In chapters five and six, I present definitions of each individual variable
and the quantitative data regarding its use by my research subjects, a sample of
women in the feminist community.
4.3 STRUCTURE OF THE REMAINING CHAPTERS
The remainder of this section of the dissertation is divided into two
chapters.  The chapters present detailed descriptions of the five morpho-semantic
variables under investigation, and the findings of quantitative and qualitative
analyses of their use by fifteen Israeli feminists.  Each variable or set of variables
is defined by both the semantic and syntactic environments within which feminist
linguistic innovation occurs.  Included in the definition of the variables are
examples of both conventional and feminist variations and a description of the
general characteristics that mark the feminist variants as distinct from
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conventional practices of use for Contemporary Israeli Hebrew.  I present the
quantitative data on my informants’ use of the different variants in the form of
tables followed by an explanation of the significance of the data with regard to
both conventional and feminist practices of language use.  Within these chapters, I
will discuss the significance of inter-speaker variation with respect to my claims
that there is a distinct set of sociolinguistic behaviors that can be described and
labeled as feminist Hebrew.  I also will discuss the various factors that may
account for speakers’ variation between feminist and standard Israeli varieties
Hebrew.
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Chapter V: Feminist practice and the rules of plural gender
agreement
Israeli feminist language practices, with respect to definite or sex-specific
reference, are marked by three sites of morpho-semantic variation: (1) the hyper-
standardized use of FEMININE plural forms for gender-specific definite
reference to females, (2) the use of FEMININE or SLASH (doubly gendered)
forms for inclusive definite reference to mixed gender groups and (3) the use of
historical FEMININE plural agreement markers on future tense and imperative
predicates with second and third-person female agents.  The term “hyper-
standard” refers to the practice of adhering to the standard MIH rules for gender
agreement in a manner that exceeds the norms of the mainstream Hebrew-
speaking population.  In section 5.2, I discuss the use of the hyper-standard
FEMININE forms.  The innovative use of gender agreement for reference to
mixed gender groups is discussed in section 5.3.  The “revival” of the historical
FEMININE agreement markers is discussed in section 5.4.
5.2 “OVDOT ANAXNU!” ‘FEMALE WORKERS ARE WE’: THE HYPER-STANDARD
USE OF FEMININE PLURALS FOR DEFINITE REFERENCE
My observation of language use within the Israeli feminist community
revealed a practice of language use that included hyper-standardization to
FEMININE plural forms for both deictic pronouns and nominal forms of
reference to women and girls.  This practice contrasted with my experience of
observing other speakers, both male and female, use MASCULINE plural forms
to address or describe groups of females.  I found that within the feminist
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community, there was a clear effort to use language to mark the social reality of
work places or encounters where all the participants were women.  Often
members of the community would correct others when MASCULINE plurals
were used to address a female audience. These practices led me to identify gender
marking for “plural definite reference to females” as a site of variation between
conventional and feminist practices of language use.
For the purposes of data collection and analysis, I defined “plural definite
reference to females” as the use of grammatical forms to mark agreement on
nominal, pronominal and predicate forms with female referents, agents, or
subjects. As is evident from the label “hyper-standardized,” this feminist
innovation conforms to the prescriptive grammar of standard MIH, but diverges
from the observable practices of language use in CIH.  Below are examples of
both the feminist and conventional variants for definite plural reference to
females.
1. kulan           amru    haben      zu  sheli,
everyone (F,P) said (P) the male pair mine
everyone said my partner(rather than husband)
ani amarti ma   ze  hashtuyot haeile?
I    said     what   this    stupidity  these
I said, to myself, what is this stupidity?
ma aten      mitaskot     bekeilu zman lekol haterminoloia?
what you(F,P) engage(F,P) in like   time  to all   the terminology
what you all use time to engage with all the terminology?
In  example (1), the speaker, Ora, was referring to the women who worked with
her at a feminist organization.  She was describing her experience of learning to
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use new terminology to refer to male marital partners.  The referential pronouns
and predicates with gender agreement are highlighted in bold text.  Of particular
interest is Ora’s use of the FEMININE construction of ‘everyone’ – kulan.
According to my observations of language use, most speakers of CIH, even those
that use FEMININE plural forms, are more likely to use the MASCULINE
construction of everyone – kulam.  The reduction in the grammatical paradigms of
gendered plural forms, discussed in previous chapters, is primarily centered on the
loss of the phonologically based morphological distinction between the [n] final
FEMININE forms and the [m] final MASCULINE forms.  Ora’s use of both
kulan in the first line, and aten in the second line are typical examples of the
feminist variant for gender agreement marking in this morpho-semantic context.
Example (2), taken from the transcript of my interview with Iris, shows
the more conventional variant.
2. mehayom    medabrim   belashon     nekeiva
from today    speak (M,P) in language  feminine
from today (we) use the feminine
mikeivan  sheyesh  po    rak   nashim
because   that there  here only women
because, there are only women here
In the quote above, Iris was reporting the instructions she gave to her female
students about the use of grammatical gender to address a group of women.  Iris
and the women in her class are the implied agents of the bolded predicate with the
MASCULINE plural agreement marker.  The irony inherent in this example, that
Iris has used the MASCULINE form in exactly the way she is instructing her
students to avoid, can be understood as evidence of the extent to which the use of
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MASCULINE plurals to address a group of females is a naturalized linguistic
practice.
The use of gender for definite gender-specific plural reference is
ideologized within the feminist community as a means of making visible the
unique social reality of consciously defined all female space.  Several of the
women in my study discuss experiencing or participating in language
socialization to the hyper-standard forms when they first became active in
feminist organizations.
yesh lanu mankalit, hi kvar shana mankalit shelanu. vekeshehiia hi
dibra eleinu belashon rabim zaxar. zot omeret, ani rotsa, eix hi omeret
hi mamash dibra eleinu bezaxar. vemeod meod tsaram lanu.  kol
paam tikanu ota, ovdot anaxnu.  hi doveret ivrit, sfat em shela. ... aval
besof az am hi kvar medaberet eleinu belashon nekeiva.
We have an executive director she is with us now a year.  When she first
came, she spoke to us using masculine plural language.  That is to say,
how she said, she really spoke to us in the masculine.  And it really, really
irritated us.  Every time we corrected her, we are female workers.  She is a
Hebrew speaker,[it is] her mother tongue.  But in the end, so she also now
speaks to us in the feminine language.
The above quote from one of my informants exemplifies the type of language
socialization that occurs within the community regarding this variable.  Thus, we
might expect Israeli feminists to demonstrate a preference for the use of
FEMININE forms, at least within an overtly feminist context.  In Table 5.1, I
present data on the use of gender marking for definite plural reference to females.
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Speaker Total tokens FEMININE tokens % of FEMININE
Dafna 5 5 100%
Edit 11 8 73%
Einat 27 20 74%
Eti 23 22 96%
Iris 25 17 68%
Meital 9 8 88%
Merav 11 11 100%
Michal 3 3 100%
Na’ama 16 16 100%
Neta 13 13 100%
Nitsan 9 9 100%
Nurit 22 22 100%
Ofra 21 20 95%
Ora 8 8 100%
Osnat 33 33 100%
Total 235 215 91%
Table 5.1 Use of gender for plural definite reference to females
The data presented in the table 5.1 include occurrences of both first and
third-person morphological forms as well as plural forms of nouns and their
coordinated predicates.58  Second-person morphological forms only occurred as
instances of reported speech during the interviews, and as such are not included in
the tokens counted.  The numbers in the final column indicate that nine of the
fifteen participants used the FEMININE forms exclusively and eleven of the
participants use the FEMININE forms in at least ninety percent of their
utterances.  Across all the speakers, 91% of the tokens are FEMININE.  Overall,
                                                 
58 Chapter II contains a description of the different types of nominal forms found in Hebrew and
the grammatical paradigms for the declension of nominal forms.
95
the women in this study demonstrate a clear preference for using FEMININE
plural forms for definite sex-specific reference.
The high percentage of FEMININE tokens across these speakers and
utterances confirms practices I observed in the broader Israeli feminist
community.  It is not surprising that the use of gender marking in the context of
definite sex-specific reference would be a site of ideologically motivated feminist
linguistic practice and language socialization.  The grammar of the language and
the prescriptive rules if MIH, to which speakers have conscious access, support
the need to “accurately” reflect the gender of sex-specific definite referents with
the corresponding grammatical markers.  Thus, I would argue, gender in this
particular syntactic and semantic context is a highly salient linguistic feature.
Salience in this case refers to the speakers’ conscious access to and use of a
linguistic element.  Given that gender is an overt grammatical category in
Hebrew, it is also not surprising that gender marking is available for ideological
rationalization by speakers.  The overt ideological conceptualization of this
particular element by the feminists, claiming it as a means of making women
visible, is supported by the structure of the language itself.  The feminists’ use of
gender in this case also supports the assertion that they are adopting a practice that
runs counter to the ongoing trends in CIH.
Despite the overwhelming preference for using FEMININE plural forms
in this communicative context, there are several noticeable examples of my
informants using the more conventional MASCULINE form.  Three speakers use
the FEMININE form in fewer than 80% of their relevant utterances, and many of
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the women use the MASCULINE form in at least one utterance. A discussion of
the possible explanations for variation across speakers might reveal more
information about the ways in which the linguistic resource of gender marking is
used by Israeli feminists and other CIH speakers to convey socio-cultural
information.  One explanation for their deviation from the ideologically preferred
form is that these women are attempting to undo years of language socialization
and habitual practice.  Their ability to monitor their speech in online processing
has limits and occasional “slips” are to be expected.  However, this processing
explanation assumes that the women must constantly monitor their speech to
adhere to the newly adopted feminist norm and that the meaning of the
grammatical gender markers is constant.  The salience of gender classification as
a linguistic element may also contribute to a speaker’s ability to use gender
consistently across a variety of syntactic and semantic contexts.
Questions regarding this variation led me to examine how the semantic
and morpho-syntactic environments of third-person versus first-person reference
might affect the use of gender differently.  As discussed in chapter two,
grammatical gender in both first-person and third-person plural contexts carries
referential and indexical meaning; however, for most CIH speakers, the
FEMININE forms are more productive in the third-person context than in the
first-person context.59  Overall, gender agreement is more productive in the third-
person context than in first-person syntactic context, because all third-person
                                                 
59 The term productive in this context refers to the fact that the grammatical parameters for the use
of gender in first-person contexts are more limited, and as such, the grammatical distinction is not
linguistically realized in this context.
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pronouns must agree in gender with the intended referent(s) and gender is marked
on predicates in all tenses except past tense plural forms.60   In the first-person
context, pronouns are not marked for gender, and predicates are only marked in
present tense conjugations.  (Adjectives, including numbers, always show gender
agreement.)  In addition to the grammatical parameters for marking gender
agreement, there are, as I have previously mentioned, social parameters that
constraint the contexts within which FEMININE forms are used. A speaker
referring to a group, of which she is a member, is expected to use the first-person
FEMININE plural only when all the members of the group are female.  It seems
possible that the self-inclusive nature of definite first-person plural reference to an
all-female group might contribute to its salience for feminists.  However, outside
of the world of feminist organizations there are limited contexts within which
speakers would find themselves part of an all female group.  This combination of
social factors, grammatical parameters, and discursive practices make it possible
that FEMININE plural forms would occur with more consistency in the third-
person context than in the first-person context.  The table on the following page
includes the separated quantitative data for each syntactic context.
                                                 
60 The ongoing simplification of the gender paradigm for plural forms to a single plural form – the
historically MASCULINE form – does result in the loss of gender distinction in the second and
third-person contexts.  Nonetheless the prescriptive rules of grammar which speakers learn still




















Dafna 5 5 100% Dafna 0 0 0%
Edit 9 7 78% Edit 2 1 50%
Einat 15 14 93% Einat 12 6 50%
Eti 16 15 94% Eti 7 7 100%
Iris 19 14 74% Iris 6 3 50%
Meital 8 7 88% Meital 1 1 100%
Merav 11 11 100% Merav 0 0 0%
Michal 3 3 100% Michal 0 0 0%
Na’ama 16 16 100% Na’ama 0 0 0%
Neta 6 6 100% Neta 7 7 100%
Nitsan 3 3 100% Nitsan 6 6 100%
Nurit 19 19 100% Nurit 3 3 100%
Ofra 9 8 89% Ofra 12 12 100%
Ora 6 6 100% Ora 2 2 100%
Osnat 28 28 100% Osnat 5 5 100%
Total 173 162 94% Total 63 53 84%
Table 5.2 Separated data on use of gender for third-person and first-person plural definite sex-specific reference
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As the data above indicate, the FEMININE forms occur in 94% of the
utterances with third-person reference and in 84% of the utterances with first-
person reference.  A comparison of the use of gender in each context reveals
interesting differences in the degree of variation between the use of
MASCULINE and FEMININE demonstrated by the speakers.  Nine of the fifteen
women in the study used the FEMININE form in 100% of the possible third-
person utterances.  Two of the six speakers who showed variation between
MASCULINE and FEMININE forms, Iris and Edit, used the MASCULINE form
in more than one utterance.  Eight out of the eleven women who used first-person
definite plural reference used the FEMININE form in 100% of their relevant
utterances, a higher ratio than that for the third-person context.  However, the
three speakers who showed variation in the first-person context used the
FEMININE plural in only 50% of the possible utterances.  The variation between
MASCULINE and FEMININE forms in both contexts may be a function of
individual speakers’ language practices, or it may be related to other linguistic or
sociolinguistic factors that conditioned gender agreement in a given context.
Below is an analysis of contextualized utterances from those speakers who
demonstrated variation in both contexts.
While Iris demonstrated the most variation across both syntactic contexts,
five other women also used the MASCULINE plural form at least once in the
third-person context.  Below are transliterated texts of the utterances in which
they used the MASCULINE third-person plural to refer to group of females.
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3. haish    haze yodeia  shekulam  shekulan po nashim
the man this  knows(M) that all(M) that all(F) here women
this man knows that all, all of us here are women.
4. am  nashim  medabrim    beineihen       kaxa
also   women   speak(M,P)  between them(F) such
women also speak with each other this way
Example (3), from Edit, shows a speaker self-correcting from MASCULINE to
the FEMININE.  She was discussing how a particular man always used
MASCULINE forms to refer to the women working at a feminist organization.  In
this context, gender and gender marking were the explicit topics of the discourse.
Edit first used the MASCULINE pronominal form for ‘all’ /kulam/ with the final
[m], but immediately corrected herself to the FEMININE form /kulan/ with the
final [n].  As discussed previously, the distinction between the [m] and [n] final
forms is falling out of spoken Hebrew in most informal contexts.  For many
speakers the use of kulam is totally gender neutral.  There is evidence of the use
of the MASCULINE forms of ‘all’ – kulam, ‘everyone’ - kol exad and ‘no one’ -
af exad followed by personal pronouns and predicates with FEMININE gender
agreement markers.  Edit’s initial use of the MASCULINE form can be
understood as evidence that these forms are the default impersonal pronouns and
the forms she habitually uses.  Her immediate self-correction to the FEMININE
form indicates her awareness of the “error.”  Gender may be more salient for her
in this context because it is the overt topic of discourse.  The content of her
utterance may also effect her awareness of gender marking.  Since the MIH
copula is not overly realized in the present tense, Edit is not required to coordinate
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the impersonal pronoun kulam with a predicate.  The fact that she is coordinating
the impersonal pronoun with the antecedent, nashim ‘women’ may contribute to
her awareness of gender and her ability to catch and correct her grammatical
error.  In example (3), therefore, discourse topic as well as proximity of pronouns
to nominal antecedents seems to counteract the habituated use of plural
MASCULINE impersonal pronouns.
Example (4) above, also from Edit, is clearly a simple production error.
The plural form of the word isha ‘woman’ is nashim ‘women,’ which has the
same phonological shape as the MASCULINE plural morpheme [im].61  The
word is assigned FEMININE gender and should co-occur with FEMININE
agreement markers, but the phonology triggers occasional “processing errors.”
There are several irregular Hebrew nominal forms for which the phonological
shape of the plural form conflicts with the gender classification.  For example, the
plural for av ‘father’ is avot, which has the [ot] ending morphologically associated
with FEMININE plurals but retains a MASCULINE classification and takes
MASCULINE agreement markers.  It is not surprising to find native Hebrew
speakers making these types of online processing errors in gender agreement with
these irregular nominal forms.  It is interesting to note that in this phrase, despite
the MASCULINE agreement marker on the predicate, the anaphoric objective
pronoun hen ‘them (F)’ preserves the FEMININE gender agreement of the
referent nashim ‘women.’  The use of the FEMININE pronominal form for
                                                 
61 As noted in Chapter II, MIH has root and pattern morphology.  Reference to [im] as the
MASCULINE plural morpheme is not meant to imply that MIH has concatenative morphology
but that the [im] ending is one of the morphological markers that distinguishes between
FEMININE and MASCULINE plural nouns.
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reflexive reference to the nominal subject “women” suggests that the explanation
of a phonologically triggered production error is correct.
In the next set of utterances, speakers use predicates with dropped
subjects, often referred to as “pro-drop predicates.”  The agreement marking on
these predicates supplies the “missing” information that allows hearers to identify
the implied subject.  In each of the examples below, the implied agents are
women but there is no overt nominal or pronominal element to trigger the
FEMININE agreement marker.  It is not surprising to find that in this context,
speakers may revert to the habitual practice of using MASCULINE plural
agreement markers with seemingly ambiguous plural subjects.
5. anaxnu rak nashim po   baxeder     vekama kef im yedu.
we       only women   here in the room an how fun if knew (M,P)
we are only women here, and how fun if (they) knew that
kol   paam   shemedabrim belashon zaxar
every time that speak (M,P) in language male
every time that (we) speak(M,P) in masculine language
ze keilu lo lasim lev   lauvda  hazot.
it is like no  put    heart to the fact this
it’s like not paying attention to this fact.
6. hameser    haalui ze okei   medabrim belashon
the message overt   this okay speak(M,P) in language
the overt message is, okay we speak in FEMININE language
nekeiva         ki       kulan  nashim
FEMININE  because  all(F)  women
because all are women.
103
7. am bilal  sheani kan veani ken, eh meirim li.
also because that I   here and I   yes, eh comment(M,P) to me
also, because I am here and I yes eh (they) comment to me
veanaxnu   meirot       axat    leshniya       am.
and  we     comment(F,P) one(F) to second(F) also
and we also comment to one another.
The agents of all the predicates in bold type are defined by the context or content
of the utterance rather than by an overt nominal or pronominal form.  In Eti’s
utterance, (5), the missing agents of the MASCULINE marked predicate are
overtly mentioned in an earlier part of the utterance - anaxnu rak nashim po ‘we
are all women here’ - nonetheless, the predicate was produced with MASCULINE
agreement.  In example (6), Iris’s statement about the implied message of
insisting that a group of women students use FEMININE forms about themselves,
the implied agents of the verb medabrim ‘speak’ were Iris, herself, and the
women in her class.  Despite the topic of the utterance and the gender of the
implied agents, Iris marks the predicate with MASCULINE plural agreement.
Finally, Meital’s utterance, (7), also demonstrates that predicates with implied
subjects seem more likely to trigger MASCULINE agreement even if the subject
or agent of the predicate is a specific group of females. Meital’s utterance was in
the context a longer exchange about language use at the feminist organization
where she works and they way women monitor each other’s speech. Notice that in
(7), the third-person plural form without an overt nominal or pronominal agent
was MASCULINE variant.  The occurrence of the first-person plural variable in
the second part of the statement was coordinated with an overt first-person
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pronoun anaxnu and Meital used the FEMININE variant for agreement on the
same predicate.  Although the first-person pronoun is not marked for gender, the
use of the pronoun may have raised Meital’s awareness of the antecedents of the
pronoun, the women at the center.
What is of interest to this investigation is that in all of these examples, the
overt topic of discourse is language use practices and the use of gender in
reference to female subjects.  Based on the evidence of Edit’s overt self-
correction, we might assume that discourse topic would lead Eti, Iris, and Meital
to use FEMININE agreement even without overt FEMININE nominal or
pronominal forms.  In the three cases above, however, the discourse topic did not
seem to trigger greater awareness of gender or condition these speakers to use
FEMININE agreement on plural predicates with implied subjects.  In separate
analysis of gender agreement on predicates with implied agents or subjects, I
found only two occurrences of FEMININE agreement marking and both of these
were on singular forms.  (See Appendix B for the quantitative data on my
informants’ use of grammatical gender with dropped-subject predicates.)  The
combined evidence from the three utterances above and the analysis of other
dropped subject predicates seems to indicate that when a predicate has an implied
subject, speakers are more likely to revert to the use of “generic” MASCULINE
agreement.  The lack of an overt nominal or pronominal form to condition gender
marking seems to lead these speakers to use the form they have been socialized to
treat as the unmarked or generic.  Even for utterances in which the context or
content defines the implied agent clearly.
105
Example (8) also shows third-person plural reference, Ofra used a
MASCULINE impersonal pronoun and coordinated predicate in reference to her
female coworkers.
8. aval af exad     lo rotse et ze
but   no one(M)  no want(M,S) D.O. this
but no one wants this
This example of the use of a MASCULINE form for ‘no one’ in the context of an
utterance where the only possible referents are women is similar to Edit’s initial
use of MASCULINE kulam in example (3).  As I stated earlier, the majority of
speakers use MASCULINE forms for the impersonal pronouns, ‘all,’ ‘everyone,’
‘no one,’ and ‘someone,’ even in reference to women.  The use of MASCULINE
forms in these cases may be due in part to the generic construction of the
utterances.  Despite the fact that the possible referents of Ofra’s statement are
limited to her female coworkers at a feminist organization, the construction of the
sentence is generic.  The context of Ofra’s utterance and information gathered
from other parts of the conversational exchange defined the set of possible
referents for impersonal pronoun ‘no one.’  Ofra’s utterance is similar to Edit’s
statement “shekulam shekulan po nashim” ‘that all(M), that all(F) here (are)
women.’  In both cases, the construction of the statement is generic.  I will refer to
this type of utterance as a pseudo-generic because although the grammatical
construction is clearly generic, the scope of referents is limited to a specific and
known set of referents.  Here, it was the women from Edit’s feminist organization.
The use of the MASCULINE forms in these somewhat ambiguous or
generic contexts might be seen as evidence that the MASCULINE category is
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grammatically or structurally the unmarked or generic.  I would, however, caution
readers from drawing that conclusion.  It should not be surprising that the generic
structure of Ofra’s and Edit’s statements leads them to use MASCULINE forms,
just as it is not surprising to find that Eti, Iris, and Meital use MASCULINE plural
agreement with subjectless predicates.  They have been socialized by years of
exposure to prescriptive rules and conventional practices of language use to treat
the MASCULINE as the unmarked or generic.  In the absence of overt
FEMININE forms, it is not surprising to find these “slips” into conventional
usage despite the fact that the implied or referential subjects can only be female.
I turn now to an examination of the use of gender with first-person plural
forms.  As stated earlier, first-person only triggers gender agreement on predicates
in the present tense.62  Table 5.2 shows that Edit, Einat, and Iris used FEMININE
forms in only half of their possible utterances.  In comparison to the language use
of the other women, the behavior of these three women might be seen as unusual.
While some deviation from the communal norm is to be expected, the degree of
variation from the feminist norm and the lack of clear preference for either
gendered form warrant an examination and the positing of possible explanations.
An examination of some contextualized utterances in which Einat and Iris
use plural first-person reference might provide more information about the factors
that are conditioning their choices.  The examples below contain both
                                                 
62 I use the term “predicates” to include forms that are referred to colloquially as “verbs” in
Hebrew but are in fact predicate nouns or adjectives. The lack of the copula in the present tense
results in these predicate nouns (sometimes called adjectives) appearing as nouns or adjective in
translated texts but in the MIH grammatical system they are predicates.  For example, anaxnu
reevot would be translated into English idiomatically as ‘we are hungry’ but in the Hebrew the
“adjective” reevot ‘hungry’ is literally ‘the ones (F) who hunger.’
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MASCULINE and FEMININE forms coordinated with first-person plural
reference to women.  In example (9), Einat was discussing the new voice mail
system and the use of FEMININE singular forms in the recording to address
callers.  In example (10), Iris was reporting an instruction she gave to her female
students in a class of all women.  Each use of the plural first-person is in bold
type.
9. varim hitkashru   elai       veze    meatsben otam.
men(P) called(M,P) to me   and this  angers    them(M,P)
the men called me, and this angers them
meatsben shelo  medabrim    eleihem besafa       shelahem
angers      that no  speak (M,P)  to them  in language that to them(M,P)
it angers them that (we) don’t address them in their language.
10. mehayom    medabrim   belashon     nekeiva
from today    speak  (M.P.) in language  feminine
from today (we) use the feminine
mekeivan  sheyesh       po    rak   nashim
because    that existence here only women
because, there are only women here
In both (9) and (10) above, the agent of the verb medabrim ‘speak’ is implied
rather than overt.  The intended agent of Einat’s statement, in (9), could have been
anyone.  However, the context of the utterance led me to conclude that Einat was
referring to herself and the other women who made controversial linguistic
choices regarding the voicemail recording.  In (10), Iris’s use of MASCULINE
agreement on the predicate medabrim is interesting given that she was speaking
about what she and her students should do in the class or any all female context.
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She could have avoided the issue of gender agreement altogether by using the
first-person plural in future tense nedaber.  Her use of the present tense form
forced her to use either MASCULINE or FEMININE agreement.  An overt
nominal or pronominal agent would likely have conditioned gender agreement.
Despite the fact that the first-person pronouns are not marked for gender, the overt
pronoun did appear to aid Meital’s use of the FEMININE first-person variant in
example seven.  Gender agreement on the predicate is the only way to index the
gender of an intended first-person agent and agreement is only marked in present
tense.   As I have demonstrated in the analysis of the third-person context, the
absence of an overt nominal or pronominal subject seems to trigger
MASCULINE agreement even when the implied agent(s) are female.  Given these
related conditioning factors, it is not surprising to find that feminist speakers will
use MASCULINE plural forms in the first-person plural context, particularly in
the case of “subjectless” predicates.
In example (11), Einat varied agreement marking on predicates
coordinated with the first-person plural.
11. haemda     need   omeret  sheanaxnu osim    lahem
the position against    says     that  we         do(M,P) to them(M,P)
the opposing position says that we are doing to them(men)
ma    shehem       osim       lanu
what that they(M,P) do (M,P) to us
what they(men) do to us.
vehaemda        sheli omeret sheze    lo bediyuk kaxa,
and the position  mine says     that this   not exactly so
and my position says that this is not exactly the case,
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mikeivan sheze    irun           nashim.
because    that this  organization  women.
because this is a women’s organization.
ze irun           shetishim axuz meihatelefonim shelo
this organization that 90  percent  of the calls         of his
this is an organization where 90% of the calls it gets,
ze lenashim, eh shenashim mitkashrot.
this to women eh, that women call (F,P)
are to women eh, that women call.
ze  irun          shetsrixa         lihiyot frendli lasviva           shelo,
this organization  that must(F,S)   be friendly to constituents  of his
this is an organization that must be friendly to its constituents,
shenashim yarishu kan kmo babayit.
that women will feel here like in the home
that women will feel at home here.
az      ein     tsorex, dafka   kan anaxnu tsrixot lihiyot, letaken.
so there is no  need,    actually here     we      need(F,P) to be, to fix
so there is not need, actually here we must be,  fix,
ah zot omeret ze mariz oti sheanaxnu tsrixot lihiyot,
ah that says    this angers me   that we        need(F,P) to be
ah that is to say it angers me that we(women at org.) need to be
afilu kan, keilu beseder,  velesharet     am    et havarim.
even here like  in order and to give service also (DO) the men.
even here, like, okay, to give service the men also. 63
                                                 
63 It is interesting to note that while irgun ‘organization’ is a MASCULINE noun, she used a
FEMININE agreement marking on the predicate, thought the possessive pronoun shelo maintains
MASCULINE agreement.  While I am not addressing the use of gender with inanimate nouns, it is
possible that this grammatical “slip” was due to Einat’s focus on the fact that the organization in
question was a women’s organization.  If she were to personify the organization itself, she would
probably have used a FEMININE personification.
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In example (11), there are three occurrences of first-person plural reference,
highlighted by bold type face, each of which has an overt subject.  In the first
occurrence, Einat uses the MASCULINE agreement marker on the coordinated
predicate.  The second and third uses of the first-person plural pronoun are both
coordinated with predicates that show FEMININE plural agreement.  What might
have triggered the use of the MASCULINE agreement marker with the first use of
‘we’? Or conversely, what might have caused Einat to switch from the
MASCULINE to the FEMININE between the first and second use of the first-
person plural?
Einat’s first use of the first-person plural occurs within the following set of
phrases: anaxnu osim lahem ma shehem osim lanu ‘we [the women at the
organization] do(M,P) to them(M,P) what they(M,P) do to us.’  It is possible that
the proximity of three MASCULINE forms, one of which was within the relevant
syntactic phrase, triggered an adjacency production error.  The first-person plural
pronoun, anaxnu, is not marked for gender, so the referents and their gender are
evident only from other contextual clues.  The only pronominal form in the initial
verb phrase with overt gender marking is the object lahem ‘to them(M,P),’ which
refers to men.  In addition, the predicate osim ‘do(M,P)’ occurs twice within this
initial statement in close proximity.  The first time, the agents are the women at
the feminist center, which should trigger FEMININE agreement.  The second
predicate has a different agent, men or at least those who use MASCULINE forms
to address women. The close proximity of the two predicates, as well as the overt
use of the MASCULINE plural third-person pronoun in both verb phrases, may
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have pushed the MASCULINE gender category to the forefront of Einat’s
consciousness.64  The conventional practice of using MASCULINE agreement
even for female agents may also have contributed to Einat’s use of MASCULINE
agreement for the predicate with female agents.
A comparison of this initial occurrence of the first-person plural with the
latter uses of the first-person plurals reveals that the latter uses were not in
proximity to other plural predicates.  Additionally, they were proceeded by
several statements that overtly refered to women and the fact that the organization
served women.  It could be argued that her explicit reference to women and
women’s needs pushed the FEMININE and feminine categories forward in her
consciousness, thus increasing the probability that she would produce the
“correct” FEMININE form.  The discourse topic, the approval of using the
FEMININE forms to address callers to a feminist organization, may also
influence the salience of the gender and the FEMININE category.  As I have
already demonstrated, discourse topic seems to influence speaker behavior in the
use of gender agreement.
Another possible explanation for Einat’s behavior is related to the fact that
in the beginning of the utterance, she was reporting the content of the “opposing
position” regarding the linguistic choice made for the voice mail recording.
                                                 
64 It is not within the scope of this dissertation to discuss the various theories regarding the source
of production errors for gender agreement.  Badecker (2004) discussed various theories and
explanations for agreement errors in the case of conflicting gender forms within sentence level
syntactic units.  Badecker’s research focused on gender agreement with inanimate referents.
Nonetheless, I believe his theories can be applied in this case, particularly in light of the
asymmetrical use of MASCULINE and FEMININE forms for plural gender agreement by MIH
speakers.
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haemda need omeret sheanaxnu osim lahem ma shehem osim lanu ‘the
opposing position says that we are doing to them [men] what they do to us.’  The
use of the predicate omeret ‘says’ is a discourse marker.  It indicates to the hearer
that the following statement is a direct quote or paraphrase of speech from the
supporters of the “opposing position.”  Her report about the “opposing position”
was followed immediately with a presentation of her own position: vehaemda
sheli omeret sheze lo bediyuk kaxa mikeivan sheze irun nashim. ‘And my
position says that this is not exactly so, given that this is a women’s organization.’
Einat used the same construction vehaemda omeret “the position says” to
express each perspective; however, her presentation of the second position was
her own perspective.  The language she used to express her own position is more
likely to reflect her own practices, or those she felt were in line with her
ideological position.  Based on this observation, I would like to argue that it is
possible to interpret Einat’s use of MASCULINE gender within the report of the
“opposing” position as an indexical marker of her relationship to the opposing
ideological perspective and those who held it.
The referential meaning of the two gender categories is altered or
augmented by Einat’s ideological perspective on how gender agreement is used in
mainstream varieties of CIH and how it is used by feminists.  The use of
MASCULINE agreement in the statement representing those opposed to the use
of FEMININE forms of address on the voicemail indexes their language practices
as well as their ideological distance from the feminist practices.  The FEMININE
agreement on the predicates linked to the expression of a feminist ideological
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perspective index that position as well as the practice itself.  The “meaning” of the
gender agreement, therefore, cannot be read simply from the forms as they occur
but must be interpreted through the context within which they are uttered.  In the
examples of MASCULINE agreement on third-person plural forms, Eti also used
the MASCULINE plural to describe an action she found problematic, women
using MASCULINE language to talk amongst themselves.  In (5) her use of
MASCULINE agreement on a predicate with an implied agent may also have
indexed Eti’s personal or ideological relationship to that practice.  This sample of
data cannot conclusively determine which factor or combination of factors
influenced Einat’s and Eti’s behavior.  Nonetheless, it seems possible that their
behavior is an example of using the grammatical system to create distinctions
between feminist and non-feminist perspectives or membership in their
communities of practice.
The contexualized examples analyzed above demonstrate some of the
various factors that influence the use of gender marking in the syntactic/semantic
context of plural definite reference to females.  The women in this study
demonstrated a clear preference for the use of FEMININE agreement markers in
reference to females; however, certain grammatical and contextual parameters
seemed to condition the use of MASCULINE forms in some utterances.  There is
a strong association between seemingly ambiguous or generic referents and the
MASCULINE gender category.  Agents or nominal subjects that are implied
rather than explicitly realized may resemble ambiguous or generic referents,
which may explain why several of the MASCULINE tokens for the variable
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occurred within utterances with implied or pseudo-generic referents.  The
evidence from Einat and others shows that discourse topic influenced the
realization of gender agreement.  If the discourse topic was explicitly about
women or about language and gender issues, gender appears to have been more
salient for the speaker, which generally led to the use of FEMININE forms.
Finally, speakers appear to use gender pragmatically to index the nature of their
social relationships with referents in their utterances or their ideological stance
vis-à-vis a particular position.  In the utterances of Eti and Einat, the use of
FEMININE forms indexed solidarity while the use of MASCULINE forms
indexed distance.65  Despite the various contexts within which my informants
used MASCULINE agreement in reference to females, the quantitative data
clearly indicate that the preference for these feminist women was to use
FEMININE gender markers in utterances about women and girls.  This evidence
is consistent with my observations of the use of this variable in the larger feminist
community.  Together they support a broad assertion that within the Israeli
feminist community, the hyper-standard use of FEMININE forms for definite
feminine reference is an emerging norm.
Before concluding the analysis of this variable, I would like to discuss its
overall indexical value as a marker of feminist Hebrew and by extension feminist
identity.  The high percentage of use for this variable and a strictly quantitative
perspective might lead to the conclusion that this is a very salient indexical
marker of feminist Hebrew.  Statements about the way women are socialized to
                                                 
65 I return to the issue of gender as a pragmatic index of solidarity or distance in chapter six.
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use FEMININE plural forms in feminist organizations is clear evidence that this
variable indexes a feminist sensibility within the feminist community of practice.
However, this variable does not contradict existing prescriptive rules of MIH and
it is an acceptable, if hyper-standardized, use of Hebrew.  Hebrew speakers who
are not members of the feminist community of practice, might understand the use
of FEMININE plural marking with plural definite reference as a index of
grammatical correctness or careful speech.  In formal speech contexts, the use of
this variable might not be remarkable at all.  Nor is its use limited to members of
the feminist community.  Educated Israelis in academic contexts, newly fluent
speakers of Hebrew, and women who find themselves in culturally marked female
contexts, such as a girls’ religious school, are also likely to use FEMININE plural
marking for definite plural reference to females.  This variable does index a
feminine cultural context for most Israeli Hebrew speakers, however it does not
necessarily index a specifically feminist practice or ideology for mainstream
Hebrew speakers.
5.3 INCLUSIVE DEFINITE PLURAL REFERENCE
The use of FEMININE plural forms for definite plural reference to
females may be a form of hyper-standard or contextually conditioned language
use, but the use of FEMININE forms for definite plural reference to mixed gender
groups is a specifically feminist practice.  Several times throughout the course of
my field research, informants told me that the Hebrew Language Academy (HLA)
had passed a ruling that allowed speakers to use the FEMININE plural when
addressing or referring to a mixed group of males and females.  In one version of
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the rumor, a speaker could choose agreement forms based on the apparent gender
of the majority, (i.e. FEMININE for majority female groups, MASCULINE for
majority male groups).  In a separate version, there were no restrictions; a speaker
could simply choose which gender she/he wanted to use.66  As discussed in
chapter two, the Academy had never passed such a ruling, nor was it ever likely to
do so.  Nonetheless, the rumor of this ruling was so widely believed in segments
of the Israeli population, that it appeared as a triumph of feminist activism in
some popular and academic articles about language use and the expression of
gender identity. One of my informants reported that she had adopted the
innovative practice of using FEMININE plural forms with majority female groups
until she read a statement issued by the HLA to the popular press that “set the
record straight.”67  Rumor or no, many of the women I knew or worked with in
the feminist community claimed to use the FEMININE plural for definite
reference to mixed gender groups in a variety of social contexts.  Some of these
speakers also reported using the SLASH form, MASCULINE and FEMININE
forms together, when addressing a mixed audience.  In this section, I present the
quantitative data on the use of both FEMININE and SLASH forms for definite
reference to mixed gender groups.
For the purposes of data analysis, I defined “inclusive plural definite
reference” as the use of grammatical forms to mark agreement on nominal,
                                                 
66 I alternate between using she and she/he for generic reference to speakers.  The reader should
understand that the use of either convention applies to any Hebrew speaker regardless of gender.
67 As noted in chapter two, I never found this “statement” or any other article regarding the HLA’s
retraction of the rumored ruling; nonetheless, the existence of this rumor points to the interesting
and complex value that Israeli Hebrew speakers seem to place on the “correct” use of Hebrew.
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pronominal and predicate forms with definite mixed gender referents, agents, or
subjects. Definite reference, in this analysis, includes direct address, as well as
third-person reference to a defined group or community.  The rules of prescriptive
grammar and conventional practices socialize speakers to use MASCULINE
plurals when referring to or addressing a mixed gender group.  Nonetheless, the
rumored HLA ruling allowing speakers to choose the gender marking according
to the majority in a given context was adopted by members of diverse social
communities including the LGBT community and other socially progressive sub-
cultural groups.  The concept of gender equality and transparency also led to the
use of the SLASH form in both formal and informal contexts.
The examples below demonstrate the three variants of gender marking for
this variable context.  All of the examples are taken from the same informant,
Osnat, who reported using FEMININE forms to address her students in some of
the classes she taught.
12. baseminar   hem       matxilim   ledaber    axeret
in seminar they(M,P) begin(M,P) to speak differently
in the seminar they begin to speak differently
Example (12) contains the conventional and prescribed use of MASCULINE
plural forms for reference to a mixed group of males and females.  The bolded
words are the MASCULINE plural third-person pronoun hem followed by the
predicate matxilim ‘begin’ with the plural MASCULINE agreement marker [im].
Out of context, this utterance could be interpreted as reference to an exclusively
male group or a group of males and females together.  The context of the
utterance, Osnat’s explanation of how her language practices effect both her male
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and female students, provides the necessary information to interpret the
MASCULINE plurals as inclusive.
In (13) below, Osnat uses both the FEMININE plural and then the SLASH
form to refer to her students.  The bolded words are the FEMININE plural form of
the word ‘students’ studentiyot followed by the explicit inclusion of the
MASCULINE –studentim – and FEMININE – studentiyot – forms in the SLASH
form.  I identified the hesitation marker em, as an indication that the use of the
SLASH forms was a qualification of the initial use of the FEMININE forms.  This
example points to the inherent problem of using the FEMININE plural forms for
definite reference in a third-person context.  Without the explicit inclusion of
males in the SLASH form, most MIH speakers would assume that Osnat was
referring specifically to her female students.  My knowledge of Osnat’s practice
of using FEMININE plurals as inclusive combined with the qualification of the
SLASH form helped me to identify the token in line (13) as an example of the
FEMININE plural being used for inclusive plural reference.
13. kesheani pona   el hastudentiyot       sheli  belashon
when  I   address to  the students(F,P) mine  in language
when I address my students in language
em lestudentim       vestudentiyot       belashon nekeiva
em to students(M,P) and students(F,P) in language feminine
em to male students and females students with feminine language
14. bashiurim hem      nihyim          venihyot
in class    they(M,P) become(M,P) and become(F,P)
in class they become
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meod mudaim    vemudaot        leze
very   aware(M,P) and aware(F,P) to this
very aware of this, both the men and women.
Example (14) contains two uses of the SLASH form.  Osnat began this utterance
with the MASCULINE plural third-person pronoun hem in reference to her
students, but she used both the MASCULINE and FEMININE forms of the
predicates nihyim venihyot ‘become’ and muda’im vemuda’ot ‘aware.’  This
example is typical of the way that the SLASH form appears in speech.  Speakers
often begin with a MASCULINE nominal or pronominal form and then provide
some overt qualification that informs hearers that the intended referent group
includes both males and females.  In the case of the example above, Osnat
conjugated both predicate forms.  Often the SLASH form appears only as an overt
qualification of the nominal form such as: hem, gam nashim vegam gvarim
‘they(M,P) men and women.’  In my analysis of the SLASH forms, any explicit
qualification of a MASCULINE (or FEMININE) plural form as inclusive was
counted as a SLASH token.
The variable context potentially includes first, second, and third-person
plural reference; however, the structure of the interview only elicited third-person
reference.  The use of either the FEMININE or SLASH variants for inclusive
reference seemed to occur more readily in second-person forms of direct address
than in the other contexts.  Since the quantitative data on the use of this variable
was quite limited by the context of the interview, Table 5.3 includes data on
reported use of either the FEMININE or the SLASH forms in speech or writing.
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Dafna 0 0 0 no yes (in writing)
Edit 0 0 0 yes no
Einat 3 0 0
Eti 0 0 0 yes (by majority)
Iris 6 0 0 no (did before) yes (in writing)
Meital 1 0 0 yes (by majority) yes
Merav 0 0 0 yes
Michal 3 0 0 no yes (in writing)
Na’ama 4 0 0
Neta 7 0 0 yes
Nitsan 1 0 0 yes (by majority)
Nurit 0 0 0 yes
Ofra 0 0 0 yes
Ora 3 0 0 yes
Osnat 23 1 3 yes yes
Table 5.3 Usage of grammatical gender for definite plural reference to mixed gender groups
121
The quantitative data presented in table 5.3 show that Osnat was the only
informant to use either the FEMININE plural or the SLASH construction in the
context of the interview
Of more significance for the analysis of this variable is the reported use of
the FEMININE and SLASH variants.  Table 5.3 presents the data on reported use
of both the FEMININE plural and SLASH forms.  If an informant reported using
either form, the entry in the relevant column is “yes.”  A “no” entry in the column
indicates that an informant reported that she did not use the form.  If an informant
did not directly indicate whether or not she used either form, the space on the
table was left blank.  The table shows that nine of the fifteen informants reported
using the FEMININE forms to address or refer to mixed gender groups.  A few of
the informants qualified their answer by stating that they used the gendered form
that corresponded to the gender of the majority of the members of the referent
group. Iris, whose “no” response is qualified, revealed that she had used the
FEMININE form in contexts where there were more women than men until she
discovered that the rumor of the HLA ruling was false.  When I asked her why
she had change her practice, she responded that she felt it was her duty as a native
speaker and an educator to model “correct” grammar.  In response to questions
about the use of the SLASH variant, six informants reported using this double
gendered construction.  As the table indicates, however, three of these women
reported only using it in writing.  When I asked why they did not try to use it in
their speech, they responded that the double gendering of forms was too
cumbersome for spoken language use.
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It is not surprising to find that the use of FEMININE plural forms as
inclusive is limited even within the feminist community.  Language ideology and
concepts of grammatical correctness as well as habituation to naturalized practices
of using MASCULINE plurals as inclusive clearly shaped their practices with
respect to the use of the FEMININE and SLASH variants in this context.  In
addtion, the need to communicate clearly and effectively in a variety of social
contexts limits the usefulness of this innovative practice. As example two
illustrated, Osnat felt the need to qualify her use of an inclusive FEMININE
plural, even in the context of a discussion about the use of this variable with
another feminist.  Israeli feminists clearly place ideological value on the use of
FEMININE forms as gender inclusive, using language to reverse the naturalized
relationship of men and women to the linguistically constructed collective.68
Nonetheless, the use of FEMININE plurals as inclusive can often result in
miscommunication.  The quantitative data on those who reported using the
FEMININE forms in certain contexts, illustrates that this variable was ideologized
within the feminist community.  Given that the FEMININE variant clearly
violates prescribed grammatical rules as well as conventional practices of use, it is
also highly marked as an index of feminist practice and ideology for most MIH
                                                 
68 Prescribed and conventional practices of language use naturalize the relationship between the
grammatical and social categories of gender.  The metaphorical relationship of the unmarked
linguistic form to the unmarked social category of Israeli is reified through the use of
MASCULINE plural forms to address a collective of males and females.  Thus, feminist use of the
FEMININE plural form to address a mixed gender group inverts this naturalized relationship
between males as unmarked and females as marked members of the collective.  By inverting the
relationship, the practice also calls attention to the underlying ideological associations,
associations that are keenly felt by those who are consistently marked as OTHER vis-à-vis the
“normalized’ collective identity.
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speakers.  Of course, the interpretation of the indexical meaning of the variable
depends on interlocutors correctly interpreting the inclusive referential meaning.
The SLASH variant is less controversial than the FEMININE variant.  It
does not violate any prescriptive rules but it does diverge from conventional
practices of language use.  The SLASH construction also overtly calls attention to
the ambiguity inherent in using MASCULINE (or for that matter FEMININE)
plural forms as inclusive.  As such, many feminists prefer this form for written
texts, particularly in education textbooks.  One of my informants, an elementary
school teacher, reported her conscious effort to use the SLASH variant when she
addressed the girls and boys in her class for advanced students.  She said that her
practices did not affect the students use of language, but the girls in the class
noticed and appreciated being addressed directly.  In mainstream Israeli society,
the SLASH form is identified as a form of “politically correct” language use, a
label and concept borrowed from the United States.  Israeli equal employment
opportunity laws include a mandate that all published employment advertisements
must include explicit reference to males and females through the use of both
MASCULINE and FEMININE grammatical forms.  The mandated use of the
SLASH form as well as recent efforts to reform language use in other public
contexts has raised awareness of this variable and linked it to the greater Israeli
movement for gender equality and modernization.
5.4 GENDER-SPECIFIC PLURAL REFERENCE: RECLAIMING HISTORICAL
FEMININE PREDICATE FORMS
Historically, second and third-person plural FEMININE forms in the
future tense were distinguished from the MASCULINE forms.  The
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reconstruction of MIH grammar from biblical Hebrew maintained this distinction,
but in the early part of the twentieth century the paradigm was reduced to the
MASCULINE form in most oral contexts.  The historical or literary grammatical
forms for showing FEMININE plural agreement on future tense and imperative
predicates, hereafter referred to as the historical, or the historical FEMININE,
forms, became limited to higher registers of MIH in the 1950’s.  I was not taught
these forms in the ulpan, language immersion program, in which I participated in
1993.  A survey of similar programs aimed at new immigrants revealed that most
ulpanim present the MASCULINE forms as the only forms in these syntactic
paradigms.69  They are still included in Hebrew Verb Table books (Tarmon &
Uva, 199l), and the forms are part of the gender paradigm for verb declension still
taught in schools.  Nonetheless, the vast majority of CIH speakers use them only
in the most formal socio-linguistic contexts, if at all.  Academics may use these
forms as part of an academic register of speech, and some older Israelis who
learned Hebrew before 1950 also use these historical FEMININE forms.  Despite
the almost complete simplification in CIH of the gender declension paradigm for
plural future and imperative predicates, I found that some of the feminists with
whom I interacted used the FEMININE forms in informal communicative
contexts.  This discovery led me to identify these historical FEMININE forms as
potential markers of feminist Hebrew.
                                                 
69 Ulpanim are the language immersion programs offered to all new immigrant citizens by the
Israeli state and contracted agencies.  The goal of these programs is to help new citizens in their
process of acculturation.   The language taught in these classes follows prescriptive rules of MIH
but accommodates for changes in CIH such as the simplification of the gender paradigm for
certain verb classes or tenses.
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I understand the use of these forms as another example of the feminist
practice of resisting the loss of FEMININE forms from CIH.  The practice of
using the historical FEMININE form is similar to the feminist practice of using
FEMININE plural forms and agreement markers for definite plural reference to
females.  The primary difference between the historical forms and other plural
FEMININE forms is that the historical forms began falling out of use at a much
earlier period in the history of MIH.  As such, the use of these forms by members
of the feminist community might be seen as an attempt to revive or reinsert a lost
form into the grammatical paradigm.  The forms are used for both definite and
sex-specific generic plural reference to females.  Below are tables presenting the
conjugation paradigms for plural future and imperative predicates.  I include both
the historical and the conventional forms for the conjugation of predicates with
FEMININE subjects.
person Hebrew plural70 English gloss
first MASC/FEM navo we will come
second MASCULINE tavou you (M) will come
second historical
FEMININE
tavona you (F) will come
second conventional
FEMININE
tavou you (F) will come
third MASCULINE hem yavou they (M) will come
third historical
FEMININE
hen tavona they (F) will come
third conventional
FEMININE
hen yavou they (F) will come
                                                 
70 In the future and past tense paradigms the pronouns are optional for first and second person
conjugations, thus I have left them out of the representation of the Hebrew forms in second
column of Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4 Conjugation of Hebrew future tense plural verbs
As table 5.4 shows, the second-person and third-person FEMININE plural
pronouns are used with either the MASCULINE form or the historical
FEMININE form.  FEMININE nominal agents would also occur with either form
of the predicate.  Table 5.5 below presents the conjugation of imperative Hebrew
verbs.  Again, MIH speakers can address females with either the historical
FEMININE or the conventional MASCULINE form.
Gender Hebrew Plural Gloss
MASCULINE bou you come (M,P)
historical FEMININE bona you come (F,P)
conventional FEMININE bou you come (F,P)
Table 5.5 Conjugation of Hebrew plural imperative verbs
The women in my study used both the historical FEMININE forms and
the MASCULINE forms in their utterances.  The interview setting did not elicit
any examples of the imperative forms, but the future forms appeared in some
utterances as either simple future or conditional predicates.  Below are examples
from the data of sentences in which speakers used either the conventional
MASCULINE form or the historical FEMININE form with a FEMININE subject.
15. shehabanot    sheli titstarexna     laavor            et     ze
that daughters mine will need (F,P) to pass through D.O. this
that my daughters will need to endure this [sexism]
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16. shetar
eshna     babayit. hinei hen hiiu lamakom
that will feel(F,P) at home  here they arrived to a place
that they will feel at home.  Now they got to a place,
shemedabrim    eleihen        beleshonan
that speaks(M,P) to them(F,P) in language theirs
that addresses them in their language.
17. rov  hanashim  baaretz  yeshanu            et shem hamishpaxa
most the women in Israel will change(P) D.O. name the family
most Israeli women will change their family name
shelahen     axarei hanisuim     leshem     baalan
of theirs(F,P) after  the wedding to the name husband (pos.F,P)
after the wedding to their husbands’ name
In example (15), Merav expressed her fears about the sexist attitudes that her
future daughters might face.  She used the future plural form with female subjects
twice and in both instances, she used the FEMININE form.  Merav did not
comment directly on her use of this variable.  In both occurrences, the
uninterrupted flow of the discourse seems to indicate that the historical forms
were part of her normal repertoire of linguistic resources.  In (16), Iris was
referring to women who might call her organization and feel encouraged by the
use of FEMININE forms to address callers.  Although she was ambivalent about
this policy, she did see this as a potential positive outcome.71  This use of the
historical form was the only occurrence of a plural future tense predicate in Iris’s
discourse.  Both of these examples are typical of the utterances in which my
                                                 
71 In chapter seven, I examine the attitudes of Iris and three other women, from her organization,
regarding the issue of the voicemail recording and the “underlying message” of using only
FEMININE forms of address.
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informants used the FEMININE future plural form.  Example (17), from the
interview with Dafna, contains an example of the historically MASCULINE form
coordinated with a FEMININE subject.72  Dafna’s utterance is a typical example
of the more conventional use of gender agreement for plural future tense verbs
with female subjects.
The majority of my informants did not use any future tense verbs in the
context of our interviews.  Of the eight women who did use the plural future tense
forms, four used the historical FEMININE forms exclusively. Some of my
informants claimed that they tried to use it but found it difficult to incorporate into
their speech.  Table 5.6 presents the quantitative data on their behavior as well as
their reported use of the FEMININE form.  The tokens counted in the analysis
represent the use of plural future tense predicates with any plural FEMININE
subject; the semantic contexts include plural reference to definite FEMININE
subjects as well as sex-specific generic FEMININE nominal and pronominal
subjects.  In the column that contains data on reported use of the variable, “yes”
indicates an informant claims to use it, “no” indicates the informant reported not
using it, and a blank space indicates that the informant did not comment directly
on her use of this variable.
                                                 
72 Readers should not confuse the use of the qualifier “historically” with the adjective “historical.”
In CIH the “historically” MASCULINE form is now the only form – i.e. gender neutral – for most
speakers.  See the discussion of this variable in Chapter II.
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Dafna 1 0 0% no
Edit 0 0 yes (not always)
Einat 1 0 0% no
Eti 1 0 yes
Iris 1 1 100% yes
Meital 2 0 0% aspires to use it
Merav 2 2 100% yes
Michal 0 0
Na’ama 0 0
Neta 0 0 yes (takes effort)
Nitsan 0 0 yes (rarely)
Nurit 0 0
Ofra 0 0
Ora 1 1 100% no
Osnat 3 3 100% yes
Total 12 7 58%
Table 5.6 Use of future/imperative predicates w/feminine subject/agent
130
 The quantitative data indicate that a slight majority of my informants
reported using or trying to use the historical form.  In addition to the four women
who used it during the interview, four other women reported using or trying to use
the historical form.  The gap between the number of women who used it and those
who reported using it may be an indication of the fact that this variable is not an
easily accessible element of the linguistic repertoire for these women or for most
Israeli Hebrew speakers.  As previously stated, these FEMININE forms fell out of
most registers of spoken Israeli Hebrew in the 1950’s.  The majority of my
informants were born after this change had taken place.  Thus, their reports of
trying to incorporate the historical FEMININE into their linguistic practices
seemed to indicate that the variable was ideologized within the feminist
community.  These reports may also indicate that within the community the
variable has a positive evaluation as an index of feminist sensibilities.
However, two of my informants reported that they did not use the
historical FEMININE because it was too difficult or because using it would make
them sound like “snobs.”  The remarks of these two informants point to the
problem of using this variable as an index of feminist practice or feminist
ideology.  Osnat, an academic whose metalinguistic and linguistic data indicate
that she paid close attention to her use of language, was one of the four informants
who used this variable in the interview and reported using it consistently.  She
was the only one who seemed surprised to find that other women, particularly
other feminists, did not use it regularly.  In our conversation, the historical
FEMININE form occurred within a larger statement about women’s language use:
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18. ani xoshevet sheze yihiye tsaad meod adol kadima beshalav ze
I    think       that this will be step very  great   forward in stage this
“I think that it would be a great step forward at this stage,
im lefaxot nashim tedaberna al     atsman     benekeiva
if  at least  women will speak  about themselves in feminine
if at the least women would speak about themselves in the feminine.”
Osnat used the FEMININE plural future tense form in the context of
speaking about the need for women to use FEMININE forms about themselves.
In latter parts of our conversation, she stated that she considered the historical
form to be one of the forms that women should use in self and other reference.
Osnat’s practice and attitude regarding this variable may reflect her academic
identity as much as her feminist identity.  The combination of her academic
background with her feminist convictions makes her more likely to use this
variable unselfconsciously.  As I stated at the beginning of this section, the
historical FEMININE plural forms are mostly understood as forms used in literary
or high-level Hebrew. Their use is usually restricted to the academy, literary
speech, or the elite newspaper, Ha’aretz.  Osnat’s convictions and practices
notwithstanding, for most MIH speakers including many within the feminist
community, the historical form indexes education and high culture rather than
feminism or feminist identity.
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Chapter VI: Lashon nekeiva kolel gam et hagever ‘FEMININE
language also includes the man’
6.1 GENDER AND GENERIC REFERENCE
In this chapter, I examine my informants’ use of grammatical gender for
generic reference.  As the reader might expect, standard rules for the use of MIH
instruct speakers to use MASCULINE forms for ambiguous generic reference to
animate referents. Advertisements, public safety signs, instructions for use of
products, voicemail outgoing messages, instructions on government forms, and
other forms of address aimed at the general public are usually written in the
MASCULINE singular.  Speakers making ambiguous generic statements are
socialized to use the MASCULINE form in impersonal or generic statements,
including examples in educational settings.  The term “ambiguous generic
reference” refers to those generics that are gender-neutral or inclusive of male and
female referents.  I have used the term “ambiguous” here to call attention to the
ambiguity inherent in using gendered forms for generic reference to all human
referents.  Ambiguous generics are distinct from gender-specific generic reference
to males or females exclusively.  However, as I will discuss in this chapter, it is
not clear that speakers are always able to clearly differentiate between an
ambiguous use of MASCULINE (or FEMININE) forms and gender-specific
generic uses.  My analysis of gender agreement in generic contexts focuses on the
use of third-person and second-person forms of ambiguous generic reference.
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The use of FEMININE forms in the context of generic statements can be
understood in a similar light to the use of FEMININE forms for specific reference
to males and females.  In both contexts, feminists are using the “marked” gender
form as though it were the “unmarked” form.  As in the context of definite third-
person plural reference to a mixed group of males and females, the use of
FEMININE forms for ambiguous generic reference can lead to
miscommunication.  Hearers may assume that the use of the FEMININE gender
in a generic statement is intended to limit the potential referents to females.  In
contrast, the use of the SLASH convention, with its explicit inclusion of both
males and females as potential referents, can be seen as a strategy to disambiguate
the use of gendered forms as gender-neutral or inclusive generics.
6.2 VARIATION FOR THIRD-PERSON GENERIC REFERENCE
Within the feminist community, I encountered several women who used
either FEMININE forms or SLASH conventions for ambiguous generic reference.
The sentences below present the three variants, MASCULINE, FEMININE, and
SLASH, for the ambiguous generic variable context.  Each example was taken
from the speech of an informant.
19. kedei shekol exad     yarish            tov im hasafa shelo
so  that every one(M,S) will feel (M,S) good with the language his
So every one will feel comfortable with his language
In example (19), Einat used the MASCULINE form of the generic ‘everyone’ kol
exad with MASCULINE gender agreement on the coordinated predicate and
possessive pronoun. This utterance is an example of conventional practices for
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gender marking of ambiguous generics.  It occurred in response to a question
about the types of changes Einat might make to language use in educational
settings.  She suggested that creating two sets of textbooks, one using
MASCULINE and one using FEMININE forms of address, could be a solution.
By creating “gender appropriate” texts, neither boys nor girls would have to find
themselves in the texts aimed at the opposite gender.  Her solution also would
alleviate the need for the use of the cumbersome SLASH convention, which many
MIH speakers believe mesarbel et hasafa ‘complicates the language.’ ‘Everyone’
in this context refers to all the students, male and female, who would receive these
gender appropriate books and presumably be more comfortable with the language
used to address them.  It is interesting to note that only girls are likely to be
uncomfortable or alienated by conventional practices of language use in the
classroom or in textbooks. Einat’s generic statement obscures this fact,
particularly when taken out of context.
The next example, (20), also taken from my interview with Einat, contains
the use of a FEMININE form as an ambiguous generic.
20. im yesh       lemishehi          ben o yeladim,    banim o banot
if (existence) to someone(F,S) son or children(M), sons   or daughters
if someone(F) has a son or children, sons or daughters
haolam  sheniftax   bifneihem,       hu olam shave hizdamnuyot
the world that opens before them(M) he world equal opportunities
the world that is open to them is a world of equal opportunities
Einat used the generic pronoun ‘someone’ in its FEMININE form mishehi
literally ‘who that she’ as opposed to the MASCULINE form mishehu ‘who that
he.’  This generic FEMININE form occurred in the context of her utterance about
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how she defined feminism and feminist principles.  Her use of the FEMININE
generic mishehi  “someone” may have been influenced by the fact that she was
talking about a person having children.  Nonetheless, the semantic meaning of her
whole utterance led me to conclude that mishehi “someone(F)” was an ambiguous
generic.  In my analysis of the data for this variable, I will demonstrate that
cultural associations influence the use of both MASCULINE and FEMININE
generics in both predictable and unexpected ways.
The next example contains the use of the SLASH convention.  The
utterance below was taken from a conversation with Iris, in which she described
her vision of feminist change.
21. kol   exad      veaxat          matslixim       o   matslixot
every one(M,S) and one(F,S) succeeds(M,P) or  succeeds(F,P)
everyone, male and female, succeeds
bizxut atsmam
in right theirs(M)
on their own terms”
Example (21) is typical of the SLASH variant in a generic context.  Often, the
speaker does not maintain the double gendering of the forms consistently
throughout the entire utterance.  Iris used both MASCULINE and FEMININE
forms of the generic pronoun ‘one’ and the coordinated predicate; however, she
did not maintain the double gender agreement marking on the anaphoric
possessive pronoun astmam ‘theirs (M,P).’  As I demonstrated in chapter five,
section 5.3, speakers have a difficult time maintaining the double gendering of
forms.  The use of two nominal forms in subject position also created problems
for number agreement on the predicate.  Below, I have rewritten Iris’s statement
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carrying the paradigm of parallel agreement for both gender and number through
the entire utterance:
kol    exad      o exat    matsliax         o matslixa
every  one(M) or one(F) succeeds(M,S) or succeeds(F,S)
everyone male or female succeeds
bezxut atsmo o atsma
by right  his     or hers
by his or her own right
A comparison of this “model” SLASH sentence with Iris’s actual utterance
reveals that double gendering of each linguistic element is not necessary to
achieve the pragmatic goal of explicitly including males and females as potential
referents of the ambiguous generic.  (Though, as noted, those who value
consistency would be likely to criticize her utterance.)  In example (20), Einat
also used the SLASH convention in a limited manner.  She began her comment
about children having equal rights with the use of the singular masculine form ben
‘son.’  She then expanded the singular form, first to the plural MASCULINE
yeladim ‘children (M, P)’ and finally to the phrase, banimo banot ‘sons or
daughters;’ however, the anaphoric pronoun in the objective position that refers
back to the hypothetical children is the simple MASCULINE plural form for
‘them’ hem.  The data will show that feminist speakers use the convention of
double gendering in a variety of ways to achieve their pragmatic goals.
The use of either the SLASH convention or FEMININE forms as
ambiguous generics is ideologized within the feminist community and to a lesser
extent in the general Israeli public.  Legislation related to ensuring equal
opportunities in education and employment included the mandated use of the
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SLASH convention or some explicit reference to the inclusion of females in
educational texts, employment advertisements, and government forms.  Most
MIH speakers, including members of the HLA, view the SLASH convention as an
inelegant solution that makes reading texts unnecessarily cumbersome.  They do
not expect to encounter it in speech.  The legislated changes to the use of
language in these public contexts were the direct or indirect result of feminist
activism on issues of equal access to education and employment.  As such, within
mainstream Hebrew-speaking Israeli society, there is a strong association between
the use of the SLASH convention and FEMININE generics with principles of
gender equality and feminism.  Given the ideological arguments attached to these
practices and the willingness of feminist activists to push for legislated changes,
we might expect members of the feminist community to demonstrate a clear
preference for these linguistic alternatives to the generic MASCULINE.
Table 6.1 presents each informant’s linguistic choices regarding gender
marking for ambiguous generic referents.  The data are limited to third-person
singular and plural ambiguous generics.  (I will address the use of the second-
person singular pronoun as the impersonal generic form in section 6.3)  The first
column shows the total number of ambiguous generic tokens for each speaker.
The second column shows the number of FEMININE tokens.  The third column
records number of tokens for use of the SLASH convention.  The fourth and fifth
columns record the percentage of use for the FEMININE and SLASH forms
respectively. Double gendered forms within a single syntactic clause (VP)
counted as a single token.
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Dafna 8 3 0 38% 0 38%
Edit 12 1 2 8% 17% 25%
Einat 24 1 3 4% 13% 17%
Eti 6 0 0 0 0 0
Iris 30 6 4 20% 13% 33%
Meital 7 1 0 14% 0 14%
Merav 10 1 0 10% 0 10%
Michal 15 2 0 13% 0 13%
Na’ama 21 0 0 0 0 0
Neta 15 8 1 53% 7% 60%
Nitsan 9 1 0 11% 0 11%
Nurit 25 4 2 16% 8% 24%
Ofra 13 0 0 0 0 0
Ora 11 1 1 9% 9% 18%
Osnat 63 0 2 0 3% 3%
Total 269 29 15 11% 6% 16%
Table 6.1 Ambiguous 3rd person generic reference (singular and plural)
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Table 6.1 shows that overall the women in this study used the FEMININE
and SLASH variants infrequently.  Only 16% of the total number of generic
tokens were alternative variants.  The women primarily used MASCULINE forms
for ambiguous generic reference.  Nonetheless, eleven of the speakers, a clear
majority, used a FEMININE generic in at least one utterance, and Neta used
FEMININE generics in 53% of her generic statements.  Although the overall
percentage of utterances wherein speakers used the SLASH form is only 6%,
seven the women used the SLASH variant in one or more utterances.  Edit’s use
of SLASH forms accounted for 17% of her total generic tokens.  The fact that
these two variables were used so infrequently does not necessarily indicate that
they are not important markers of feminist practice.  As noted earlier, the SLASH
variable is ideologized within mainstream Israeli culture as a marker of feminist
principles.  The use of FEMININE generics, a clear violation of conventional
practice and prescriptive rules for MIH, is also associated with feminism.  These
variables may not account for a high percentage of overall generic reference.
Nonetheless, any use of them is likely to be very salient for both feminist and
mainstream MIH speakers because they violate accepted practices and prescribed
standards of use.
Among my informants and more broadly within the feminist community, I
found that most speakers expressed a preference for the use of MASCULINE
plural forms over the use of MASCULINE singular forms for generic reference.
Michal made the following comment about the marking of generic contexts,
barabim hakonotatsiya lezaxar yoter xalasha measher bayexid - ‘in the
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plural(M) the connotation of the masculine is weaker than it is in the
singular(M).’  It is very likely that the ongoing loss of FEMININE plural forms
from informal spoken and written CIH contributes to feminists accepting the
MASCULINE plural forms as gender-neutral.  It is also likely that habitual use of
the MASCULINE plural forms for reference to both males and females weakens
the link between the FORMAL grammatical category its differential meaning.73
The difference in attitude towards singular and plural use of MASCULINE
generics led me to examine how it might affect the use of alternative forms in
each context.  Tables 6.2 and 6.3 present the quantitative data for singular and
plural ambiguous generics respectively.
                                                 
73 The use of MASCULINE plural forms for differential or male-exclusive reference is also
limited by socio-cultural context.
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Dafna 4 1 0 25% 0 25%
Edit 6 0 2 0 33% 33%
Einat 12 1 0 8% 0 8%
Eti 2 0 0 0 0
Iris 11 6 1 55% 9% 64%
Meital 5 1 0 20% 0 20%
Merav 6 1 0 17% 0 17%
Michal 5 2 0 40% 0 40%
Na’ama 12 0 0 0 0 0
Neta 10 7 1 70% 10% 80%
Nitsan 4 0 0 0 0 0
Nurit 7 0 1 0 14% 14%
Ofra 5 0 0 0 0 0
Ora 3 0 0 0 0 0
Osnat 17 0 0 0 0 0
Total 109 19 5 17% 5% 22%
Table 6.2: Ambiguous 3rd person singular generic reference
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Dafna 4 2 0 50% 0 50%
Edit 6 1 0 17% 0 17%
Einat 22 0 3 0 14% 14%
Eti 4 0 0 0 0 0
Iris 19 0 3 0 16% 16%
Meital 2 0 0 0 0 0
Merav 4 0 0 0 0 0
Michal 10 0 0 0 0 0
Na’ama 9 0 0 0 0 0
Neta 5 1 0 20% 0 20%
Nitsan 5 1 0 20% 0 20%
Nurit 18 4 1 22% 6% 28%
Ofra 8 0 0 0 0 0
Ora 8 1 1 13% 13% 26%
Osnat 46 0 2 0 4% 4%
Total 170 11 13 6% 8% 14%
Table 6.3: Ambiguous 3rd person plural generic reference
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The data indicate that in the singular context the use of FEMININE tokens
was higher than the percentage for the combined data, 17% as compared to the
combined singular and plural usage of only 11%.  Seven women used the
FEMININE form as a singular ambiguous generic in one or more of their
utterances, and five of them used FEMININE forms in more than 20% of their
utterances.  Table 6.3 shows that my informants used the FEMININE forms as
plural generics less often that as singular generics.  Six women used the
FEMININE in the plural context, but the usage only accounts for 6% of the plural
generics used across all the women.  The difference in use is not surprising given
that many of the women in my study commented that plural MASCULINE forms
were more acceptable to them as generics.
The difference in the use of SLASH forms between singular and plural
generic contexts is less dramatic, but they do account for a high percentage of
total number of plural generic uses and fewer of the singular generic forms.  In the
singular context, SLASH forms accounted for only 5% of the total generics.  That
is a difference of only 1% from the combined use of plural and singular forms, but
only four women used the SLASH forms as singular generics.  The use of SLASH
forms increases from 6% of the combined generics to 8% of the plural generic
forms, and five of the original seven women who used the SLASH form at all
used it for ambiguous plural reference.
The comparative data seem to indicate that my informants are more likely
to use a FEMININE form than a SLASH form for singular generic reference.  The
differences in use between the FEMININE form and the SLASH form in singular
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versus plural contexts also indicate that the SLASH form is not widely used in
either context.  Overall, the speakers used one of the alternative forms for 22% of
the total singular generic forms.  The data for the use of both alternative variants
for plural generics indicate only a slight preference for SLASH forms over
FEMININE forms.  The use of alternative forms for plural generics was only 14%
of the total number of plural generic tokens.  The overall difference between the
use of alternative forms in singular and plural contexts indicates that the feminists
in this study were more likely to use an alternative form for singular generics than
for plural generics.  Thus, it also seems reasonable to conclude that the use of
MASCULINE forms for plural generics was more acceptable than singular
MASCULINE generics.  These conclusions resonate with my observations of
language use and metalinguistic discourse about generic reference in the Israeli
feminist community.  I believe it is possible to conclude that members of the
feminist community have an ideological preference for the use of either
FEMININE or SLASH forms in all generic contexts, but actual use is more
limited.
The data presented in tables 6.2 and 6.3 above demonstrate that the
syntactic and semantic environments of singular versus plural reference influence
the use of gender marking for generic reference.  Gender marking for ambiguous
generic reference is also influenced by a number of other factors, many of which
are social rather than strictly grammatical.  Whether or not we accept theoretical
linguistic analyses that identify the MASCULINE forms (and by extension the
whole grammatical category) as the structurally unmarked, it is clear that speakers
145
of MIH are socialized to use and interpret the MASCULINE as the unmarked.  As
such, habitual associations between the MASCULINE category and gender-
neutral usage hinder the use of FEMININE and/or SLASH variants.  Speakers
using FEMININE forms risk being misunderstood, as was the case in Osnat’s use
of the FEMININE plural for inclusive reference to her male and females students,
discussed in the previous chapter, section 5.3.  The SLASH variant clearly
disambiguates the intention of the speaker; however, it can lead to confusion
between singular and plural agreement, which was evident in example (3) above
from Iris.  In addition, the SLASH variant is cumbersome, particularly if a
speaker tries to use the double gender agreement consistently beyond the initial
nominal phrase.
Cultural associations between social roles and gender categories can also
influence the use of ambiguous generics.  I counted Einat’s use of mishehi, the
FEMININE form of ‘someone,’ as an ambiguous generic, but it is likely that the
association between women and child-rearing influenced her choice in gender
marking.  It is possible to understand all of the gender use choices of my
informants as on some level responding to existing cultural associations between
social roles and gender categorization which link the culturally defined masculine
class with the grammatically unmarked MASCULINE category.  Below are
additional examples of my informant’s use of alternative generic forms.  I
contextualize each example and analyze the socio-linguistic factors that may have
influenced the speaker’s use of gender marking.
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One of the most interesting examples a FEMININE ambiguous generic
form demonstrates the complexity of the MIH gender agreement system and  the
manner in which cultural associations result in innovative forms of gender
marking.  Example (22) occurred in the speech of two different informants, but in
reference to the same topic.  Both speakers were talking about the motivation to
use FEMININE forms of address on the voicemail system of a feminist
organization.
22. rov        haponot                   eleinu  hen      nashim
majority the ones who call(F,P)   to us   they(F) women
the majority of our callers are women
What makes (22) so interesting is the number of elements that are marked for
gender and the possible permutations for agreement.  The noun rov ‘majority’ is
actually MASCULINE but it is coordinated with a FEMININE predicate noun in
the above utterance.  The predicate noun ponot ‘callers,’ literally ‘ones who call,’
should agree with the MASCULINE rov, but these speakers used the FEMININE
rather than the MASCULINE.  The gender marking in second half of the
sentence, hen nashim ‘they(F) women’ is consistent as a noun phrase but the
pronoun hen “should” agree with its antecedent, which is not ponot but the
MASCULINE subject rov.
The complexity of the agreement structure in this sentence prompted me
to submit it, along with two other choices for expressing the same semantic
information, to four native MIH linguists under the pretext of asking for
grammaticality judgements.  I sent them the construction that had occurred in my
data set, (22) above, along with the following alternatives: rov haponim eleinu
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hen nashim  ‘the majority callers(M) to us they(F) women’ and rov haponim
eleinu hem nashim ‘the majority callers(M) to us they(M) women.  I did not tell
the linguists that the sentence using the FEMININE predicate nominative haponot
‘the callers (F,P)’ had occurred in my data set twice.  All of the Israeli linguists
responded that the construction presented in (22) was ungrammatical and unlikely
to occur within spoken CIH.  Most preferred the third sentence, rov haponim
eleinu hem nashim, which used all MASCULINE forms except for women, which
has “natural gender.”  Ron Kuzar, a well known Israeli semanticist, explained that
either of the alternative sentences might occur since the distinction between hem
‘they(M)’ and hen ‘they(F)’ was not maintained consistently in all varieties of
CIH.  (His response confirmed my suspicion that these distinctions were being
lost in spoken CIH.)  Regarding the sentence that used rov haponot ‘majority of
the callers (F,P),’ he responded, “(t)here is only one condition under which [it]
would be felicitous: if it were true that you use the feminine form if the majority
in a group is female. But this is a myth. Nobody uses Hebrew this way. If you do
come across such a sentence in real languages it is simply a too early application
of the feminine category.”  (Emphasis mine.  See footnote below for the full text
of his analysis, which I have reprinted with his permission.)74  I found Kuzar’s
                                                 
74 Israeli linguist, Ron Kuzar, sent the following response to my grammatical query.  With his
permission, I have reprinted it below.
1) rov haponim eleynu hen nashim   2) rov haponim eleynu hem nashim  3) rov haponot eleynu
hen nashim  There is also a fourth option:  4) rov haponot eleynu hem nashim.  Numbers three and
four are identical. In spoken Hebrew, there is a weakening of the hen form towards the hem in
either unsupervised or lower-class variants. The difference would be between careful educated
speech (3) and unsupervised speech or lower-class speech (4). In the case of educated people,
there is stylistic choice.  In the case of less educated people, only the form hem exists.  The
difference between 1 and 2 is also grammatical.  Equational sentences tend to have a copula
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response interesting, though not surprising.  Given that he was not aware that the
sentence was part of my data set, he may have been trying to “set the record”
straight on his experience of language use in CIH.  Nonetheless, it is worth noting
that the possibility that this use of a FEMININE plural might be evidence of a
variety of Hebrew in which speakers did in fact use the FEMININE as inclusive is
not seriously entertained.
Kuzar’s analysis, however, does provide a reasonable, semantically based,
explanation for the “unconventional” use of gender agreement in this sentence.
The anticipation of the FEMININE gender for nashim caused the agreement
“error” between rov (M) and ponot (F).  (Indeed, one of the linguists stated that
she would have been more comfortable with the sentence, if the speakers had used
the FEMININE noun marbit ‘majority,’ which is derived from a different
consonantal root.)  Studies on gender agreement errors for reference to inanimate
objects show that speakers sometimes make processing errors when the gender of
                                                                                                                                      
agreeing with the subject, but certain factors may change this.  Since there is no context here, I
don't know what this factor might be.
The real difference then is between 1-2 and 3-4.  There cannot be a difference between
the meanings of the two sentences.  1-2 present the general group as gender neutral in the
masculine form (males and females).  This is the more "logical" form, since not all applicants are
women.  3-4 is awkward, because once you name the group as feminine (hence female), you can
only add other attributes, such as "nashim ovdot" [women workers(F,P)] or "akrot bayit”
[housewives], but to use the attribute "nashim" [women] is tautological.  There is only one
condition under which 3-4 would be felicitous: if it were true that you use the feminine form if the
majority in a group is female. But this is a myth. Nobody uses Hebrew this way.  If you do come
across such a sentence in real languages it is simply a too early application of the feminine
category, just as might be the case in 3.  It would be a constructio ad sensum as illogical as "a
bunch of people are waiting for you" where "are" is used although "bunch" is singular.
I think that despite all objections to the masculine form as gender-neutral, most people
(and most women) under most circumstances use it unproblematically.  Note the following
sentence, said by a woman on the radio on the 22.10.2003 on reshet bet [channel bet] at 06:50:
"ani, ke'adam shemetapel behafra'ot akhila, khoshevet she..." [I, as a person that takes care of
(M,S) eating disorders, think(F,S) that...].  This is a skillful use of both masculine and feminine
forms in the appropriate places.
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an object in a dependant clause differs from that of the initial noun phrase.  It
seems possible that the use of the FEMININE plural in this sentence (22) might
be the result of processing errors that associated the initial noun “callers” with the
semantic intent, that the majority of the callers were women.  Although in that
case, we might expect the noun used for “majority” to have been FEMININE as
well, but I believe that marbit is a less common noun (i.e. less used) in spoken
CIH.
The use of the FEMININE form might also be interpreted as emphatic
marking.  The utterance, as it occurred in the discourse of both women, was a
report of the justification given to a phone technician who objected to the
organization’s decision to use FEMININE singular terms of address on the
outgoing voicemail message.  The women may have wanted to highlight the fact
that their decision was based on the desire to meet the needs of their primary
demographic, hence the emphatic gender marking.  All of these factors may have
contributed in some measure to the use of a FEMININE plural form as a generic
in this utterance.  Regardless of the various factors that conditioned their use of
ponot ‘callers(F),’ it is clearly intended as an ambiguous generic reference to all
callers.  This example also raises a question about theories of the underlying
semantic markedness of either the FEMININE or MASCULINE forms
(Silverstein, 1985).  (See example (24) below and the related footnote for the
discussion of another agreement error in a generic equational statement with the
construction “the ‘majority’ of a ‘group of X’ are women.”)
150
Several of my informants indicated they felt the use of MASCULINE
singular forms for gender-neutral generic reference was particularly offensive.  It
is likely that their ideological objection to this prescribed and naturalized practice
supported their alternative use of language, but there are several other socio-
linguistic factors that may also contribute to their use of gender in generic
utterances.  The association of certain social roles or occupations with one gender
or the other clearly conditions the use of grammatical gender in generic contexts.
Several cross-linguistic studies have demonstrated this socio-linguistic
phenomenon.75  The examples below provide a comparison of the contexts in
which speakers used FEMININE, MASCULINE and SLASH forms for generic
reference.
The first set of utterances below includes examples in which speakers used
the FEMININE grammatical forms as the unmarked generic.  (The words in bold
text are the FEMININE singular or plural forms.)
23. ani lo maamina shemora      bkita     takri      kaxa
I    no  believe   that teacher(F) in a class read(F, S) like that
I don’t believe that a teacher, in the class, would read like that
layeladim.             hi     ta
id      kitvu
to the children(M,P).  she would say “you write(M,P)”
to the children.  She would say “you write”
hi lo ta
id ktov kitvi
she no would say write(M,S) write(F,S)
she would not say “you (masculine) write, you (feminine) write.”
                                                 
75 See Ervin (1962) for detailed discussions of this phenomenon.
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In (23), Iris stated that although she preferred the use of SLASH forms in
education texts, she did not expect teachers to address the class in that manner.
Her use of the singular FEMININE form of the noun ‘teacher’ – mora as well as
her consistent use of FEMININE pronouns in reference to the hypothetical
teacher were not intended to refer only to female teachers.  She was speaking
about any teacher in an elementary classroom.  The use of the FEMININE form
as the generic in this context indexes the Israeli gender stereotype that elementary
school teachers are women.  In the next example, Nurit used the plural
FEMININE form also in reference to elementary school teachers.  Unlike Iris, she
justified her use of the FEMININE plural form.
24. keshehamorot     omdot mul hakita,
when the teachers  stand  before the class
when teachers stand before the class
vemarbit         hamorot         bemedinat yisrael  ze    nashim.
and majority(F) the teacher(F,P) in state of  Israel  this(M) women 76
and the majority of teachers in the state of Israel are women’
Nurit’s explanation that ‘the majority of teachers in the state of Israel are women’
may have been triggered by the fact that we were overtly discussing the manner in
which conventional practices for the use of grammatical gender often reflect
                                                 
76 It is interesting to note that the construction of Nurit’s utterance in (24) is very similar to the
earlier use of the FEMININE plural as an ambiguous generic in (22) rov haponot eleinu hen
nashim.  In both sentences, there are agreement errors related to the use of the words rov
(MASCULINE) and marbit (FEMININE) for reference to an unmarked ‘majority’ of X.  In (24),
the error occurred between the FEMININE noun marbit ‘majority’ and the deitic pronoun ze
‘this(M).’  The MIH rules of gender agreement would lead us to expect the FEMININE form zot
because the antecedent of the deitic pronoun in this sentence is the FEMININE marbit.  I will
return to examples (22) and (24) and the implication of these processing errors for understanding
issues of markedness and gender agreement in Chapter IX.
152
cultural stereotypes.  She may also have felt the need to clarify that she was
speaking about teachers in general not female teachers only.  Despite the fact that
FEMININE forms are not understood as gender-ambiguous in generic reference
and the prescriptive rules of MIH discourage this practice, mora ‘teacher(F) and
morot ‘teachers(F)’ are culturally unmarked.77 The same is true for axot and
axayot ‘nurse’ and ‘nurses’ respectively.  Iris and Nurit’s uses of the FEMININE
grammatical form as the generic in this context are not necessarily markers of
feminist language practice.  More likely, they simply reflect the socio-cultural
norms, which have a strong governing effect over the use of gendered forms for
generic reference.
In contrast example (25), Neta’s use of FEMININE forms in reference to a
hypothetical university professor might be understood as a marker of feminist
language practice since professor is not a professional role generically associated
with women.
25. kemo sheani yoshevet behartsaa, beseder,
like   that   I   sit          in a lecture, okay
like, if I sit in a lecture, okay,
venaniax     sheaxat    hamartsot        matxila       lehartsot,
and imagine that one(F) the lecturers(F,P) begins(F,S) to lecture
and imagine that one of the lecturers begins to lecture
vehi     mishtameshet    besafa        universalit, beseder.
and she uses(F,S)       in the language  universal,       okay.
and she uses the universal language okay.
                                                 
77 I had the opportunity to volunteer in elementary and pre-kindergarten classrooms where I
observed that many reading books portrayed only female teachers working with small children.
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The above utterance occurred within a larger conversation about the importance
of language and forms of address.  Neta revealed herself, throughout our
discussions, as a strong believer in the need for feminist language reform.  The
utterance above was her description of the level of alienation she experienced
when speakers addressed her with MASCULINE forms.  The relevant issue for
this part of my analysis is her use of FEMININE forms for reference to the
hypothetical lecturers.  Neta used singular FEMININE forms in reference to the
hypothetical university instructor as well as the plural FEMININE form of the
noun ‘lecturers’ – martsot in reference to university lecturers as a collective.78
Neta’s choice of grammatical gender does not conform to some cultural norm
conditioned by the gendered division of labor in Israeli society.  (Both Michal and
Osnat, university faculty members, commented on the general assumption that
university professors are male.)  Observations of language use in the general
Hebrew-speaking Israeli population confirm my assertion that the MASCULINE
forms are the unmarked generics for reference to university lecturers.  I presented
these three examples together to demonstrate two points.  First, socio-cultural
associations played a role in determining which grammatically gendered form
these speakers used as the unmarked generic.  Second, not every use of a
FEMININE noun as the generic should be understood as an indexical marker of
feminist practice.
With the examples of FEMININE generics in mind, I turn to utterances in
which my informants used MASCULINE forms as generics.  In the example
                                                 
78 In Israel, the title martse/martsa ‘lecturer’ is used interchangeably with ‘professor’ in most
informal contexts.  The title professor is generally reserved for tenured faculty members.
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below, Einat used the MASCULINE singular form for the noun ‘doctor’ as a
generic.  She was speaking about the connection between the use of
MASCULINE grammatical forms as generics and the use of male bodies as the
baseline for medical research.  In the context of this discussion, she referred
generically to women’s experiences of going to the doctor with the following
statement:
26. kemo kesheat      holexet larofe
like when you(F,S) go(F,S) to the doctor(M,S)
for instance, when you go to the doctor
In example (26), Einat used the MASCULINE singular form of the noun ‘doctor’
in generic reference to doctors and more broadly the medical profession.  It seems
likely that Einat’s generic use of the MASCULINE rofe was an example of
habitualized linguistic behavior.  In Israel, the majority of doctors are men, and
there is an assumption, supported by linguistic practices, that male doctors are the
unmarked group.  It is interesting to contrast Einat’s use of the MASCULINE
form of rofe in the above utterance, with a latter statement she made regarding the
use of language as a tool to socialize children in non-gender biased ways.
yesh li yeled ben shalosh vexetsi.  az eh az ani omeret lo naid,
stam naid, eh rofim.  ani metaeret lo ma afilu yesh rofim
verofot. sheaz ani lo aid rak rofim.  shehu yavin shehaolam hu
lo banu rak rofim evarim, yesh rofim verofot
I have a child(M) three and a half years old.  So, eh, so I say to him,
let’s say, for example let’s say eh doctors(M).  I describe to him what,
that there are male doctors and female doctors.  That thus I don’t say
only doctors(M), so that he will understand that the world is not built
only doctors(M) male, there are male doctors and female doctors.’
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In the statement above, Einat expressed her commitment to using language as a
means of countering gender stereotypes in Israeli society.  Despite her conscious
commitment to using language as a tool for re-creating the gendered social order,
she used the MASCULINE form of the noun as a generic in her conversation with
me.  The apparent contradiction between Einat’s ideological stance and her
linguistic behavior is evidence of the strength of language socialization and
naturalized associations between grammatical gender categories and social roles.
Einat’s attitude regarding language socialization and the importance of using
language to challenge cultural stereotypes was salient for the women in my study,
despite the minimal use of FEMININE or SLASH generic forms.
Feminist innovative language use for generic reference can be understood
as a tool to challenge the relationship between the grammatically “unmarked”
forms and the cultural system of marked and unmarked gendered behavior.
Einat’s two statements taken together seem to indicate that the different levels at
which markedness functions are interconnected and fluid.  The grammatically
unmarked status of the MASCULINE nominal form rofe both supports and is
supported by the culturally unmarked status of male doctors.  As I have stated
elsewhere, the default generic for most nouns with animate referents is
MASCULINE, unless cultural associations dictate otherwise.  The qualification
“unless cultural associations dictate otherwise” points to a central issue regarding
my analysis of feminist language practices.  In the case of the FEMININE forms
used as generics, the grammatically marked status of the forms makes it easier to
observe that cultural concepts of gender roles and socialization lead to specific
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language practices.  With MASCULINE generics, it is more complicated.  How
can we know whether the grammatical predisposition or the cultural conditioning
leads a speaker to use a MASCULINE generic for reference to ‘doctors’ or any
other social role associated with men?  Many formal models of gender-based
noun classification systems privilege the unmarked status of the MASCULINE
category as the determining factor.  But, is the grammatical classification of
MASCULINE as unmarked simply an artifact of cultural conditioning?  It is not
my intention to answer these questions definitively; rather, I use this analysis to
point to places where feminist language practices raise our awareness of these
issues.  The predisposition to use MASCULINE forms as the unmarked in all
contexts masks those contexts in which the use of the grammatical form is
conditioned by cultural stereotypes.  Furthermore, in the context of sexist
societies, the predisposition to use the MASCULINE as the generic in all contexts
becomes suspect not because speakers consciously intend a sexist or male-
exclusive meaning, but because the socio-cultural context supports such an
interpretation.  Feminist innovative language practices point to the collusion of
these two phenomena by occasionally “breaking the rules” of association.  They
disrupt the symbolic privilege of males by symbolically linking the status of
“unmarked” with the females.
If we take Einat’s linguistic choices together with those of Iris and Nurit,
their behavior supports the conclusion that socio-cultural associations condition
the use of both MASCULINE and FEMININE generics with respect to particular
social roles.  The use of FEMININE forms as unmarked generics is not unique to
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feminist language practice, but when used to counter cultural stereotypes, it is a
tool of feminist social change.  Neta’s use of FEMININE forms as the unmarked
for reference to university professors is an example of this, as is Einat’s report
that she used FEMININE and MASCULINE forms together in generic reference
to traditionally male professions.
The SLASH construction for generic reference is an important innovation
that also can be understood to challenge cultural stereotypes as well as the
naturalized relationship between the grammatically unmarked MASCULINE
form and the culturally unmarked male.  It is interesting to note that most of the
uses of the SLASH construction, both plural and singular, were with impersonal
pronouns.  In most cases, the speaker was referring to “someone” or “everyone,”
an unqualified generic, if there is such a thing.  Examples (27), (28), and (29)
present cases in which speakers used the SLASH form with nominal rather than
pronominal generic forms.
27. ani osa korsim lemorim        velemorot
I do course for teachers(M,P) and for teachers(F,P)
I teach courses for male and female teachers
veleolim               hadashot      olim            hadashim
and immigrants(M,P) new(F,P), immigrants (M,P) new(M,P)
and female and male new immigrants
28. hamoamad         tsarix o hamoamedet tsrixim
the candidate(M,S) must or the candidate(F,S) must (M,P)
the candidate must or the female candidate, they must
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lemale    et     hatofes
complete D.O.  the form.
complete the form.
29. im yesh lemishehi ben o yeladim, banim o banot
if there is to someone(F,S) son or children(M), sons or daughters
if someone(F) has a son or children, sons or daughters
In the above examples, the speakers used the SLASH convention for generic
reference to teachers, new immigrants, political candidates, and children.  It is
interesting to note that, in (27), Iris used the MASCULINE plural form for
‘teachers’ before using the FEMININE form.  She was speaking about elementary
school teachers who participated in a program for new immigrants.  As I have
already noted, most elementary school teachers are women, and Iris herself later
explained that most of new immigrant teachers in her classes were women.  As
such, I believe we might view Iris’s use of the SLASH form as an index of her
commitment to using language in non-gender specific ways.  Or an attempt to
highlight the fact she was responsible for modeling “appropriate” language use to
both men and women.  In Edit’s utterance, (28) above, the addition of the
FEMININE form for the noun ‘candidate’ moamedet appears to be an
afterthought.  She had already used the singular MASCULINE nominal form and
coordinated the appropriately gender-marked predicate.  The context of her
utterance, however, was the need to create new application forms for political
candidates that would overtly address both males and females.  Political office is
considered a very masculine realm in Israeli culture, Golda Meir notwithstanding.
Edit’s initial use of the MASCULINE nominal form can be viewed as evidence of
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this cultural association between the role of politician and masculinity.  Her
subsequent addition of the FEMININE nominal form can thus be understood as a
type of self-correction triggered by the topic of our conversation as well as the
overall context of our larger discussion, feminist practice and social change.
The SLASH form, in its various instantiations, provides an opportunity for
speakers to monitor their use of gender and “correct’ themselves to reflect a
gender-neutral or feminist perspective.  The “self-corrective” aspect of the
SLASH form can also be seen in example (29), Einat’s previously analyzed
utterance regarding equal opportunities for all children regardless of gender.  Her
movement from the initial use of ben, the MASCULINE singular form that can
mean either ‘child’ or more literally ‘son,’ to yeladim, the MASCULINE plural
form of the noun ‘children,’ and finally, to the SLASH use of banim o banot
literally ‘sons or daughters’ appears as a form of online verbal editing.  Generic
reference to children, singularly or plurally, is often MASCULINE.  (In many of
the radio and television advertisements for traffic safety that I observed, children
were represented as boys.)  Einat’s verbal progression moved from the initial use
of the “most offensive” form of the generic to the most inclusive double-gendered
plural SLASH.  Einat’s utterance provides a perfect concrete example of the
struggle that most of my informants discussed regarding their attempts to bring
their ideological convictions and their linguistic behavior together.
The majority of my informants, thirteen of the fifteen, reported using
alternative forms for generic reference, but most of them also reported finding it
difficult.  As the numbers in the data tables showed, the use of alternative forms
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for ambiguous generics was a semantic context in which my informants did not
use feminist linguistic innovations consistently.  The inconsistent use of the
alternative forms, however, should not be understood as implicit acceptance of the
MASCULINE as the unmarked gender category.  Rather, the analysis of my
informants behavior with respect to this variable context demonstrates that
innovative linguistic behavior need not be consistent to create change within a
sociolinguistic system.  Linguistic attitudes and language ideologies are equally
important to shifting sociolinguistic norms.  The metalinguistic discourse within
the feminist community regarding the practice of using the MASCULINE as the
unmarked generic coincides with heightened awareness of gendered social issues
at the micro-level of women in the feminist community and the macro-level of
mainstream Israeli society.
6.3 GENERIC USES OF THE SECOND-PERSON SINGULAR IMPERSONAL
PRONOUN
When asked to describe language use practices that they found particularly
salient, many of the women in my study remarked on the phenomena of women
using the MASCULINE form of the second-person singular pronoun in
impersonal statements.  Regarding this practice, Edit made the following
comment:
ma shehaxi bolet etsli. sheani roa, mashehu meod meod bolet.  …
ze shekesheisha medaberet al mashehu bestami.  vehi omeret na	id
ata holex.  zot omeret keshehi medaberet al mashehu beofen keilu
stami.  zot omeret keilu tsad shlishi aval ze belashon zaxar ze kol
kax tsorem li.  ani pashut lo yexola lishmoa et ze.
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The thing that is the most obvious to me.  That I see as something very,
very obvious.  …  This is when a woman speaks about something
generically.  And she says “let’s say you(M,S) go(M,S)”  That is to say
when she speaks about something in the manner like generically.  That
is to say like from the other side but it is in the masculine language.
This really irritates me.  I simply cannot listen to it.
The majority of the women in my study as well as many other feminists with
whom I interacted, echoed her statement.  An informal survey of Israelis from the
general Hebrew-speaking population regarding this variable indicated that it was
not a salient a grammatical context or a recognized site of gender-oriented
language reform outside the feminist community.  (Most speakers understood the
issue of gender marking on this variable once we discussed it but viewed it as no
different than any other generic form of reference.)  In contrast, nearly every
women who participated in my study raised the issue of guf sheini keguf stami
‘the second-person as the generic’ as a critical example of the problem with
gender agreement in standard MIH.  They claimed a clear preference for using the
FEMININE variant of the informal pronoun.  Why should this variable, in essence
another type of generic, be more salient for the feminist community than the third-
person generic variable?  In this section, I address this question by examining my
informants’ linguistic behavior and ideological claims regarding gender
agreement on second-person pronouns.  I focus on the impersonal form because it
was the semantic use that was the most productive in the interview context.  It is
also quite an interesting variable with respect to the pragmatic use of gender to
index social identities and stances.
The second-person impersonal is a form of generic.  However, its
characteristics distinguish it from both third-person generic forms and personal
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second-person generic terms of address and warrant its investigation as an
independent variable.79  The use of personal second-person pronominal forms as
generics is limited mostly to outgoing voicemail messages and written texts.  In
these contexts, there is an intended addressee of unknown gender.  The form is
generic because it must refer to either a male or female addressee, but it is a
personal form of address nonetheless.  My informants reported using the SLASH
or FEMININE forms for personal second-person generic reference, but the
context of the interview led to only metalinguistic data about the use of personal
second-person ambiguous generics forms.
In contrast, the second-person impersonal pronoun usually occurs in the
context of statements in which a speaker uses at or ata “you(F)” or “you(M)” in
place of a third-person impersonal pronoun such as mishehu/hi “someone” or
exad/exat “one.”  In this semantic context, the form is generic because it
potentially includes any human referent if it is ambiguous or all males or females
if it is sex-specific.  Unlike generic uses of third-person impersonal pronouns,
such as mishehu/hi ‘someone (M or F)’or ze ‘this (M),’ zot ‘this(F),’ and eile
‘these (M or F),’ the impersonal use of the second-person pronoun carries with it
a cognitive (and pragmatic) association with the direct form of personal address.
In the context of a conversation, speakers and hearers must rely on contextual
clues to interpret the meaning of the second-person singular pronoun as the
impersonal.  Most uses of the impersonal second-person convey a sense of
                                                 
79 In the context of this discussion, I will use the terms ‘impersonal second-person’ and‘second-
person impersonal’ interchangably.  The use of the term ‘impersonal’ alone will also refer to the
second-person impersonal forms unless otherwise noted.
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explicitly including the interlocutor/addressee in the referential scope of the
generic pronoun.  Metalinguistic comments by the women in the study
demonstrated that they clearly understood the difference between uses of the
personal and impersonal pronouns.  Nonetheless, this pragmatic aspect adds to the
complexity of determining gender agreement for the impersonal pronoun.
Another characteristic of the impersonal second-person is its use by speakers to
relate personal experiences or perspectives in a generalized manner.  The
impersonal second-person creates some cognitive distance between the speaker
and the “agent” of the her utterance. These characteristics combined with the
metalinguistic discourse I observed regarding this variable led me to investigate it
separately from other generic pronouns.
The presentation of my analysis of the impersonal second-person singular
pronoun differs slightly from those of the other variable contexts.  In addition to
presenting quantitative and qualitative data regarding the linguistic behavior of
my informants, I include data related to their metalinguistic discussion of this
variable.  For the purpose of this analysis, I defined the second–person impersonal
as the use of the singular form of the second-person pronouns ata or at as generic
impersonal pronouns.  I have further limited the scope of my investigation to the
use of the second-person impersonal pronoun by females in conversation with
female interlocutors.  While some of my informants reported using the
FEMININE form of the impersonal even in conversation with male interlocutors,
I have no data to evaluate these claims.  My observations of language use within
the general Israeli population revealed that the MASCULINE impersonal ata
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‘you’ is used by both male and female speakers regardless of the gender of the
conversational partner(s), topic, or gender of possible referents.  The practice of
using ata as the generic impersonal is supported by the prescriptive rules of MIH,
which identify the MASCULINE grammatical category as the unmarked.
One of the characteristics of the impersonal second-person variable, noted
above, is the cognitive link between the impersonal and personal uses of the
second-person singular pronoun.  There are no morphological or phonological
markers to distinguish between the personal and the impersonal forms of the
pronoun.  In addition, the personal pronoun can be used in generic contexts,
further complicating the differentiation between the impersonal and the personal
uses of the second-person pronoun.  The sentences below provide readers with
examples of personal (direct address of an interlocutor), generic personal address,
and impersonal uses of the second-person singular pronouns.  Examples (30),
(31), (32), and (33) show the use of the personal second-person pronoun in direct
address and generic contexts.  These are followed by examples (34) and (35), in
which speakers used the MASCULINE and the FEMININE forms of the second-
person, respectively, as impersonal generic pronouns.
Examples (30) and (31) below are sentences in which the second-person
pronoun was used as the personal form of direct address between a speaker and
her interlocutor.
30. ani yexola lehaid lax               shebaseminar
I      can      tell         to you(F,S) that in the seminar
I can tell you that in the seminar
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hem        matxilim ledaber  axeret
they(M,P) begin      to speak different
they(the students) begin to speak differently.
31. veat            tsrixa lirot.  ani xoshevet  shebemiseret
and you(F,S) must see.        I        think     that in the context
And you have to see (it).  I think in the context of
haraayonot     shelax         laraayen
the interviews of yours(F,S) to interview
your interviews, to interview
et      hatalfaniot                shel  hairiya.
D.O the phone operators(F,P) of the municipality
the female telephone operators of the municipality.
In example (30), Osnat was reporting the influence of her own language use
practices on her students’ use of language.  The “you” refers directly to me, her
interlocutor.  In number (31) above, Na’ama was encouraging me to include the
telephone operators in my study because of their interesting experiences with
language use.  Again, the “you” refers directly to me.  While the initial use of the
pronouns may not immediately indicate that these are personal uses of the second-
person, other contextual clues rule out a generic reading, for example Na’ama’s
reference to my research.  In both sentences, the content and context of the
utterances allow us to interpret them as direct forms of address between a speaker
and her interlocutor.
Examples (32) and (33) below present the use of the second-person
singular pronoun as a form of generic personal address.  These sentences were
both taken from outgoing voicemail messages I encountered in Israel.
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32. shalom hi
ata                     lebezek
hello you(M,S) reached(M,S) to Bezeq
hello you have reached Bezeq (Israeli phone company)’
As the outgoing message on a voicemail system, this utterance must address any
caller who reaches the voicemail system.  It is a personal address but the context
of use is generic.  The agent of the predicate higata ‘reached (M,S, 2nd) is
unknown to the “speaker” in this case the voicemail system.  Those who recorded
the message used the default MASCULINE singular as the “unmarked” second-
person pronoun.  Although the use of the MASCULINE singular was acceptable
to most MIH speakers, I found that many organizations and individuals used the
plural MASCULINE form higatem in outgoing messages.  It is likely that this
practice was adopted because the connection between the pronoun and the
MASCULINE gender category is weaker in the plural form.  Nonetheless it
should be noted that voicemail systems of many individuals and organizations
used the MASCULINE singular pronoun to address callers.
An exception to these conventions was recording for the voicemail system
of one of the feminist organizations.  The organization had installed a new
automated voicemail system and chose to use the FEMININE singular second-
person pronoun to address callers.  Below is the opening address from the system.
33. shalom hi
at                leshdulat   hanashim
hello reached(F,S) to political lobby the women
hello you have reached the Women’s Political Lobby
The use of the FEMININE second-person singular pronoun in this outgoing
message is highly marked.  As noted above, most organizations or individuals that
did not use the MASCULINE singular form adopted the equally acceptable
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practice of using the MASCULINE plural.80  The use of the FEMININE singular
form was controversial even in the context of the organization’s feminist
community.  I found that the decision to use the FEMININE singular form
generated several debates of potential positive and negative consequences of the
innovative practice.  As with the use of the MASCULINE form higata in the
Bezeq message, higat is an ambiguous generic because the gender of each
individual caller is unknown.  In context of a phone message, we might interpret
the FEMININE term of address as an index of the feminist identity of the
organization.  The use of grammatical gender to index a particular stance or
identity is also relevant to the analysis of the impersonal second-person pronoun.
The next two examples contain uses of the second-person singular
pronoun as the impersonal.  In the first sentence, example (34), Osnat used the
MASCULINE form of the second-person pronoun.  It is an example of
conventional MIH use for gender agreement with impersonal generics.
34. ani omeret lahem    okei   haxalon      haze
I    say     to them(M) okay the window this
I say to them, okay this window,
hu zaxar       o nekeiva?   hu o zaxar o nekeiva
he masculine or feminine?  He or masculine or feminine
it is masculine or feminine? It is either masculine or feminine.
                                                 
80 It is interesting to note that the use of the MASCULINE plural form in this context would
violate the rule for number agreement between a pronoun and its potential referent.  Presumably
the message is heard by individual callers not groups.  This practice of using atem rather than ata
to highlight the generic nature of the pronoun is very similar to American English speakers’
practice of using the third-person plural pronoun in generic statements.
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veim ata            pone    elav       lo naxon
and if you(M,S,2nd) address(M,S) him not correct
and if you address it incorrectly
o medaber      alav       banekeiva keshehu zaxar
or speak(M,S) about him in feminine when he is masculine
or you speak about it in the feminine when it is masculine
o   hahefex,     zo      taut     dikdukit     ayuma.
or the opposite, this is mistake grammatical terrible
or the opposite, it is a terrible grammatical mistake.
The bolded words are the impersonal second-person pronoun and the coordinated
predicates.  In this utterance, Osnat was comparing attitudes towards the use of
gender agreement with inanimate nouns to attitudes regarding its use for reference
to humans.  According to Osnat, most CIH speakers judge the incorrect use of
gender with inanimate objects as a significant grammatical mistake.  In contrast,
no one (other than feminists) thinks twice about using MASCULINE terms for
generic (or plural definite) reference to women.  (See chapter nine for a discussion
of Osnat’s language ideology and the way it shaped her innovative use of
language as a feminist pedagogical tool.)  The statement was made in the context
of a conversation about the relationship between linguistic gender issues and
socialized sexism in Israeli society.  Given that I was Osnat’s only interlocutor
during the interview, her use of the MASCULINE second-person pronoun can be
understood as a signal that the statement is generic.  As additional test, we can
substitute “someone,” the third-person impersonal pronoun, in place of ata ‘you’
in Osnat’s statement.  “If someone speaks about it incorrectly, or speaks about it
with the feminine when it is masculine or the opposite, it is a terrible grammatical
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mistake.”  Note that the substitution of “someone” does not change the meaning
of the utterance, nor do we lose any contextual clues regarding the gender of
speaker or hearer.  The statement is a hypothetical generic that Osnat used to
illustrate her larger point.  (The salience of gender for MIH speakers.)
Example (35) below contains the use of the FEMININE form of the
impersonal second-person pronoun.  In this statement, Nitsan expressed her belief
that language is an important tool for socialization.  The larger context for the
utterance was my interview with Nitsan and our conversation about the
relationship between language use practices and the status of women in Israeli
society.  (In her statement, ze –‘this’ – refers to the use of the SLASH convention
and other forms of feminist language practice.) The bolded words are the
impersonal second-person pronoun in subject and object positions.
35. sheim  meil   tsair at              mitraelet           leze
that if from age young you(F,S) become accustomed to this
if from an early age you become accustomed to it,
sheyesh      kax  vekax    veze,     az   ze   nitma.
that there is such and such and this, then this internalized
that this is how it is, then it is internalized.
veze       melave      otax        veze   meshane devarim
and this accompanies you(F,S) and this changes   things.
and this goes with you and it makes things change.
As with Osnat’s statement, we can substitute the third-person impersonal pronoun
“someone” for Nitsan’s use of at and otax ‘you’ without changing the meaning of
the sentence or losing contextual clues.  Nitsan was expressing the belief that if
one is socialized to use the SLASH form, then one views it as normal and the
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normalization of this practice can affect other things.  The “you” in her utterance
is anyone who might experience this form of socialization.  The syntax of
Nitsan’s statement parallels that of Osnat, in the preceding example.  Both women
use a conditional construction to present a hypothetical example of a contingency.
The important difference between Osnat’s utterance and Nitsan’s is that
Nitsan used the FEMNINE form of the second-person singular pronoun.  MIH
speakers might assume that the FEMININE form in the utterance is the personal
pronoun because the conventional rules of language use prescribe the use of the
MASCULINE form for generic statements.  Nonetheless, the fact that we can
substitute the third-person impersonal without otherwise changing the syntax of
the sentence supports the categorization of this variable as an impersonal use of
the FEMININE second-person singular pronoun.  Nitsan’s use of the FEMININE
form may have been influenced by a number of factors.  The topic of her
utterance was the use of language to create social change and her interlocutor was
a woman.  She may also have been more conscious of her language use given the
context and topic of our overall conversation and the physical location of the
interview, a feminist organization.  Regardless of the configuration of factors that
led Nitsan to use the FEMININE form, her behavior is a typical example of
innovative feminist practice with respect to this variable.
Given the volume and tone of the metalinguistic discourse regarding
gender marking on the impersonal second-person pronoun among the women in
my study, we might expect a high percentage of overall use for FEMININE
variant.  Table 6.4 presents the quantitative data on my informants’ use of gender
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agreement with the impersonal second-person singular pronoun.  The first column
records the total number of impersonal tokens; the second column records the
total number of FEMININE tokens.  A token consists of the use of the second-
person impersonal pronoun with any coordinated predicates within a single
syntactic clause.  As noted, Hebrew is a pro-drop language; therefore, the
conjugated form of a predicate in past, future, or imperative tenses incorporates
the semantic information of the pronominal element into the conjugated predicate
form.  (Ata higata ‘you(M,S) reached(M,S,2nd) usually occurs as higata where the
overt pronoun is dropped because the relevant semantic and syntactic information
is marked on the predicate.)  The third column presents the percentage of
FEMININE tokens out of the total number of occurrences.  The final column on
the right shows whether or not an informant reported using the FEMININE form
of the impersonal.  Although I included metalinguistic discourse and mentions of
this variable in my overall analysis, the tokens in the Table 6.4 represent only
direct uses of the impersonal second-person.
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Dafna 0 0 yes
Edit 3 3 100% yes
Einat 24 24 100% yes
Eti 0 0 yes
Iris 10 7 70% yes
Meital 0 0 yes
Merav 1 0 0% only w/women
Michal 23 23 100%
Na’ama 1 1 100% yes
Neta 26 16 61% yes
Nitsan 10 10 100%
Nurit 15 14 93% yes (self-correction)
Ofra 11 7 63% yes (self-correction)
Ora 14 14 100% yes
Osnat 15 8 53% yes
TOTAL 153 127 83% N/A
Table 6.4: Use of gender with 2nd Person Singular Impersonal
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As the data in table 6.4 show, the women in my study used the
FEMININE form of this variable in 83% of their utterances.  Twelve of the fifteen
women use this variable in at least one of their utterances, and six of the twelve
women who used it did so in all of the relevant contexts. All of the women, except
of Michal and Ora, explicitly reported using the FEMININE form.  Michal and
Ora, though they did not explicitly discuss their practice, used the FEMININE
variant in 100% of their utterances.  The percentage of overall use for this
variable is the second highest for all the variables.  (The use of FEMININE plural
forms for definite gender-specific plural reference was higher at 93%.)  The
quantitative data are evidence that the FEMININE singular impersonal second-
person pronoun is the preferred variant for this group of Israeli feminists.  As I
have stated previously, the women who participated in this study are in many
ways representative of a broad range of native Hebrew-speaking women within
the Israeli feminist community.  The data above confirm my impression of
language use tendencies within the larger feminist community, impressions based
on eighteen months of working within the Israeli feminist community.
There are, however, three women who demonstrated considerable
variation between the MASCULINE and the FEMININE variants of the
impersonal second-person.  Neta, Ofra, and Osnat used the MASCULINE form in
over one-third of their utterances.  Column four of the table shows that each of
these women claimed to use the FEMININE form of the impersonal.  All of them
also made strong ideological claims regarding the importance of using
FEMININE forms as generics.  The apparent “gap” between their reported usage,
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ideological claims, and actual recorded behavior presents an opportunity to
investigate the factors that may condition gender agreement on impersonal
second-person forms.  An examination of contextualized examples from these
three women and my other informants, will also facilitate an analysis of the
pragmatic and ideological value of this variable within feminist language practice.
During our interview, Ofra “caught” herself using the MASCULINE form
of the impersonal and self-corrected.  Her metalinguistic comment presented in
example (36), reveals confusion between the personal and impersonal uses of the
second-person pronoun and seems to support an explanation that the frequent
usage of the FEMININE variant may be the result of hyper-correction.  (The
bolded words are the MASCULINE and the FEMININE forms of the impersonal
pronoun and their coordinated predicates.  The underlined text is the
metalinguistic commentary preceding the self-correction.)
36. im ata       meunyan          belashon     zaxar         lexats eks.
if you(M,S) interested(M,S) in language MASCULINE press X
if you are interested in the MASCULINE language press X
veaz      ata          over         leod     kateoriya,
and then you(M,S) move(M,S) to other  category
and then you would move to another category
vebakateoriya habaa ata       mekabel lashon zaxar ve,
and in category next  you(M,S) get(M,S) language MASCULINE and
and in the next category you would get the MASCULINE language and
hinei at         roa  ani medeberet itax    belashon        ata,
here  you(F,S) see   I    speaking    to you in the language ata
here you see, I am speaking to you in the language ata [i.e.
MASCULINE]
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bekateoriya hareila    at          keilu tekabli       ota.
in category    the regular you(F,S), like,   will get(F,S) her




Ofra began this statement using the MASCULINE variant of the impersonal
second-person.  She was explaining how someone could navigate the new
voicemail system if it had an added feature that could allow the caller to chose
whether he/she was addressed with MASCULINE or FEMININE language.  The
impersonal pronoun refers to an unknown caller.  After the third use of the
impersonal, Ofra recognized that she had been using the MASCULINE form and
made the following metalinguistic comment, hinei at ro
a ani medeberet itax
belashon ata ‘here you(F,S) see I am speaking to you(F,S) in the language of ata
(i.e. MASCULINE).’  The ‘you’ addressed in this part of the utterance is the
researcher.  She became aware, it seems, of a contradiction between the gender of
the second-person pronoun she was using and the gender of her conversational
partner.  Following her metalinguistic comment, Ofra completed her utterance
with the statement that in the primary category at ke
ilu tekabli ota belashon
nekeiva ‘you(F), like, get it [the message] in FEMININE language.’  Her
comment that she had been addressing me in the MASCULINE seems to have
precipitated her switch to the FEMININE form.  However, the second-person
forms that precede and follow her self-interruption are all impersonal uses with
generic referents. There was no need for them to index the gender of her female
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interlocutor.  As such, her choice to switch can be seen as an example of hyper-
correction; applying the rules governing gender agreement for definite reference
in a generic context.
Ofra’s utterance illustrates the ambiguity for speakers between the
personal and impersonal uses of the second-person pronoun.  The most salient use
of the second-person pronoun is as a form of direct address, in which case the
agreement markers on the second-person forms must index the gender of the
addressee.  Ofra’s “misanalysis” of the linguistic form as a personal address to her
female interlocutor points to one possible explanation for my informants’
apparent preference of the FEMININE impersonal pronoun.  The women in the
study were incorrectly applying grammatical rules for personal differential gender
reference in an impersonal generic contexts.  Researchers critical of feminist
linguistic innovations have pointed to this type of hyper-correction as proof that
the “problem” with the use of the MASCULINE as generic is the ideological
“misanalysis” of the relationship between the pronominal form and linguistic
categories.  According to some, the asymmetry of markedness in the discursive
context is to blame for this “misanalysis.”  Feminist language reformers are
simply not aware, as speakers, of the difference between the generic HE that
corresponds to all referents in the personal category and the differential ‘he’ that
corresponds to male members of the personal category exclusively (Silverstein,
1985, pp. 228-30).81  In the case of Ofra’s utterance, the hyper-correction analysis
                                                 
81 These examples actually point to one of the ways explanatory models based on English cannot
fully account for the Hebrew case.  In English, the grammatical system includes MASCULINE,
FEMININE, and NEUTER forms; thus, the use of the MASCULINE as a generic can differentiate
between animate and inanimate reference.  In the Hebrew system of grammatical gender, however,
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might lead us to conclude that she was “correctly” using the MASCULINE
generic impersonal pronoun but hyper-corrected to the FEMININE form because
of the gender of her interlocutor.
Ofra’s metalinguistic discourse clearly supports the explanation of hyper-
correction for her shift between the MASCULINE and FEMININE forms at the
end of her utterance.  However, if the source of feminist linguistic behavior in this
context is a form of hyper-correction, then how do we account for Ofra’s use of
the MASCULINE forms in this utterance?  As I have noted, contextual clues are
often used to signal the difference between the personal and impersonal pronoun.
They also seem to play a role in determining whether a speaker is likely to use the
MASCULINE or FEMININE form.  The meta-context of the utterance was a
conversation between two women, two feminists.  The immediate context or the
“focal event” was our discussion of the choice to use only FEMININE singular
forms of address on the IWN new voice mail system.  Ofra expressed doubts that
this choice reflected a truly gender egalitarian perspective.  She felt that the new
female-oriented recording would not address male callers and might offend them.
She reported that she had suggested an alternative that would allow male callers
to choose a recording that addressed them in the MASCULINE.  The utterance
below includes the all the lines that preceded the “hyper-correction.”
37. hahatsaa       sheli hayeta lakaxat keilu
the suggestion mine was       to take like
my suggestion was to take like
                                                                                                                                      
there are only two categories MASCULINE and FEMININE; thus, the use of the MASCULINE
generic does not differentiate between animate and inanimate reference.
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shemishehu       mitkasher veaz yesh        efsharut    livxor.
that someone(M) calls(M)      and so there is    possibility to choose
‘someone calls and there is the possibility to choose
keilu, hamaane koli omer, naxon bahatxala hamaane koli omer
like the voice mail       says, right,    at the start the voice mail  says
like the voicemail recording says, right, at the beginning it says
im ata      rotse    meser       belashon   anlit   lexats exad, naid
if you(M) want(M) message   in language English press   one,  let’s say
if you want the message in English press one, let’s say,
veaz   at overet leanlit.
and so you move to English
and then you switch to English’
veaz efshar   lishol  sheela, im hamaane koli belashon nekeiva
and so possible to ask question, if the voicemail   in language feminine
so it’s possible to ask a question, if the voicemail is in the feminine,
im ata       meunyan          belashon     zaxar           lexats eks.
if you(M,S) interested(M,S) in language MASCULINE press X
if you are interested in the MASCULINE language press X
veaz      ata          over         leod     kateoriya,
and then you(M,S) move(M,S) to other  category
and then you would move to another category
vebakateoriya habaa ata       mekabel lashon zaxar ve..,
and in category next  you(M,S) get(M,S) language MASCULINE and
and in the next category you would get the MASCULINE language and
hinei at         roa  ani medeberet itax    belashon        ata,
here  you(F,S) see   I    speaking    to you in the language ata
here you see, I am speaking to you in the language ata (i.e.
MASCULINE)
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bakateoriya hareila    at          keilu tekabli       ota.
in category    the regular you(F,S), like,   will get(F,S) her




In line two of example (37), Ofra used the MASCULINE singular third-person
impersonal pronoun mishehu ‘someone’ to refer to a person calling the IWN.  The
pronoun mishehu is the unmarked inclusive generic in standard MIH, but it can
also be used differentially to refer to males exclusively.  It is likely that in this
utterance, Ofra used mishehu because she was thinking about male callers to the
IWN.  Ofra also used the MASCULINE pronoun, the generic personal second-
person ata in the made-up message from the type of voicemail she wanted to
imitate.  Following these two uses of MASCULINE generics, however, Ofra used
the FEMININE impersonal in the phrase ve
az at overet le
anlit ‘and so
you(F,S) change to English.’  If she was focused on male callers, why would she
use the FEMININE impersonal in line five?  A close examination of the order of
her utterance shows that the FEMININE form in line five refers to a caller who is
given the option to choose between English and Hebrew.  Ofra had based her own
proposed changes to the IWN system on this model.  Thus, this use of the
FEMININE impersonal must be an ambiguous generic.  In contrast, the
MASCULINE impersonal pronouns used in the following lines are most likely
gender-specific referring, as I noted, to the potential male callers who would
prefer MASCULINE forms of address.
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If we return to the table reporting the informants’ behavior, we see that
Ofra used the MASCULINE form four times out of a total of eleven throughout
our interview.  Three of these occurred in this utterance.  The fourth occurred later
in the conversation about the voicemail system, in reference to how the
FEMININE message could affect male callers.  All of Ofra’s other uses of the
impersonal second-person, which were all ambiguous generics, were FEMININE
forms. Ofra’s variation between MASCULINE and FEMININE forms was
triggered in part by the topic of her utterance and the gendered scope of her
intended generic references.  This explanation does not negate the analysis of her
metalinguistic comment and subsequent switch to the FEMININE form as hyper-
correction.  Rather the two explanations of her overall behavior demonstrate that
numerous contextual factors interact in any given utterance to govern a speaker’s
use of gender agreement with the impersonal pronoun.
The pragmatic and semantic functions of the impersonal second-person
also effect variation between MASCULINE and FEMININE forms of the
variable.  In my analysis of the data, I identified two primary pragmatic uses for
this linguistic element.  The first was the use of the impersonal in place of the
first-person personal pronoun.  As noted previously, speakers often used the
impersonal second-person as a means of representing personal experience in a
generalized manner.  I refer to this use of the impersonal as self-incorporative.
Usually, the self-incorporative impersonal is preceded by first-person singular
reference.  The first-person reference preceding the impersonal second-person
tells the hearer that the speaker is relating a personal experience or perspective.
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The speaker’s shift into the second-person impersonal has the pragmatic effect of
inviting the hearer to place her/himself in that of the speaker.  Below is an excerpt
from Michal’s discourse containing an example of the self-incorporative
impersonal form.
38. ani naniax,     asarev          beofen   hakavua    lo lehaid baali.
I, let’s assume will refuse(1st) in manner established no to say ba’ali
I let’s assume I will refuse to ever say ba’ali (husband/owner)
veani aid    ishi eh  o ben zui  az ani yexola laasot et hanekuda.
and I will say  my man or my partner then I   can   to make the point
so I say my man or my partner then I can make that point
velaxen       ma     shekore       harbe peamim ze
and therefore what that happens  many times is
and thus what happens many times is
sheim at       omeret ben zui o  ishi
that if  you(F) say     my partner or my man
that if you say my partner or my man
az anashim xoshvim shebeemet einex       nesua
then people think      that in truth you(F) not married
then people think you are not really married.
In this utterance, Michal gave an example of how using feminist innovative
practices within mainstream Israeli society can result in miscommunication or
misunderstanding between feminist speaker and non-feminist hearer.  Michal
began her utterance using the first-person pronoun ani, but in the second half of
her utterance she used the second-person impersonal at ‘you(F).’  Her use of at
‘you’ in the second part of her utterance creates some distance between her as the
speaker and the “subject” of the second half of her utterance.  Michal’s experience
of having people question her marital status because she did not use the
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conventional word ba
al ‘husband/owner’ becomes the experience of every
women who uses the alternative forms.
It also accomplishes the pragmatic goal of inviting her interlocutor to see
the specific issue from her perspective, an invitation or request for feminist
solidarity.  This pragmatic goal or stance could not be achieved with the use of
either third-person impersonal pronouns or a continued use of the first-person
pronoun.  Michal’s utterance is a typical example of the self-incorporative use of
the impersonal second-person.  As one might expect, a survey of the self-
incorporative uses of the impersonal by my informants revealed that in this
pragmatic context, most speakers consistently used the FEMININE form.
There were only two occurrences of speakers using the MASCULINE
form in the self-incorporative context.  Iris and Nurit each used the MASCULINE
self-incorporative impersonal, but in each case the speaker caught herself and
self-corrected to the FEMININE form.  Nurit switched mid-utterance from the
MASCULINE ata to the FEMININE at and continued without comment to
coordinate the predicate with the FEMININE form.  Iris, however, stopped her
initial statement to comment directly on her usage.  The utterance occurred in the
context of discussing her personal language practices and the social contexts in
which she felt most comfortable using feminist innovations.  Iris commented that
her belief in the transformative power of linguistic innovation did not prevent her
from using more conventional practices in certain social contexts.  In example
(39) below, I highlighted her use of the first-person and impersonal second-person
forms.
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39. ani     mudaat         al     atsmi sheani,
I   am knowledgeable about myself   that I
I know about myself that I
eh am natati lax et haduma
um also I gave to you the example
um also, I gave you the example of
shel mishehu        yakum veyitnadev.
someone(M,S) get up(M) and volunteer(M)
someone (male) get up and volunteer
ani am harbe peamim medaberet kaxa
I   also    many times      speak          so
I also a lot of times speak that way.
beini levein       atsmi baxevra         hapratit     sheli.
in me to between myself in community the private of mine
with myself in my personal community (life)
ki        alef ze paxot shone   ki          ze ma sherail        beyisrael.
because (A)  it is less   different because it what that is regular in Israel
because first it stands out less because it is what is normal in Israel
veaz    kesheat         medaberet belashon       nekeiva
and then when you(F)  speak       in the language FEMININE
and then when you use FEMININE language
az ehx ketsat, lo over tamid.
so yuck  little   no pass always
so it’s a little icky it doesn’t always go over
az yesh     bemekomot sheze ken yaxol laavor
so there are in places      that it yes    can   to pass
so there are places where it can go over [well]
veyesh       mekomot shelo.  veata       matim     et  atsmexa,
and there are places   that no.  and you(M) match(M)  yourself(M)
and there are places where it doesn’t and you adjust yourself
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veata           matim     et atsmexa, hine at roa ze
and you(M) match(M)  yourself(M), here you see this
and you adjust yourself, here you see this
veze ze       hasafa      haivrit       lamrot sheani medaberet alai
and this this the language Hebrew, despite that I    speak   about myself
and this is the Hebrew language, despite the fact that I am speaking
about myself [I used the masculine].
Iris began her utterance talking about her tendency to use MASCULINE forms
despite her ideological convictions.  She used the first-person in the first four lines
of this utterance.  Then in line six, she switches to the FEMININE impersonal
second-person: ve
az keshe
at medaberet belashon nekeiva ‘so when you(F)
speak in the FEMININE.’  Her use of the impersonal in this context was self-
incorporative and had the pragmatic effect of including me, her interlocutor in her
experience.  My gender and the topic of the utterance as well as the fact that it
was self-incorporative might have triggered her use of the FEMININE.  In line
nine, however, she used the MASCULINE impersonal in a self-incorporative
statement.  Iris immediately caught herself, in line ten, and commented directly on
her “mistake.”
Several factors probably contributed to Iris’s awareness of her language
use in this utterance. The topic of conversation itself was her variation between
the MASCULINE in conventional language practices and the FEMININE in
innovative language practices.  It is also likely that the pragmatic aspect of this
particular MASCULINE impersonal – as a self-incorporative use – raised her
awareness of the contradiction between her own gender and the agreement
marking on the impersonal second-person forms.
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It was precisely women’s use of MASCULINE impersonal forms in the
self-incorporative manner that generated many of my informants’ metalinguistic
comments about the impersonal second-person variable.  As noted, the self-
incorporative impersonal is also a pragmatic tool for inviting or requesting
solidarity from an interlocutor.  Iris’s use of the MASCULINE impersonal,
particularly in a feminist context, would likely have the opposite effect.  It could
create a more generic feel to the impersonal form and mitigate the sense of
solidarity with a female interlocutor.  The pragmatic effect of the MASCULINE
impersonal, to create distance, may also have triggered Iris’s self-correction.  Not
only did the impersonal form conflict with her own gender but it also conflicted
with the gender of her interlocutor.  Here again, it would be possible to propose
the hyper-correction analysis, however, I believe that the analysis I present above
accounts for both the behavioral data as well as the ideological and cognitive
salience of this variable in each of the uses of the self-incorporative.
The second major use of the impersonal second-person occurs in the
context of generic reference.  The impersonal is often used within the context of
hypothetical, conditional, or explanatory statements. In Hebrew, the generic
second-person impersonal is often preceded by one of the following phrases:
haim, im – ‘if’ naid, nomar  – ‘let’s say’
naniax she – ‘let’s assume keilu – ‘as though or like’
lemashal, leduma – ‘for example’
Two of the examples presented at the beginning of section 6.3 were hypothetical
statements containing the impersonal second-person.  The conditional impersonal
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can be either ambiguous or gender-specific.  Recall my analysis of Ofra’s
statement in which she presented a hypothetical scenario and used MASCULINE
impersonal forms to refer to an imagined caller.  The use of the MASCULINE
form in that context was a gender-specific generic.  Below is an example of the
conditional impersonal used as a female specific-generic:
40. im ba elayix     shravrav habayita     vebilal
if come to you(F) plumber the home and because
if the plumber comes to your house because
sheat   isha,    hu mityaxes elayix axer
that you woman he treats     to you(F) different
you are a woman he treats you differently.
measher im at ever
than       if you man
than if you were a man.
The topic of Einat’s utterance, in example (40), was a discussion of how sexism
manifests itself in everyday life in Israeli society.  She clearly limits the scope of
potential referents for this conditional impersonal at the end of the first line:
vebilal she
at isha ‘and because you are a women.’  The contrastive nature of
this statement clarifies her intent.  Most of my informants did not use the female-
specific conditional impersonal forms in such an obviously gender-exclusive
contrastive manner.  Usually the context or content of the utterance provided
clues to the gender-specific nature of the generic.
Einat’s use of the impersonal second-person rather than a third-person
generic also invited her female interlocutor to identify with the experience.82  As
                                                 
82 The final phrase in Einat’s utterance me
asher im at ever ‘than if you were a man’ is an
interesting semantic construct to examine.  On the referential level at cannot be a man since at is
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we might expect, all of the gender-specific conditional impersonal forms that my
informants used agreed with the gender of the hypothetical referent group.
Within the larger feminist community, I also found this to be the case.  However,
most of my informants reported observing other women use the MASCULINE
impersonal forms even when talking specifically about female experiences such
as pregnancy and sexual assault.  Nurit reported that she interrupted a training
session for rape crisis counselors to correct their use of the impersonal second-
person.  Nurit’s motivation for correcting the other women’s language was both
ideological and pragmatic.  On the ideological level, Nurit felt that the use of the
MASCULINE forms obscured the reality that rape is primarily a crime with
female victims.  On the pragmatic level, she believed that the use of FEMININE
forms would facilitate a sense of female solidarity that could be harnessed to
address the issue of violence against women.
In the context of ambiguous generic reference, speakers used both the
FEMININE and MASCULINE forms for the conditional impersonal.  Recall
Osnat’s use of the impersonal earlier in this section, repeated below as (41):
41. im ata            pone   elav       lo naxon
if you(M,S,2nd) speak(M,S) about him not correct
if you speak about it incorrectly
o medaber        alav       banekeiva keshehu zaxar
or speak(M,S) about him in feminine when he is masculine
or you speak about it in the feminine when it is masculine
                                                                                                                                      
FEMININE, but MIH does not provide a gender-neutral way for expressing this contrastive
statement.
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o   hahefex,     zo      taut     dikdukit     ayuma.
or the opposite, this is mistake grammatical terrible
or the opposite, it is a terrible grammatical mistake.
Osnat was making a generic statement regarding the use of Hebrew.  Any Hebrew
speaker was a potential referent for this generic impersonal.  It is not surprising to
find that all of Osnat’s MASCULINE tokens occurred in ambiguous generic
context.  It is also not surprising that a close examination of all the impersonal
second-person forms revealed that the majority of MASCULINE tokens, for all
the speakers, occurred in ambiguous generic contexts.
At an earlier point in the same utterance, Osnat used the FEMININE form
of the second-person impersonal to refer to a generic Hebrew speaker.
42. im at      pona    lemishehi,
if you(F) address someone(F)
if you address someone
shehi     nekeiva belashon zaxar
that she  feminine in language MASCULINE
that is female in the MASCULINE language
In this part of her utterance, Osnat not only used the FEMININE form of the
conditional impersonal but also the FEMININE form of the third-person
impersonal mishehi ‘someone.’  Osnat’s variation between the two impersonal
second-person forms in examples (41) and (42) does not seem to be triggered by
any specific contextual factor.  The MASCULINE and FEMININE ambiguous
generic impersonal forms seem to be in free variation.  This is not surprising
given that Osnat strongly advocated the use of innovative language to promote
gender equality.  Her alternation between MASCULINE and FEMININE forms
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for generic impersonal reference is consistent with her ideological stance that
innovative use of grammatical gender is the best tool for deconstructing the male-
bias embedded in Israeli socio-cultural practices.
Despite Osnat’s strong claims, it is still possible for some to evaluate her
use of FEMININE forms as hyper-correction and the use of MASCULINE forms
as adherence to rules for standard MIH.  The absence of data on my informants’
use of the second-person impersonal with a male interlocutor prohibits me from
determining the role of hyper-correction in gender agreement.  This is particularly
the case for ambiguous generic reference, in which other contextual and
pragmatic factors are weaker or non-existent.  Nonetheless, the pragmatic value of
the second-person impersonal pronoun – to convey solidarity or distance between
a speaker and an interlocutor, or a speaker and the perspective or experience – is
valuable a linguistic resource.  It is the type of resource that would be very useful
for achieving the ideological and pragmatic goals of Israeli feminist language
innovators.  To conclude my analysis of the second-person impersonal variable, I
present an example of how the second-person impersonal pronoun can be used to
index alternate concepts of social gender relationships.
In our discussion about her relationship to feminism, Neta alternated
between using the MASCULINE and FEMININE forms of the second-person
pronoun as the impersonal form.  An examination of her behavior reveals the use
of language as a means of differentiating between a male-dominated hierarchical
concept of the gendered social order and a feminist egalitarian orientation to
gender marker of social distinction.  In the following utterance, each use of the
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impersonal pronoun is in bold type. (The English gloss follows the Hebrew
transcription.):
bishvili ma ze feminizim eh ze lo shivyon bein haminim.  ani xoshevet
sheze tsurat xayim berama shel eh.  ze ken ze, im ani kax lezuiyut.
az zu zuiyut im shituf.  ze zuiyut shel,  bli bli devarim shehem
brurim mealeihem.  zot omeret zuiyut bli xukim mudarim bli ata
ose kaxa ani osa kaxa.  em bli lehaid oh ata ata zaxar ata ever az
haxeshbonot ata mesader, et hatashlumim ata mesader.  et habank,
ata mitasek ito.  ze bayom yom.  ze lehaid, ze im ani nimtset beeize
shehu makom veani nimtset beeize shehu, nomar masa umatan al kol
davar.  az haisha hi shel ani avater ketsat veat tevatri ketsat.  ze lo
sheani rotsa et hakol veat taftsidi, o at tikxi et hakol veani afsid.  ze
ketsat ani veketsat at.
For me what is feminism?  eh It is not [just] equality between the sexes.  I
think that it is a type of life on the level of eh.  It is yes, it is, if I take a
couplehood [for example] so this is couplehood with partnership, without
things that are clear from above.  That is to say, without the roles being
set.  Without you(M) do this and I do that, without for instance you(M)
are male you(M) are the man so the bills you(M) take care of, the
payments you(M) take care of, the bank, you(M) interact with it.  It is
[rather] that day by day it is to say, it is that if I am some place I am in
negotiation on everything, It is that I give up a little and you(F) give up a
little.  It is not that I want everything and you(F) lose out or you(F) take
everything and I lose out. It is a little me and a little you(F).
The first use of ata ‘you(M)’ in the phrase ata ose kaxa ani osa kaxa
could be an ambiguous generic, but in the context of her description about the
division of labor along gender lines, it is likely to be male-specific.  The use of
ata you(M) in the next part of her utterance refers appears to index the patriarchal
division labor.  By saying “you(M) are male, you(M) are the man” she limited the
most likely interpretation of the impersonal generic to gender-specific
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MASCULINE reference.  Contrast that usage with her use of at “you(F)” in the
second part of the utterance.  This use of the second-person pronoun was clearly
an impersonal use.  She was not addressing her female interlocutor directly but
using the FEMININE form as an impersonal generic, and the most likely
interpretation of this use, in the context of her utterance, is ambiguous.  The
referential scope includes anyone, male or female, with whom she might interact
and have to negotiate matters.  Her use of the FEMININE form is particularly
notable because she began her utterance by referencing the division of labor in the
context of a domestic partnership.  In Israeli culture, the normative representation
of domestic partnership is a heterosexual marriage.
Neta repeated this pattern throughout our conversation.  At a later point in
our conversation, she again used the MASCULINE impersonal to reference a
masculine or patriarchal perspective.  (The bolded text are the MASCULINE
impersonal forms.)
ani lo rotsa shetadir oti.  ani lo rotsa shetasim oti benish
sheata xoshev haxi nexona.  ma ani isha, az ani adina veani
raka.
‘I don’t want for you(M) to define(M,S) me.  I don’t want you(M)
to put me in the niche that you(M) think(M,S) is the most correct.
What I am a woman, so I am fragile and I am soft.’
Out of context, these forms seem to be directly addressed to a male interlocutor,
but they are a form of impersonal.  They were addressed generically, it seems, to
those who would try to prescribe Neta’s identity as a woman.  All ten of the
MASCULINE tokens of the impersonal in Neta’s speech were either overtly
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gender-specific or conceptually limited to those who would promote a male-
centric social order.  In contrast, her FEMININE tokens included ambiguous and
gender-specific generic and self-incorporative impersonal forms.
On the surface we can analyze Neta’s variation as an example of
alternation between the sex-specific use of MASCULINE forms and the feminist
use of FEMININE forms as ambiguous generics.  I believe there is also a deeper
level of meaning encoded in the regular variability between her use of
MASCULINE and FEMININE second-person impersonal forms.  Neta
emphatically stated a belief in using language to subvert the sexism embedded in
Israeli social practices.  The alternation that occured between the MASCULINE
and the FEMININE forms can be interpreted as a signal of a shift in the
conceptual or contextual frame being referenced.  When she spoke about the
dominant patriarchal social reality and its division of household chores along
traditional gender-lines, she used the MASCULINE form.  When she moved on to
describe the way she thought things should be divided between a couple, or in
relationships generally, she immediately switched to using the FEMININE form
for the impersonal.  The switch to the FEMININE form, which for this informant
functioned as the unmarked, indexed a feminist ideology and feminist practices.
The spontaneity and rate of Neta’s speech make it unlikely that she was
consciously alternating her production of forms; the switching between
MASCULINE and FEMININE forms seems to occur at a deeper level of
cognition.
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It is also possible to understand her alternating use of gender agreement on
the second-person impersonal forms as inter-textual reference to the language
practices associated with each contextual frame.  She used the MASCULINE
forms as the impersonal second-person generic only in the context of statements
about patriarchal norms, a linguistic practice that conforms with conventional
uses of language.  She used the FEMININE as the impersonal second-person in
the context of ideological statements about the feminist conceptualization of
gender and women’s right to self-determination.  The use of the forms can thus be
understood, within a feminist context, to index not only to the different
ideological concepts of gender but also to the practices of language use associated
with each contextual frame or set of communal norms.  Her innovative use of
gender agreement on the impersonal second-person disrupts, both literally and
metaphorically, normative Israeli social order.
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NEGOTIATING IDENTITY AND THE USE OF FEMINIST
HEBREW
Chapter VII: The social meaning of language variation among
Israeli feminists
7.1:  INDEXICALITY, VARIATION AND THE CONTEXTS OF USE
The analysis of the morpho-semantic variables in the preceding chapters
demonstrated the relationship between a set of innovative language use practices
and Israeli feminist communal practice.  Taken together, the description of these
practices constitutes a partial mapping of the parameters of a variety of CIH that I
refer to as Israeli feminist Hebrew.83  The women in my study, representatives of
the feminist community, used or claimed to use grammatical gender strategically
in a variety of sociolinguistic contexts.  In the analysis of each variable, I
presented some explanations for the reasons that particular morpho-semantic
context was incorporated into feminist practices.  The results of the quantitative
and qualitative analysis revealed a considerable level of inter-speaker and intra-
speaker variation with regard to the use of the conventional and feminist morpho-
semantic variants.  This variation as well as an apparent gap between their
behavior and their ideological claims could be interpreted as a measure of each
woman’s identification with the feminist community.  Alternatively, it could be
used to examine the value of each linguistic element of feminist Hebrew in the
performance of a feminist social identity.  In this chapter, I relate my findings on
                                                 
83 As noted, feminist Hebrew also includes a number of lexical variables.
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feminist linguistic behavior to the issue of using language to index social
identities and ideologies.
7.2  MEASURING THE RELATIVE INDEXICAL VALUE OF THE VARIABLES
Some of the variables, such as the use of FEMININE plurals for definite
feminine reference, represent a hyper-standardized use of language.  These hyper-
standard variables have socially constitutive value within the feminist community,
but in the meta-communal context of Israeli Hebrew speakers, they are not
necessarily viewed as innovative practices.  Other variables, such as the use of
FEMININE plural forms for gender-inclusive reference, are recognized by most
speakers of MIH as markers of feminist practice because they clearly violate
accepted norms for language use.  However, the value of these easily recognizable
variables may be more ideological than practical because they generally occur in
socio-cultural contexts that are already highly marked.  What, if any, relationship
exists between the productiveness of a variable and its value as a marker of
feminist practice?  Does the relative indexical value of a practice change as a
speaker moves from one community of practice, in this case, the feminist
community, to another community of practice, such as mainstream Hebrew-
speaking Israeli society?  If yes, does the social meaning remain constant, or does
it change?  All of these questions relate to the larger question of how innovative
linguistic practices are used strategically to construct and deconstruct social
relationships.
Although all the morpho-semantic variables are related through the use of
grammatical gender, the syntactic and semantic environment for each is different.
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Therefore, it should not be surprising to find that the value of each variable as an
indexical marker is not equal.  Nor is it surprising to find that the meaning of
some variables changes depending on the sociolinguistic context of use.  How do
we assess the relative value or weight of the morpho-semantic variables that
constitute feminist Israeli Hebrew?  If, as I claim, these variables index feminist
language practice and by extension a feminist identity, then we must assume that
the source of the indexicality is not arbitrary.  Based on observations of language
use in a variety of mainstream, feminist, and integrated sociolinguistic contexts, I
developed a set of criteria by which to weight the relative value of each variable
as an indexical marker of feminist speech.84
The following are the criteria used to evaluate the relative indexical value
of each feminist practice: 85
(1) Flouting or breaking with conventional practices of use is the first
criterion.  As discussed in chapter two, not all conventional or mainstream
practices of language use adhere to prescriptive rules for the use of
standard MIH.  For example, the use of MASCULINE plural forms for
reference to females does not follow standard rules for gender agreement,
but it is an accepted practice in informal sociolinguistic contexts.  If a
feminist linguistic innovation flouts conventional practice, it may or may
not also violate the prescribe rules of MIH grammar.
(2) Violating a prescriptive grammatical rule is the second criterion for
evaluating indexical value.  As demonstrated with the analysis of gender
agreement and generic reference, the same syntactic and semantic context
                                                 
84 I use the label “integrated sociolinguistic context” to refer to social situations in which women
who identify as feminist interact with Israelis who do not identify with the feminist community.
The majority of these interactions take place in local communities of practice that ascribe to the
norms of the larger community of Israeli Jewish Hebrew-speakers.
85 The evaluation of these practices was based on behavioral and metalinguistic data collected
between the years of 1996 and 1998.  The metalinguistic data include discourse about language
and gender issues by my informants as well as discourse exchanges in the broader feminist and the
general Hebrew-speaking population.
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can support variables that violate clearly established grammatical rules
and variables that only appear to challenge or question the strength of
prescribed practices of use. I used prescriptive rules as the basis for this
criterion because these are the grammatical rules to which speakers have
conscious access and to which they refer when speaking about issues of
language use.
(3) Whether or not a variable was ideologized in the general Israeli
Hebrew-speaking population was the third criterion.  I use the term
“ideologized” to refer to the phenomena of a particular linguistic practice
generating metalinguistic discourse about its relationship to feminist
values or issues of gender-equality.  The rumor about the use of
grammatical gender for reference to mixed-sex groups is a clear example
of an ideologized practice. 86
(4) Whether or not a variable is ideologized in the feminist community is
the fourth criterion.  It takes into account the fact that the feminist
community is a distinct community of practice within the larger Israeli
society and that several variables were only ideologized within the
feminist community.  These variables were overtly discussed as innovative
practices that, the feminists contended, support a more gender egalitarian
vision of Israeli society.
(5) Whether or not a variable is used as a tool of feminist socialization is
the fifth criterion.  In addition to being ideologized, a few variables were
clearly incorporated as tools of socialization within the feminist
community.  A variable was considered an aspect of feminist socialization,
if women within the feminist movement reported learning or teaching
others women to use the feminist variant(s) of a variable.87
I have assumed that each criterion has equal weight in determining the
indexical value of a feminist practice.  The indexical value of each variable is
determined individually and then compared, by means of a “score” to the other
                                                 
86 Discussion in media outlets or the overt incorporation of a practice in institutional policies was
the basis for determining whether or not a variable was ideologized in the general Hebrew-
speaking population.
87 This criterion is specifically concerned with socialization within the feminist community;
however, several of my informants reported correcting the language use of other women
regardless of the social context.
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variables.  Table 7.1 presents the evaluation of all the morpho-semantic variables.
The SLASH variants were evaluated separately from the FEMININE variants in
the relevant contexts because they have different grammatical, pragmatic and
ideological characteristics.  For each criterion listed horizontally, a variable has a
score of +1, +.5 or 0.  A score of 1 indicates that the relevant feminist practice
clearly meets that criterion.  A score of .5 indicates that the variable partially
meets the criterion.  For example, the use of second-person FEMININE
impersonal does not violate an overt prescriptive rule, but it does violate the
prescribed principle of using MASCULINE forms as ambiguous generics.  If a
variable did not satisfy a particular criterion, it received a score of zero.  The final
column in table 7.1 presents the relative indexical “score” for each variable and a
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Table 7.1 Relative indexical value of variables as markers of feminist Hebrew
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There are several ways to assess the meaning of the data presented in this
table.  Considering the table vertically, we can examine which variables share the
same sociolinguistic characteristics.  As we might expect, all the variables flout
conventional practices of language use.  Linguistic practices that mark social
distinctions must be recognizable as a set of practices that diverge from the norm
in some way.  Only three of the seven variables violate prescriptive rules for the
use of gender agreement in MIH.  All three of the variables that violate prescribed
rules involve using the FEMININE form for reference to males as part of either a
mixed gender group or potential referents of an ambiguous generic.  (The use of
the FEMININE second-person impersonal satisfies this criterion when it is used
as an ambiguous generic.)  The use of FEMININE forms for reference to males
has the pragmatic affect of forcing males to relinquish their social and
sociolinguistic privilege as the unmarked members of the collective.  Thus, these
variables have a high ideological value within the feminist community.  Although
the SLASH forms do not violate prescriptive rules, they also pragmatically
challenge the validity of using the MASCULINE as the inclusive category.  The
use of FEMININE forms force males to identify with the culturally and
linguistically marked FEMININE category, while the use of the SLASH forms
simply expands the paradigm to explicitly include both genders in the linguistic
construct.
Let us now compare those variables that are ideologized in both
mainstream Hebrew-speaking communities of practice society and the feminist
community of practice with those only ideologized in the feminist community of
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practice.  In this comparison, we find that only variables that overtly challenge the
status of the MASCULINE as the inclusive category are ideologized in the macro-
community of practice, that of Israeli Hebrew speakers.  These include using the
FEMININE or the SLASH form for ambiguous generic reference and the use of
the FEMININE form for inclusive definite reference to a group of males and
females.  It should not be surprising to find that those variables ideologized in
mainstream Israeli community are related to subverting or violating a grammatical
rule associated with the use of MASCULINE forms as the generic.  As I
discussed in the introduction to this chapter, most of the morpho-semantic
elements of feminist linguistic practice are related to an ideological rejection of
this grammatically justified practice.  The violation or subversion of the
grammatical rule and resultant practices are likely to be very salient for all
speakers of MIH.  On the ideological level of meaning, the use of any alternative
form for generic or inclusive reference to males and females disrupts the
naturalized association between the MASCULINE unmarked grammatical
category and the socio-cultural category male.  As such, we might expect all of
these variables to have equal value as indexical markers of feminist practice.  But
according to the evaluation presented in table 7.1, the FEMININE inclusive forms
(both definite and generic) have higher scores.
It also seems logical to assume that the variables that are ideologized in
mainstream Israeli society would have higher scores than those only ideologized
in the feminist community.  For a set of practices to index a specific social
identity or create social distinctions, we would expect the indexical value of those
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practices that are ideologized in the widest social grouping to carry the most
weight.  However, the indexical scores presented in the above table do not support
this expectation.  For example, the use of the FEMININE second-person
impersonal has a higher score than either of the SLASH variables, but the second-
person FEMININE impersonal is ideologized only in the feminist community.  As
discussed in chapter six, section 6.3, the pragmatic meaning of this variable is
dependent on the gender of the speaker and the hearer.  The variable only violates
prescribed grammatical rules if it is used in a generic reference that is clearly
intended to include both males and females.  As I have shown, the violation of
prescribed grammatical rules is a characteristic likely to make a variable salient to
mainstream CIH speakers.  The ideological value of this variable in the feminist
community is the associated pragmatic meaning of inviting or extending solidarity
between a speaker and her interlocutor.  This indexical meaning, extending
feminist solidarity, is limited to contexts in which the social meaning of an
inclusive FEMININE category is evaluated as positive.  The use of the
FEMININE as inclusive is evaluated positively within the feminist community of
practice, not the mainstream community.  As such, this variable has more limited
applications in mainstream Hebrew-speaking society than the use of SLASH
forms for generic or definite gender-inclusive reference.
If we compare the indexicality scores of the SLASH variables to the score
of the FEMININE plural forms for definite FEMININE reference, we find that
they all have the same indexical value.  The use of FEMININE plural forms for
definite feminine reference may be falling out of informal styles of CIH, but it
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does not violate prescribed grammatical rules.  The ideological and indexical
value of this variable is covert rather than overt.  As noted in section two of
chapter five, the norms of the macro-community of Israeli society are such that
most speakers of CIH are more likely to view this practice as hyper-standard
language use than a marker of feminist practice. Again, it is only within the
feminist community of practice that the consistent use of FEMININE plural forms
is valued as an index of feminist solidarity and recognition of women’s communal
efforts.88  Given these sociolinguistic facts, it is surprising to find that the use of
FEMININE plural forms for definite gender-specific reference appears to have the
same indexical score as the use of SLASH variables.
How can variables that do not appear to be salient enough to generate
metalinguistic discourse in the macro-community of practice serve as useful
indexical markers of social distinction?  The answer to this question lies in
understanding the dual nature of indexicality in the context of Israeli feminist
innovative linguistic practices.  As discussed in chapter two, the women in this
study are members of both the macro-community of practice that is Hebrew-
speaking Israeli society and the feminist community of practice.  The indexical
value of a variable is not necessarily absolute when speakers shuttle between two
communities of practice with ideological perspectives that are sometimes
incongruous.  To create a meaningful assessment of the relative indexical value of
                                                 
88 It is likely that the use of FEMININE plural forms in other all-female contexts such as a girl’s
school or a religious community of women has the same constitutive effect that it does in the
feminist community of practice, but the indexical meaning is unlikely to be the same.  It is the
ideological value that feminists place on recognizing women’s work and women’s solidarity that
gives the use of FEMININE plurals their social meaning.
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the variables that constitute feminist Hebrew, it is necessary to evaluate them
separately within each sociolinguistic context of use.  At the macro-level of
mainstream Israeli society, only the first three criteria are meaningful.  Within the
feminist community of practice, the ideologization of a variable in mainstream
Israeli society is likely to be secondary to the other four criteria.  In the tables on
the following pages, I present the indexical value scores of each variable
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Table 7.3 Relative indexical value of feminist variables within the Israeli feminist community
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Separating the criteria for evaluating indexicality according to the
sociolinguistic context of use results in a clear distinction between those variables
that are valuable markers of feminist practice in the mainstream context from
those more valuable in the feminist context.  As expected, in the mainstream
community of practice, the use of FEMININE forms for generic or definite
reference to males and females has the highest value.  The SLASH forms, which
also symbolically challenge the conventional practices that naturalize a one-to-
one relationship between the unmarked status of the MASCULINE grammatical
category and the unmarked status of the culturally masculine category, have the
next highest indexical value in this communal context.  The three variables that
are more related to defining culturally and linguistically female-exclusive space
are the least valuable in the mainstream sociolinguistic context.  This is not
surprising given that the use of the FEMININE impersonal second-person is the
only one of the three to violate an overt grammatical rule and only when it is used
as an ambiguous generic.  The use of FEMININE forms for feminine reference
may flout certain conventional practices of use, but they do not challenge any
associations between grammatical and cultural categories of gender.
At the macro-level of mainstream Israeli society, the most meaningful
feminist practices are those that symbolically challenge or raise awareness of the
male privilege embedded within conventional linguistic practices.  From a socio-
cultural perspective, this is the most salient ideological stance of the feminist
movement.  Thus, the value of an innovative practice at the macro-sociolinguistic
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level of a multi-layered society is dependent on its ability to symbolically index
an iconic aspect of the community of practice with which it is associated.
In contrast, when we examine indexicality in the feminist sociolinguistic
context, as shown in table 7.3, it is not surprising to find that the variable that
shares characteristics with definite reference to females and the use of
FEMININE forms for generic reference has the highest indexical value.  The
FEMININE second-person impersonal was also the variable that generated the
most metalinguistic discourse and was one of only two variables that my
informants indicated was incorporated into feminist practices of socialization.
The data in table 7.3 indicate that the use of FEMININE forms in all the morpho-
semantic contexts has more indexical value in the feminist context than the use of
SLASH forms.
The fact that the use of FEMININE forms is more socially valuable in the
feminist context is linked to the constitutive value of these variables in culturally
defining feminist community.  (The one exception to this principle is the
historical FEMININE historical form.  As discussed in chapter six, section 6.3,
this variable is associated for most CIH speakers with either literary or old-
fashioned Hebrew.  The previous indexical meaning apparently weakens its value
as a marker of feminist Hebrew in both sociolinguistic contexts.)  The use of
FEMININE forms is culturally linked to defining female socio-cultural space as
well as the feminine identity of speakers, interlocutors or potential referents
(generic or definite).  As noted, two of these variables are incorporated into
practices of feminist socialization.  The qualitative analysis of several examples
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from my informants’ speech illustrated that these women used FEMININE forms
in generic contexts to highlight the feminist identity of a speaker, an institution, or
a particular ideological stance.  The indexical meaning of this variable in the
mainstream context makes helps make sense of the negative response of an
informant to the use of at ‘you (f, s)’ on the voicemail recording of the Women’s
Lobby feminist organization.  Her objection to the practice can be seen as concern
that the use of the FEMININE form would define the organization as female-only
space, functionally excluding potential male participants or supporters.  She
claimed that her solution of using a system that followed the principles underlying
the use of SLASH forms would convey the concept of gender-equality without the
potential implication that the organization was female-only space.  (In the next
section of this chapter, I present an analysis of this “incident” from the
perspective of four employees of the organization that adopted this practice.)
Challenging male privilege and promoting gender equality are inherent
parts of the ideological and practical goals of the feminist community.  As such,
the SLASH variables, which primarily index this stance, may not be as valuable
within the feminist community as those that index an all-female identity or
accomplish both pragmatic goals at once are.  Within the sociolinguistic context
of the feminist movement, using language to define a space or an interaction as
female can raise participants’ awareness of female agency.  Awareness of female
agency is vital to creating feminist community and empowering women to act for
social change.  The variables that pragmatically support this crucial aspect of
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Israeli feminist culture are the most valuable within the local feminist community
of practice.
One of the issues central to efforts at language reform is the issue of
salience.  Throughout this chapter, I have demonstrated that one of the motivating
factors underlying Israeli feminist linguistic innovation is the commitment of the
women in the community to create change in the status quo of gender social
relations.  Linguistic innovations that are not salient are unlikely to be effective
tools of change.  The evaluation of the relative indexical value of each variable
above showed that both indexical value and ideological salience of linguistic
practices vary according to the sociolinguistic context of use.  Both the unmarked
status of the MASCULINE grammatical category and the use of FEMININE
forms for gender-exclusive reference are discursively and ideologically
unremarkable in mainstream Israeli society, because they conform to the norms of
that community of practice.  As such, only variables that challenge these practices
and the associated cultural gender ideologies are salient in that sociolinguistic
context.  In the feminist context, all the variables are salient.  However, those that
contribute to the creation of feminist community and the empowerment of women
as agents of change appear to be more valuable for indexing a speaker’s
membership in the community.
At the beginning of chapter four, I asserted that the morpho-semantic
variables that constitute feminist Hebrew are practices that stem from an
underlying ideological rejection of the MASCULINE form as the unmarked.  The
contextualized analysis of my informants’ use of the individual variables
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demonstrated that the grammatical gender categories are evaluated differently in
the feminist and mainstream contexts.  They have different social meanings that
are determined by the norms of each community of practice.  In the mainstream
context, the use of MASCULINE forms as inclusive or unmarked creates
symbolic privilege for males, because of the iconic relationship between the
grammatical and social categories of “masculine.”  The iconic relationship creates
a metaphorical collective masculine identity, which is evaluated positively within
mainstream Israeli communities of practice.  By metaphorical extension, the use
of MASCULINE forms for female referents can be interpreted as a means of
inviting or declaring the inclusion of females within the positively evaluated
masculine collective.  The social meaning of FEMININE forms in the mainstream
context is otherness.  The forms are used to identify and separate females, or
feminine marked cultural contexts, from the collective masculine.
From a feminist perspective, however, the FEMININE grammatical
category cannot not mean “other” or separate.  It is the linguistic marker of
feminine identity, which as I stated, is central to the feminist goal of creating and
supporting female agency.  The apparent preferred use of FEMININE plural
forms for definite reference to females can be interpreted as symbolic positive
evaluation of a collective feminine identity.  The use of FEMININE forms for
inclusive or generic reference grants females the symbolic privilege that they are
denied by conventional practices of language use.  In the feminist context, the
MASCULINE, and by extension the masculine is either the other or an equal, but
not the definition of the norm.  To understand the significance of feminist
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language use as a tool of feminist social change work, we must look not only at
the linguistic elements that constitute the “feminist” variety of a language.  We
must also evaluate the variability of the indexical meanings they have in the
different communities of practice in which women participate.
7.3 LINGUISTIC BEHAVIOR AND FEMINIST IDEOLOGY
As the analysis of data presented in the above section and chapters five
and six demonstrated, not all the morpho-semantic variables of feminist Hebrew
carry the same meaning across all contexts of use.  Nor do the speakers in this
study use them with equal frequency.  What, if any, relationship is there between
the women’s linguistic behavior in the interview context and their reported
ideological claims about language and gender?  Does observable intra-speaker
and inter-speaker variation have more to do with the meaning of a given practice
in a particular context or with an individual speaker’s relationship to the feminist
community? Is there an explanatory relationship between indexical values,
linguistic behaviors, actual usage, and ideological stances associated with each
variable or with the overall linguistic behavior of individual members of a
community of practice?
I have addressed some these issues through the contextualized analysis of
my informants’ uses of specific variables.  For example, I showed how my
informants’ use of MASCULINE and FEMININE forms for ambiguous generic
reference to doctors and teachers, respectively, indexed the gendered norms (and
social reality) of Israeli society.  Iris’s sense of obligation to model “correct”
Hebrew was cited as her motivation for rejecting the use of FEMININE plural
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forms for inclusive reference to males and females.  The reconceptualization of
the relationship between gender categories, both linguistic and social, and the
concept of markedness was posited as an explanation of Neta’s attested variation
regarding gender agreement on generic second-person impersonal forms and her
use of FEMININE forms for ambiguous generic reference.  The limits of length
and time inherent in a doctoral thesis prohibit an exhaustive investigation of these
issues for all fifteen informants.  However in an effort to address the issues raised
by the above questions, I devote this concluding section to the examination of
four of my informants’ behavioral data and their ideological claims regarding the
a specific sociolinguistic event.  The sociolinguistic “event” was the decision by
the staff of a feminist organization to use at ‘you (F, S)’ as the sole term of
address on its voicemail system’s recording.  I begin with a comparison of the
qualitative data on each woman’s use of the morpho-semantic variables of
feminist Hebrew.  On the following pages are tables showing the behavioral data
for Einat, Ofra, Iris, and Ora.
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11 7 0 63% N/A yes
Table 7.4  Ofra’s usage of morpho-semantic variables
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Table 7.5 Einat’s usage of morpho-semantic variables
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14 14 N/A 100% N/A yes
Table 7.6  Ora’s usage of morpho-semantic variables
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11 6 1 55%
second
highest









10 7 N/A 70% N/A yes (reported
inconsistent
use)
Table 7.7 Iris’s usage of morpho-semantic variables
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A comparison of the overall usage of feminist variants for each woman
shows that Ofra used only two of the variables in the context of the interview.
Einat used four variables; Ora used five; and Iris used the most, six.  If we follow
a classic quantitative sociolinguistic approach, we might expect the inter-speaker
variation to correlate with differences in each woman’s level of identification with
the feminist community (Labov, 1972) or the density of her feminist network
(Milroy, 1980).  Ofra with the “lowest score” would have the weakest or loosest
affiliation with the feminist community, and Iris would have the strongest or
densest.  However, all four women were senior-level staff members of the same
feminist organization, and their “feminist” networks were comparably dense.
There is not direct correlation between the number of variables they used and
their access to, or identification with, the feminist community.  In the absence of a
direct correlation between use and “identity” we might turn to “non-social”
factors to explain the variation.  Indeed, in my analysis of each variable, I
presented examples of the influence that discourse topic and grammatical
environments had on my informants’ use of MASCULINE, FEMININE, and
SLASH variants in the different morpho-semantic contexts.
I do not mean to suggest that the absence of a direct correlation rules out a
social contextual explanation of the variation.  Nor do I mean to suggest that a
correlation between the observed variation and the social factors of each woman’s
feminist identity would explain the observed sociolinguistic phenomena.  In her
article “Demythologizing sociolinguistics: Why language does not reflect
society,” Cameron (1990) stated that a correlation between linguistic behavior and
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aspects of a speaker’s social identity do not actually explain social variation of
language use.  According to Cameron, it simply adds information to the
description of a phenomenon (pp. 85-86).  A quantitative sociolinguistic approach
would lead us to expect certain correlative relationships between the variability of
language practice in the feminist community and the identity or position of each
speaker in relationship to the community.  In the case of my informants, the
expected correlative relationship is not apparent from that data; thus, we must
look elsewhere for an explanation of the observed behavior.
Cameron also made the case for including metalinguistic discourse as data
in the context of investigating the social meanings of language.  Let us therefore
examine the metalinguistic statements each woman made in her evaluation of the
organization’s decision to use the FEMININE singular form as the only term of
address on the organization’s voicemail message.
Ofra: hamaane koli shelanu ose bidiyuk et ota taut sheosim
irunim axerim.  ma anaxnu mevakshot, shelo yifnu rak belashon
zaxar sheyifnu am belashon nekeiva.  aval etsleinu ma anaxnu
osot, ponot rak belashon nekeiva velo mityaxasot lezaxar.  az
beetsem, hameser ze sheanaxnu lo rotsot shivyon zxuyot, anaxnu
rotsot odef zxuyot lenashim.
Ofra:  Our voicemail makes exactly the same mistake that other
organizations make.  What do we ask, that they don’t use only
masculine language, that they also use feminine language.  But here,
what do we do? We use only feminine language and don’t engage the
masculine.  So, essentially, the message is that we don’t want equal
rights, we want extra rights for women.
Ofra expressed clear disapproval of the organization’s choice of language use.  In
the context of our conversation, she described the elaborate alternative she had
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proposed, which would allow male callers the choice to opt out of being
addressed in the FEMININE by choosing an option for MASCULINE language.
(See the analysis of example (37) in chapter six, section 6.3 for the details of her
alternative solution.)  The principle or norm represented by her elaborate solution
is similar to the SLASH variant for generic reference; both can be understood to
represent a symbolic equality of male and female privilege.  As the quote above
highlights, Ofra interpreted the use of the FEMININE form as a message that
feminists wanted extra privileges for women and are not interested in engaging
men in their work.
Keeping her stance in mind, let us return to table 7.4, which presents her
behavioral data.  The last two columns show her reported use of each variable.
She reported using SLASH forms for generic reference. She also explicitly
reported not using the FEMININE form as an ambiguous generic.  The one
variable she used most consistently, 95%, in the context of our interview was
considerably more valuable as an index of feminist identity within the feminist
community than it was in the mainstream social context.  The work that a speaker
“does” with the consistent use of FEMININE plurals for definite feminine
reference is to create and define feminist or women’s space or agency without
overtly challenging or subverting masculine agency or privilege.  Her reported
language use viewed in light of her evaluation of the voicemail recording seems
to point to a practice of language use that indexes, among other things, an iconic
conceptualization of the relationship between grammatical and social gender
categories.  We might argue, therefore, that the analysis of the data leads to the
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following underlying ideological position regarding language use and sexism:  the
“problem” with conventional male-biased sociolinguistic practices is not the
privilege they grant men.  Rather, the “problem” is the manner in which they
erase or subjugate women and women’s agency.  Thus, the solution is to reclaim
FEMININE forms and to insist on “accurate” linguistic representation of both
males and females in all relevant contexts.  These ideological positions would
seem to explain her behavior and her reported preferences.
Now, let us compare Einat and Ora’s stances regarding the voicemail
issue, quoted below, with their observed and reported usage as shown on tables
7.5 and 7.6 respectively.  Both women reported using the SLASH form as an
alternative for ambiguous generic reference.  Einat and Ora used both FEMININE
and SLASH forms for generic reference in the context of their conversations with
me.  Their observed and reported practices of language use were quite similar.
(Ora also used the historical predicate form.)  Like Ofra, they both reported using
the SLASH form as a generic.  Neither woman explicitly claimed to use the
FEMININE form in that context, thought they did not explicitly exclude its use
either.  We might expect, therefore, that they would claim some ambivalence
about the use of FEMININE forms as the perfect solution for addressing an
unknown caller on a voicemail recording.  Below are their statements.
Ora: ani nora hitakashti beinyan shel hamaane koli, shelo yihiye
maane koli, ... berabim o mashehu kaze.  eila lo, sheyihiye maane
koli lenashim, bilal shehinei rov haponot eleinu hen nashim.
vehainyan hu am sheani rotsa lehaxdir et ze, sheze yihiye barur
meeilav, sheam im mishtamshim balashon eh nekeiva ze kolel
am et haever.  zot omeret sheyihiye po izun.
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Ora:  ‘I was very stubborn in the matter of the voicemail, it not be a
voicemail that would be ..., in the MASCULINE plural or something
like that.  That, in contrast it would be a voicemail to women, because,
here, most of our callers(F,P) are women.  And the issue is also that I
want to establish this, so it is clear from the outset, even when (we) use
of the feminine language this also includes the man.  That is to say that
here there will be equality.
Einat  lama hayiti bead ze (…) mikeivan sheze irun nashim. (…)
ze irun shetsrixa lihiyot frendli lasviva shelo.  shenashim yarishu
kan kemo babayit. (…) shehavarim shemitkashrim elai, eleinu, ze
am leinyanei nashim, rubam.
Einat:  why was I in favor of this (use of FEMININE forms)? ...
Because, this is a women’s organization.  ... This is an organization that
must be friendly to its constituency.  That here women will feel like at
home.  ... The men who call me, us, this also regarding women’s issues,
most of them.
Both Einat and Ora assessed the use of the FEMININE form on the voicemail as
an important symbol of the organization’s commitment to its female constituency.
These female callers are valued members of the organization’s extended
community.  Their positive evaluations of and explanations for this linguistic
choice highlighted feminist solidarity with all women, an extension of sisterhood,
if you will, to the women who called the organization.  It contrasts sharply with
Ofra’s evaluation of the “meaning” of the voicemail message to callers.
Both Einat and Ora use the FEMININE form of the impersonal generic
(gender specific and ambiguous) in 100% of their relevant utterances, but Ofra
only used it in 63% of her relevant utterances.  Recall that in my analysis of the
second-person impersonal, I discussed how the use of FEMININE agreement on
this morpho-semantic variable could pragmatically signal the extension of or
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request for feminist solidarity between a speaker and her interlocutor or the
ideological perspective she is presenting.89  Given this correlation, it seems
reasonable to conclude that Einat and Ora evaluate the symbolism of the
FEMININE term of address on the voicemail as an attempt to signal solidarity to
its female callers.  Indeed, the actual talk on the recording used the FEMININE
second-person singular pronoun, at, as a generic form of address to individuals of
unknown gender.  In reference to men, both Einat and Ora focused on the fact that
most male callers to their feminist organization were likely to be sympathetic to
feminist causes and/or interpret the voicemail as an indexical marker of feminist
identity.  Einat, in a different part of her statement about the voicemail, reported
that some of the men who called did complain to her, but claimed that she used it
as an opportunity to educate them about feminist issues.
The apparent correlation between the women’s language use and their
ideological stances might lead us to think that women who supported the
voicemail also consistently used, or preferred the use of, FEMININE agreement
on the second-person impersonal and third-person generic forms.  In all of these
contexts, the use of the FEMININE form indexes a focus on feminist solidarity
and the obligation of the feminist community to privilege women over men.
Through their use of language they are enacting a woman-centered form of
feminist social-change work.  In contrast, we would expect that women who were
ambivalent or uncomfortable with the use of the FEMININE forms on the
voicemail would demonstrate less consistent use of the impersonal form and
                                                 
89 See the discussion of this variable in chapter six.
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disapprove of using FEMININE forms as ambiguous generics.  The social
explanation for this behavior would be that these women understand the mission
of feminist organizations as promoting women’s equality with men.90
With that hypothetical explanation of the relationship between ideological
stances and observable inter-speaker variation in mind, let us consider Iris’s
behavior and her ideological stance regarding the voicemail recordings.  Iris
demonstrated the second highest percentage FEMININE tokens for ambiguous
generic reference.  (Only Neta’s was higher.)  Iris’s use of FEMININE impersonal
generics accounted for 70% of her tokens.  Recall, however, that two of her three
MASCULINE tokens occurred in the context of a self-inclusive use of the
impersonal second-person, in which she recognized her “mistake” and self-
corrected to the FEMININE form.  Her observed behavior seems to put her in the
category of women who fully supported the use of gender in the voicemail
recording.  But the ideological stance she took was one of deep ambivalence.
Iris:  ani, mitsad exad, meod smexa sheyesh eh, sheat merima
telefon veat shomaat irun shemedaber beleshon nekeiva.  mitsad
sheini, ani xoshevet sheulai ze yaxol lehazik lanu.(…)  ani rotsa
lihiyot universalit.  ani rotsa lehaid xevra shivyonit. ki yesh lexa
ben veyesh lexa bat veani rotsa sheyihiye lahem et oto davar.  az
po ani xoshevet sheyesh eize shehu fisfus katan.
Iris:  On the one hand, I am really happy that there is, that you call up
on the phone and you hear an organization that speaks in the feminine
language.  On the other hand, I think that perhaps it could hurt us.  I
                                                 
90 Feminists and feminist researchers have long acknowledged these types of conceptual
variations within the feminist community and how they are manifested in the practices of those
who ascribe to one position or the other.  See Freedman (2002), and Dale and Foster (1986) for
discussions of ideological variation within feminist communities.
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want to be universal.  I want to say an equal society.  Because,
you(M,S) have a son and you(M,S) have a daughter and I want it to be
the same thing for both.  So, here, I think that there is some kind of
small loss.
In the above statement, Iris expressed similar concerns to those that Ofra
expressed about the potential for the message to imply that the organization is not
interested in male callers or gender equality.  She also acknowledged the positive
message that was the focus of Einat and Ora’s evaluation, that the language of the
voicemail would be a welcome signal of explicit inclusion to female callers. Iris’s
case seems to weaken the argument that there is an explanatory relationship
between the women’s linguistic behavior and their ideological stance vis-a-vis the
voicemail.  Despite the fact that she used the widest variety of variables, including
FEMININE ambiguous generics and impersonal second-person forms, her stance
is ambivalent.
Recall, however, that some of Iris’s generic uses of the FEMININE
reflected culture norms about elementary school teachers, i.e. they were not
necessarily uses of grammatical gender according to the norms of feminist
Hebrew.  As shown in table 7.7, Iris reported limiting the use of FEMININE
generics to all female contexts.  She also reported that she stopped using the
FEMININE form as an inclusive plural when she learned that the relevant HLA
ruling was a false rumor.  In other ideological statements, Iris highlighted the
need to focus on the context of use and the social identity of one’s audience.  The
following statement was her response to my question about what linguistic
changes should be advocated for in educational contexts.  ani xoshevet sheze
meod meod meshane mi oxlusiyat hayaad.  ‘I think that it really, really makes
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a difference who the target audience is.’  Iris’s commitment to varying language
use to suit the context and audience is evident in her reported use of the difference
practices.  (See the far right columns of table 7.7.)  She claimed to tailor her usage
to suit the sociolinguistic context.  Her ideological claims seem to indicate an
acute awareness of the way in which linguistic indexicality is flexible and
meaning is conditional upon the conceptual frame of her interlocutors.
Iris’s clear concern with adjusting linguistic behavior to suit the
sociolinguistic context provides a potential clue to a more meaningful explanation
of the relationship between the observed and reported language use and the
ideological claims of these women.  Ofra’s and Iris’s ideological stances
regarding the voicemail recording clearly differ from the stances of Einat and Ora,
but the quantitative data on their behavior place them at opposite ends of the inter-
speaker continuum of variation.  Therefore, it seems unlikely that their similar
ideological stance regarding the voicemail language directly “reflects” their
commitment to using feminist Hebrew as tool of social change.  All four women
make clear statements about the potential of feminist innovative language
practices to challenge the reproduction of male privilege encoded in conventional
practices of language use.  In light of these facts, how might we explain the data?
The data can be explained by incorporating an analysis of what each
woman’s ideological statement revealed about how she conceptualized the
“interaction” between the voicemail recording and potential callers.  Einat’s and
Ora’s statements seem to indicate that they understood the “event” as an
interaction between members of the feminist community of practice and potential
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members (or peripheral members) of the community.  They both focused on the
feminist identity of the organization and the fact that most of the callers would be
women.  With respect to male callers, both Einat and Ora saw the practice as an
opportunity to raise awareness of the subordinate position that they believe
conventional practices impose on women.  Iris’s and Ofra’s talk about the practice
focused on the potential harm the recording might cause the organization’s image
by deliberately excluding  or ignoring the needs of male callers.  These two
women seem to conceptualize the voicemail as an interaction between the
feminist identified organization (and by extension the members of that feminist
community), and members of the mainstream community of practice.  Their
ideological stance reflects an awareness of the potential conflict between the
norms of each community of practice and the desire to find a way to
accommodate both sets of norms.
The concept of communities of practice helps make sense of their
ideological stances and perhaps even their observed and reported practices of
language use.  Iris and Ofra’s behavior and ideological stances reflect a
conceptualization of feminist work that always includes attention to how feminist
communal practices are understood by those with power in the mainstream
community.  The salient social factor for them seems to be the status of the
feminist community within the context of the larger community of Israeli Hebrew
speakers.  Einat and Ora, on the other hand, took ideological stances and support
language use practices that focused on the social relationship between the core of
the feminist community and its extended membership, which they define as all
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women, or at least any woman who would call a feminist organization.  For them,
the salient meanings of the feminist innovative language practices are those that
obtain within the context of the feminist community of practice.
Although there is clearly some correlation between the observed linguistic
behavior of these women and their ideological stances, the nature of this
relationship cannot be “read” in a direct fashion from the quantitative data.  If we
try to use the quantitative data as a map to their relative status within the feminist
community, we are led to believe that Ofra was a more peripheral member of the
community; Iris was a core member; and Einat and Ora fitted somewhere in
between.  However as noted, all these women are core members, paid staff, of the
same local feminist community of practice.  So what is the meaning of the inter-
speaker variation on the community?  What might it tell us about Israeli feminist
language practices and the relationship between feminist ideological stances and
feminist identity?  I would argue that the inter-speaker variation (both behavioral
and ideological) found in the Israeli feminist community should be viewed as an
index of the feminist community’s ability to tolerate a certain degree of diversity
with regard to ideologies about how and in what contexts to use language as a tool
for creating feminist culture and/or challenging male privilege within Israeli
society.  Furthermore, it is also possible to interpret the inter-speaker linguistic
variation within the Israeli feminist community as a function of the multiple
definitions of what it means to be a feminist in the Israeli context.
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7.4 LANGUAGE USE AS SOCIAL ACTION
In this chapter, I have demonstrated how the relationships between
linguistic behavior, indexicality, and language ideology must be understood in the
context of the overlapping and conflicting social practices and norms privileged
by the multiple communities of practice in which these women participate.   On
the theoretical level, I have used the data to present an argument for the necessity
of incorporating a complex and multi-faceted concept of context into the analysis
of the relationship between linguistic behavior, social identity, and ideology.  The
approach must include the speaker’s metalinguistic discourse as data of equal, if
different, value as the quantitative data on observed linguistic behavior.  In this
way, we can begin to explain, how variation in linguistic behavior is related to
what a group of speakers is doing with the sociolinguistic resources available to
them.  If, as Cameron stated, “language-using is a social practice in its own right”
(90), then we must look not only at which speakers use language in what ways,
but also what they are trying to accomplish through their use of a given linguistic
practice in specific socio-cultural contexts.  Using this conceptual approach, I will
restate my analysis of the social meaning of linguistic variation within the Israeli
feminist community.  It is a function of the multiple ways a woman can enact an
Israeli feminist identity.  In the next chapter, I continue my investigation of how
the women in my study used language to perform an Israeli feminist identity
through a detailed examination of two women’s “stories” about their
sociolinguistic strategies in different contexts.
230
Chapter VIII: The linguistic negotiation of identity and social change:
Strategies of two Israeli feminist activists.
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking
at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a
world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness,--an
American, a Negro; two warring souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings;
two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from
being torn asunder.  W.E.B. DuBois (1903)
8.1 FROM DUBOIS TO ISRAELI FEMINISTS: RECONCILING EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL
IMAGES OF SELF
W.E.B. DuBois’s (1903) concept of double consciousness can be applied to the
experiences of any individual who is marginalized by the dominant mainstream culture
because of his/her race, ethnicity, sexuality, gender-identity, religion or class.91  For these
individuals, the construction of a coherent self is complicated by conflicting images from
the separate but overlapping socio-cultural contexts in which they live.  In the
mainstream context, they are the “OTHER” defined by their differences from the
normative concept of SELF that is privileged by the dominant cultural ideologies and
practices.  This “othered” self image while externally constructed is often internalized by
the members of the marginalized community.  In the context of the “primary” community
of practice, the individual is the normative self.  His/her practices and ideological
perspectives define these communal norms.  The disjunction or dissonance between the
two images creates “two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals.”  The
individual is thus set with the task of continuously negotiating his/her creation and
performance of self in relationship to different constructions of social reality, that are
often simultaneously relevant.  In this chapter, I analyze the stories two women told about
                                                 
91 Although “race” is a problematic term, it refers to a constructed category that exerts powerful control
over issues of social identity in most socio-cultural contexts.
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their strategic use of language to further their personal and political social agendas and
their representation of self.
In complex contemporary societies, such as Israel, individuals generally, if not
always, belong to more than one of the sub-communities that exist within the larger
community of Israeli society.  For example in Israel, my identity is shaped by my
membership in several different communities some of which place me within the
dominant meta-cultural definition of the normative Israeli, and others which place me in
the category of the OTHER.  As an Ashkenazi Jewish citizen of Israel and a fluent
Hebrew speaker, I am a member of the privileged class of Israelis; I fit into the definition
of the normative Israeli SELF.  However, my social classification as Israeli SELF is
complicated by the fact that I am not a sabra (native Israeli), I am a native English
speaker, and I am a non-Orthodox practicing Jew. 92  These aspects of my ‘self’ place me
in the category of the OTHER.  As discussed in chapter two, the normative Israeli SELF
is constructed as male within a male-dominated social hierarchy.  Thus, my femaleness
also places me in the category of OTHER.
In patriarchal societies, the concept of gender does not simply center on the
differentiation of male as SELF and female as OTHER.  This binary distinction is used in
the definition of another relevant axis of social categorization, that of normative/non-
normative concepts of masculinity and femininity.  MAN represents the concept of
normative masculinity, and WOMAN represents the concept of normative femininity.93
Prescribed social behaviors, and associated characteristics, limit self-expression and self-
                                                 
92 In Israel, religious observance is defined by Orthodox laws and practices.  The image of the normative
Israeli, in the mainstream context, is of a non-practicing Jew.  Thus observant Jews from the liberal streams
of contemporary Judaism are OTHER both because they are religiously observant and because their
practices are non-Orthodox.
93 In  this chapter, I use all capital letters to refer to cultural concepts of identity defined by dominant
mainstream and lower-case letters to refer to the concepts related to marginalized sub-communities.
232
determination for both men and women; however, patriarchal ideologies further
disempower women by subordinating them to men in the overall social hierarchy.  Even
in contemporary “liberated” Western societies that espouse an ideology of gender
equality, women’s lives are still constrained by notions of appropriate gender behavior
and institutionalized forms of gender discrimination (Clark, 1990; Gilligan, 1982; West
& Zimmerman, 1987).  Women’s access to resources and social opportunities may shift
in ‘liberated’ or ‘modern’ societies, but concepts of normative femininity, masculinity
and sexuality continue to complicate the relationship between a woman’s internally
constructed self and the externally constructed image of WOMAN.  Therefore, I use the
concept of double consciousness to describe women’s experiences and their struggles to
create and express a unified sense of self.
The issue of double consciousness and the problems of agency in self-definition
emerged as central themes in my conversations with women in the Israeli feminist
community.  As discussed in chapter two, section 2.4, mainstream Israeli society is
shaped by several male-dominated institutions and patriarchal ideologies that inscribe
social relationships and communal practices with fairly rigid concepts of what constitutes
normative male and female social behaviors.  Neta, one of the women I interviewed,
made the following comment regarding the way Israeli cultural concepts of WOMAN
interfered with her ability to define herself. 94
43. ani lo rotsa shetadir oti.  ani lo rotsa shetasim oti benish sheata xoshev
haxi nexona.  ma ani isha, az ani adina veani raka, veani.  ani lo.  ani
am, aval ani am harbe devarim axerim.
I don’t want that you(M) will define me.  I don’t want that you(M) will put me
in the niche that you(M) think is the most correct.  What I am a woman so I am
                                                 
94 In this chapter, I provide only an idiomatic translation of their speech because the focus is the
metalinguistic content, although for examples in which the linguistic elements are also relevant, I include
relevant grammatical information in the idiomatic glosses.
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delicate and I am soft and I… I am not! I am also but I am also many other
things.
Neta’s comment highlights the conflict between the external definition of Israeli
WOMAN – delicate and soft – with her own definition of self, which might include these
characteristics but includes many other things as well.95
The patriarchal aspects of Israeli culture are reproduced and legitimized through
conventional practices of language use in mainstream Hebrew-speaking society.  These
practices naturalize an iconic relationship between the culturally defined social behaviors
or roles associated with MAN and WOMAN and the linguistic forms (including the
gender categories themselves) used to talk about men and women as social actors.  In
addition, the use of the MASCULINE grammatical category as the unmarked or inclusive
naturalizes the privilege afforded to men in a male-dominated society by associating the
normative MAN with the normative SELF.96
Dominance is sustained by privileging in community practice a particular
perspective on language, obscuring its status as one among many perspectives and
naturalizing it as neutral or “unmarked.”  The privileged can assume their own
positions to be norms toward which everyone else orients; they can judge other
positions while supposing their own to be invulnerable to less privileged
assessment.  This privileged relation to a symbolic system, which we shall call
symbolic privilege, carries with it interpretive and evaluative authority that
requires no explanation or justification. (Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 1992, p.
483)
Conventional practices of language use are social acts that (re)create the gender
inequality within a society.  Many of the women I interviewed commented on the way
                                                 
95 As discussed at the end of chapter six, Neta used the MASCULINE form of the impersonal second-
person pronoun to index prescribed patriarchal concepts of masculinity and femininity.  In the utterance
above, her use of ata could be understood as patriarchal ideology itself personified by the ata a male ‘you’
who would impose the stereotypical characteristics of delicacy and softness onto his definition of Neta’s
SELF.
96 In this chapter, ‘MASCULINE’ and ‘FEMININE’ continue to refer to the grammatical categories and
‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ refer to the socio-cultural categories.
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that conventional Israeli language practices construct associated the Israeli SELF with a
masculine image to which they have been socialized to orient themselves.
44. ze am muvan meelav.  at, eh nira lax barur sheponim tamid leevarim.
at lo xoshevet al ze afilu.  ki meil meod tsair hem melamdim otax, eh
lehistakel al haolam derex einayim shel ever.  keilu at kevar roa
hahizdahut shelax hi im ever.
this is also built into it.  you, um it is clear to you, that always (they)
address(M,P) men.  You don’t think about this, even, because from a very
young age (they) teach(M,P) you to look at the world through male eyes.
Seemingly, you already see your identification, it is with man.
45. kol haxayim at xelek mi min hakahal.  notnim lax et hareshut lehitstaref
lemoadon, keilu.
all of life you are a part of the collective gender.  they(M) give you(F)
permission to join the club, seemingly.
In both of the examples above, it is possible to interpret the unidentified masculine plural
agents of ponim ‘address,’ melamdim ‘teach,’ and notnim ‘give’ as either ‘people’ or the
conventional language practices themselves.  (The discourse surrounding each of these
comments did not clarify the identity of the implied agents, but these statements were
made in response to questions about the relationship between conventional practices of
language use and women’s status in Israel.)  Regardless of the intended identity of the
agents of these MASCULINE plural predicates, the statements in (2) and (3) illustrate an
awareness of the way language use contributes to the “othering” of women in Israeli
society.
I am not necessarily arguing that these women understand this relationship in the
way that linguists have articulated them, although several women did articulate a very
sophisticated understanding of this relationship.  For example, consider Einat’s comment
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in response to my question about why she felt changing practices of language use was so
important:
46. ze meod xashuv, mikeivan sheze meshakef et hadominantiyut haavrit,
haavrit vehatfisa hashaletet.
this is very important because it reflects to the dominance of the male, the
masculine and the mainstream concept.
As the statements above illustrate, for the women in my study feminist consciousness
includes an awareness of the way that language use in mainstream society contributes to
the reproduction of sexism in Jewish Israeli society.  I argue that this apparent awareness
shapes my informants’ use of language and their ideological stances vis-a-vis both
feminist and conventional practices of language use.  Furthermore, if practices of
language use contribute to the perpetuation of patriarchal concepts of SELF and
WOMAN, then it is not surprising to find that feminists, who are engaged in challenging
and dismantling patriarchal elements of culture, would use language to index an
oppositional stance.  Feminist language practices are feminist acts of social change.
However, an individual also uses language to construct and perform his/her social
identity in a multitude of socio-cultural contexts.  Thus, each of the particular elements of
the linguistic repertoire that the women in my study use was related to the negotiation of
her social ‘self’ or identity in the different communities of practice in which she must
participate.
8.2  LANGUAGE USE STRATEGIES AT THE INTERSECTION OF FEMINIST AND ISRAELI
JEWISH COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE
Before turning to the individual case studies, I want to review the analytical
framework I used to approach this data.  McConnell-Ginet (1989) argued that to
understand the power of language to reproduce or challenge existing social relationships
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we must consider the specific contexts of use.  “I argue that to understand the ways that
meanings are produced and reproduced and the significance of sex and gender in these
processes, we must consider the conditions of discourse.” (p. 37).  The “conditions of
discourse,” for the talk analyzed in this chapter, include the speakers’ commitment to the
feminist movement and the use of language to enact that ideological and socio-political
stance.  However, in the multi-layered context of Israeli society, feminist or conventional
language practices index different social meanings in different communities of practice.
Thus, I again make use of the schema, presented in chapter two section 2.3 to
contextualize the narratives I examine in this chapter.
The cases presented in this chapter demonstrate how two women made strategic
use of their linguistic resources to accomplish specific social acts and how their talk also
indexed their relationship to the feminist community.  In this analytical framework, I pay
attention to the way their strategic uses of language were, or were not, shaped by their
perceptions of how other Israeli speakers would understand and react to their use of
innovative linguistic practices.  My informants’ use of terms such as ‘struggle’ and
‘reform’ in their meta-linguistic discourse clarifies their sense of linguistic innovation as
a form of feminist resistance to dominant cultural norms and practices.  Thus, I use the
concept of language use as social acts of resistance or accommodation in my analysis of
the sociolinguistic strategies reported by Na’ama and Merav. Whether or not a particular
instance of language use constituted an act of resistance or accommodation depends as
much on the context of the utterance as it does on the intention of the speaker and the
linguistic forms she used.
8.2.2 Organization of the chapter
The first case, presented is section 8.4, is that of Na’ama.  I consider Na’ama’s
story about her use of linguistic reform as a strategy to instigate institutional change at
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the municipality of one of the three largest cities in Israel.  Na’ama overtly discussed
innovative use of language as a deliberate form of resistance to Israeli sexism.  I examine
her accounts of the reactions she got to the strategies she adopted, her choices, the
consequences of her choices, her reported motivations, and her assessment of the
experience.  The second case presented, in section 8.5, concerns Merav’s unconventional
marriage and the problems she encounters in choosing a term to refer to her husband.97
Her story demonstrates how competing issues in an individual’s life vie for expression in
language.  A comparison of her actual usage, during our conversation, with her
metalinguistic commentary about her particular problems with both the conventional and
alternative terms reveals an interesting strategy of what I will call “innovative
accommodation.”  Merav’s story also calls attention to the complexity of negotiating
through the multiplicity of conflicting and coordinating norms that are meaningful to her
construction and performance of a unified self.  In both of these cases, we see the
evidence of individual speakers struggling to find ways to express themselves with a
linguistic socio-cultural repertoire that does not always give them the necessary “tools.”
8.3 “WHEN YOU REFORM THE LANGUAGE ON YOUR OWN IT JUST DOESN’T WORK”:
INNOVATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL REALM
I met Na’ama at the beginning of my time in the field.  As noted in chapter three,
our conversations about language and gender were not limited to one recorded interview,
and she was much more aware of the scope of my research project than any of the other
women who participated in this study.  When I interviewed Na’ama, she was well known
as an elected official whose tenure on the governing council of a major Israeli city was
marked by struggles against institutional practices that limited women’s access to
                                                 
97 Merav’s marriage is considered unconventional because she is an Israeli Jew married to an Arab non-
Jew.  See section 2.4.1 for a discussion of marriage in the Israeli context.
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political and economic power.98  In one of the many stories she told about maavakim
‘struggles’ related to language, gender, and women’s political voice, Na’ama claimed to
have called the mayor of the city a tarnegol ‘rooster’ during a heated debate.  She
explained her behavior by reporting that during the interaction the mayor of the city had
called her a tarnegolet ‘hen’ and that he consistently described her speech as tsvixa,
‘screeching.’  She explained that in the context of political debate, when men shouted the
term he used to describe their speech was tsaaka ‘shouting,’ but her speech was tsvixa
‘screeching.’  She asked me aval mi tsovaxat? tarneolet tsovaxat, ben adam tsoek.
‘but who (what) screeches?  A hen screeches, a person shouts.’  She explained that from
her perspective, the term he used to describe her speech dismissed her political voice as
the “screechings of a barn animal.”  Thus, she reported, in her response to his comment
she did the same to him.  az amarti lo, beseder im ani tarneolet ata tarneol.  “So I
said to him okay, if I am a hen, you are a rooster.”  Her response metaphorically
recontextualized the political debate as a barnyard squabble between two chickens.99
I present the chicken story as a means of illustrating Na’ama’s conceptualization
of what she was “doing” as a participant in the sociolinguistic interview and her
representation of her social identity in the context of the city council.  In the context of
the interview, this story was one of many interactions she described as maavakim.
Na’ama’s discourse during the interview can be divided into two parts.  During the first
half of the interview, she responded to my questions about language use with stories
about her personal life and personal choices.  However, all of the stories in the second
                                                 
98 It is important to note that in the Israeli context, politicians elected to the city councils have a status
similar to state representatives in the United States.  Thus, the impact of policy decisions by city council
members from the major cities of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa often filters up to the national level.
99 I am keenly aware of the sexual connotations of the hen/rooster imagery and the potential of it to
undermine the equalizing power of Na’ama’s comment. However, in the context of her story, that was not
the metaphorical meaning that seemed to be primarily relevant.
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half of the interview occurred within the setting of municipal institutions and she
prefaced their telling with the following statement.
47. axshav ani rotsa lesaper lax al kama maavakim sheani neevakti.  ani
xoshevet al shelosha.
And now, I want to tell you about some struggles that I fought.  I am thinking
of three.100
Na’ama’s choice of language overtly constructs her stories about language use in the
municipal context as social actions in which she engaged as a feminist.  It also places her
actions within the context of the interview as testimony about these feminist acts.
If we consider her telling of the “chicken story” in light of the above
contextualization cue, it can be understood as an illustration of Na’ama’s concept of her
social identity within the city council.  The mayor’s characterization of her speech as
‘screeching” was represented as intentional, dismissive and potentially “othering.”  She
was not human but an irritating small female creature, a hen that screeches unintelligibly.
The report of her bold response illustrated her sense of herself as a woman who refused to
be marginalized.  She reclaimed power by taking the mayor’s language and using it to
equate his own behavior to that of a cock crowing in a barnyard.  The next story, one of
the “three struggles” referred to in her contextualization cue, further demonstrates
Na’ama’s clear awareness of her status as OTHER in relationship to the concept of the
Israeli POLITICIAN.  (Recall that capitalized nominal forms refer to the culturally
defined norm of mainstream Israeli Jewish society.)  It highlights her strategy to enact the
social identity of feminist or female political actor with the mainstream context that
locates POLITICIAN in the masculine category of social identities.
                                                 
100 In fact, Na’ama told more than three stories.  In the process of telling the three main stories, one of
which I will present in the latter half of this section, she also inserted several “tangential” stories about
language use like the “chicken story” presented above.
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Na’ama’s first “struggle” story was about her attempt to get city council
stationary that would use the FEMININIE title for “member of city council.” harishon ze
hamaavak al beemet niyar hamixtavim sheli.  ‘The first, this is the struggle about,
truly, my stationary.’  She began her telling by contrasting her “struggle” for gender
appropriate stationary with the passive acceptance of the MASCULINE stationary by
previous female city council representatives:
48. tamid hayu xavrot moetsa,
There have always been female city council representatives
aval hen    tamid  hitstapku   beniyar mixtavim
but  they(F) always made do with stationary
shekatuv           xaver       moetsa.
that was written member(M) council.
ani amarti meihahatxala
I    said    from the beginning
sheani rotsa niyar shel xavrat moetsa
that I   want stationary of member(F) council.
Note that in the first line of her statement she uses the FEMININIE title xavrot moetsa
to refer to these women rather than something like tamid hayu nashim bamoetsa ‘there
have always been women on the council.’  By referring to these women with the
FEMININE title, she positions herself as part of a long history of women politicians
while at the same highlighting the difference between her presentation of a political
identity and that of her predecessors.  The statement in (6) sets Na’ama apart from these
other female representatives because they made do with something that she would not
abide, namely, the obscuring of their female identity by allowing the municipal institution
to officially identify them as MEMBER(M) of city council.  I will return to exploring the
way her language use in the interview indexed her as a feminist vis-a-vis the other
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women on the city council, but let us now examine how her language use positions her
vis-a-vis the institution of the city council.
Her use of the FEMININE title in (6) highlights the contrast between the
institution’s use of language to refer to all members of council and the way she wanted to
use language to identify herself, and presumably other elected women, as female council
member(s).  Her FEMINIZATION of the official title used to refer to members of this
political body incorporated femaleness into the social identity of POLITICIAN.  Her
highlighting that these other women were also members of city council in the context of
the statement that they had always made do with the existing stationary may also be a
way of implicating their behavior as a contributing factor to the resistance she met from
the institution itself.  The institutional resistance is first represented by her report of the
mayor’s negative response to her request.
49. verosh hair amar      shepashut lo mevin lama.
and the mayor said(M) that he simply did not understand why.
ze bizbuz shel niyar hadfus yitstarex laasot od print.
this is a waste of paper, the printer will have to do another template
ze hitim lekol hanashim lefanayix ma habaaya.
this was suitable for all the women before you what’s the problem?
amarti tov, hakol nehedar aval ani lo xaver moetsa
I said good, everything is great, but I am not a member(M) of council
ani xavrat moetsa veani rotsa shekaxa tixtevu elai.
I am a female member of council and I want for you to write to me as such.101
                                                 
101 In (49), I translated Na’ama’s use of xavrat  as ‘female member’ rather than ‘member(F)’ because she
was using it in a differential context to highlight that she was a female member not a male member of the
city council.
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First, I want to call the reader’s attention to the phrase Na’ama used to represent the
mayor’s characterization of all the other women “who made do with the MASCULINE
stationary.”  Contrast her consistent use of the phrase xavrat moetsa in her own
characterization of these women, and herself, with the use of the phrase lekol hanashim
lefanayix, in her report of the mayor’s speech.  In the report of the mayor’s speech, the
language used highlights the fact these other members of council were also WOMEN but
they found the existing stationary suitable.  Na’ama is not acting like these other women,
and the mayor does not understand.  The statement ze hitim lekol hanashim lefanayix
ma habaaya ‘it was suitable for all the women before you’ can be understood to index
her perception of the institution or the mayor’s lack of understanding regarding the
importance of gender in the political realm.  It is not necessarily important whether this is
an exact quote, i.e. the actual wording used by the mayor, or Na’ama’s representation of
his speech with her own linguistic choices.  In either case, the contrast of the use of terms
to refer to the same group of people, the other women who had served as members of city
council, indexes the fact that Na’ama’s behavior vis-a-vis the use of the title is
exceptional.  She is the OTHER both with respect to all the other women who served as
elected officials and with respect to the institution itself.
Now let us return to how her language use indexed Na’ama’s identity as a
feminist both in the context of the city council and in the immediate context of the
sociolinguistic interview.102  In the context of Israeli society, the concept POLITICIAN,
here represented by the specific social role of MEMBER of CITY COUNCIL, is
associated with the concept MAN.  Na’ama’s awareness of this fact was evident in our
conversation, and she pointed to this association as partial explanation for why she
                                                 
102 I use the term ‘sociolinguistic interview’ to refer to the contextual frame of my conversations with
Na’ama and Merav, but the reader should bear in mind that I used both sociolinguistic and ethnographic
research methods to guide my interactions with my informants.
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wanted stationary that would identify her as xavrat moetsa.  She reported that in her role
as a city council representative a significant portion of the correspondence she received
was addressed lixvodo mar naama yisraeli ‘To his honor, Mr Na’ama Yisraeli.’
Despite her obviously feminine name, she was still addressed in the MASCULINE.
Na’ama explained this behavior with the following comment:
50. tamid medabrim alai belashon zaxar.
always (they) speak(M,P) about me in the masculine language
ki im hapolitica, az kvar shehakol yehiye zaxar.
because with the political, so let it all be masculine.
Even if we understand, as I believe Na’ama did, that the use of MASCULINE title was
simply a linguistic convention to refer to all members of the city council, its use in the
communal context of a male-dominated political system erases or obscures a part of her
social identity.  Na’ama’s desire for stationary that would officially represent her as a
‘female member of council’ might be seen as an attempt to disrupt the normative
association between MEMBER of CITY COUNCIL and MAN.  Her request may also be
seen as an attempt to force the mayor, and by extension the political institution and the
public, to recognize the relevance of gender in the Israeli political realm.
Herein we see how, in the Israeli macro-community of practice as well as the
local community of the city council, Na’ama’s linguistic choice indexed a feminist
identity.  What set Na’ama apart from the other members of city council was not her
gender per say, but rather her insistence on incorporating her feminine gender identity
into her identity as an elected city official.  (Hence, the contrasted use of xavrat moetsa
in (6), which is her own representation of herself and the other female members of the
city council, with the use of kol hanashim lefanayix in (7), which is her report of the
mayor’s representation of these other women.)  Na’ama’s linguistic behavior, both in her
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telling of the story and in the context of the story itself, indexed a feminist identity
because the insistence of on using FEMININE titles, or grammatical forms, to refer to
women is a behavior associated in Israel with the feminist movement.
The consequence of the association between Na’ama’s linguistic behavior
regarding the stationary and a feminist identity or ideology can be seen in the outcome of
this maavak al haniyar ‘struggle over stationary.’  Her request was eventually honored.
After two years, the municipality finally printed official council stationary with the
FEMININE title, but Na’ama was the only female member of council to use it. When I
asked if the city gave it to the other women she reported, haaxerot lo rotsot et ze ‘the
others(F) do not want it.’  I did not have the opportunity to speak to the other female
council members about their decision regarding the FEMININE titled stationary, but I
believe it is reasonable to interpret their actions as a hesitation to linguistically highlight
their female identities in relationship to their roles as elected officials.  As might be
expected, the administration did not act to naturalize Na’ama’s linguistic choice.
51. vebimkom sheze yihyeh niyar shenotnim beofen rail lekol xavrot
hamoetsa ze hafax lihiyot niyar shel naama yisraeli.
and instead of this being the stationary that (they) give(M) as a matter of
course to all the female members of city council, it became the stationary of
Na’ama Yisraeli.
Without institutional support by way of a policy to distribute “gender appropriate”
stationary to all members of city council (i.e. xaver moetsa for men and xavrat moetsa
for women), the FEMININE titled stationary simply becomes associated with Na’ama.
As I stated at the beginning of this section, Na’ama’s identity within the Israeli
political community was associated with a feminist agenda.  I am not arguing that we
should interpret the actions of the other women as “anti-feminist.”  It is possible that their
rejection of the FEMININE stationary simply indexes their awareness of the fact that
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linguistically highlighting their femininity in the context of Israeli political culture might
hamper their ability to do the political work they were elected to do.  However, what is
clear from Na’ama’s narrative, both in the context of the story itself and in the context of
Na’ama’s telling of it in the sociolinguistic interview, is that Na’ama understood her use
of language as a feminist act.  However, as the statement in the title of this section
(another quote from Na’ama) makes evident, language reform as an individual act does
not really work.  I believe her telling of this story in the context of her testimony about
her struggles with language use indexes Na’ama’s awareness of the way innovative uses
of language in the feminist effort to create social change can “backfire.” Na’ama’s story
can be understood as a cautionary tale illustrating that failed attempts at language reform
can serve to simply reinforce the marginal position of feminists in the mainstream Israeli
socio-political context.  In contrast, it can also be interpreted as an explanation of the
need for more women to adopt feminist practices of resistance.  Had the other women or
the institution followed Na’ama’s lead, the change in language use might have made a
social statement that Na’ama’s individual effort failed to accomplish.
8.4 INNOVATIVE ACCOMMODATION: TERMINOLOGY FOR A NONTRADITIONAL
MARRIAGE
As stated earlier, all uses of language are social acts that can have different
meanings in different communities of practice.  The term ba’al in the context of
mainstream Israeli Jewish society indexes the relationship between a woman and the man
to whom she uses it to refer as a marriage.  In the feminist community of practice,
however, the use of this term is associated with the unequal relationship between men
and women in the patriarchal construction of marriage.  Thus, the preferred feminist
practice for referring to a woman’s husband is the use of the term ben zug.  The term ben
zug, literally ‘male partner of a couple,’ does not, however, clearly identify a relationship
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as a legal marriage in either the feminist or the mainstream context.  Merav, a feminist
Jewish woman married to a non-Jewish Arab man, reported to me that “most of the time”
she used the conventional term baal rather than ben zug.  In this section, I examine her
discourse regarding her reported practice and her actual behavior in the interview to
demonstrate the way she skillfully negotiated the representation of her identity as a
Jewish Israeli feminist married to a Arab man.103
I knew Merav from my previous interactions with women in the Israeli feminist
community.  Hence, like with Na’ama, we had an established relationship prior to our
interaction in the context of the sociolinguistic interview.  Unlike Na’ama, Merav was not
aware of the focus of my research before the interview conversation, but I was aware of
her marriage to an Arab man and the problems related to ethno-religious intermarriage in
the Israeli context.  The piece of Merav’s discourse I analyze is her metalinguistic
commentary about the problems she faced choosing language to refer to her husband and,
by extension, to their relationship.
When I explained the topic of my research to Merav and asked what she had to
say, the first thing she reported was her use of the term ba’al to refer to her husband.
52. yesh li lehaid al ze      sheani rov hazman
I have to say about this that  I most of the time
mishtameshet bamila, leabei haish sheli,
use the word, about the man that is mine (my man)
mishtameshet bamila baali,   ki nora xashuv li
(I) use the word ba’ali because it is very important to me
                                                 
103 Throughout this section I used non-Jewish, Arab or non-Jewish Arab in reference to Merav’s husband
to highlight that her marriage violated two aspects of the normative definition of MARRIAGE in Jewish
Israeli society.  First he is not a Jew, so it is a religious intermarriage not sanctioned by the proper
authorities.  Her husband is also an Arab, which in the context of Israeli society is the much more
exceptional fact of the relationship.
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sheyeidu sheanaxnu nesuim.
that (they) will know that we are married.
mamash mashehu, sheanaxnu asinu harbe
really, its something that we did a lot
bishvil shenuxal lehitxaten.  venora xashuv li
so that we would be able to marry.   And it is very important to me
sheanashim yeidu sheanaxnu nesuim.
that people will know that we are married.
veani lo motset shum mila sheyexola lehasbir et ze, betsura haxi peshuta,
and I do not find any word, that can explain this, in the most simple way
sheyeidu shehaish haze hu am haish sheani nesua lo.
that (they) will know that this man he is also the man that I am married to
The focus of Merav’s statement in (52) is not the word ba’al itself so much as the
importance of representing the relationship with her male domestic partner as a
MARRIAGE.  In the context of mainstream Jewish Israeli society, however,
MARRIAGE is a religiously sanctioned relationship between a MAN and a WOMAN,
and the definitions of WOMAN and MAN include the social identity Jewish.104  Merav,
as a Jewish Israeli woman, fits within this normative female identity.  Her status as a
legally married woman would also place her within the Israeli social category of
WOMAN, but her husband does not fit into the category MAN.  Thus, Merav’s marriage
to an Arab man is erased by the cultural assumption that a Jewish WOMAN would be
married to a Jewish MAN.  Thus, Merav’s reported use of the term ba’al can be
understood as a linguistic strategy to “unerase” the marital status of her relationship by
using the term that is widely understood to index MARRIAGE in Israeli society.  Her
                                                 
104 Recall that marriage in Israel is under the authority of religious institutions.  See chapter two, 2.4, for
description of the relationship between civil and religious authority in Israel.
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strategy is a form of resistance to the hegemonic practices of Jewish Israeli society that
proscribe marriage between Jews and Arabs.
Despite her claim regarding this linguistic practice, Merav only mentioned the
term ba’ali. 105  The lexical item she used in (52) was haish sheli ‘my man’ and Merav
immediately followed her claim about the use of ba’ali with the explanation that it was
important to her that people would know they were married.  She repeated this claim
twice and contextualized it with the explanation of the difficulties they faced shenuxal
lehitxaten ‘that we would be able to marry.’  The focus of her discourse on why she used
the term and the fact that she did not actually use the term may be seen as evidence of her
reluctance to use the term in a feminist context.  Recall that her discourse was produced
in response to my question about what she had to say regarding the issue of language use
and women’s status in Israel.  She began her utterance with the phrase, yesh li lehaid al
ze ‘what I have to say about this.”  Similar to Na’ama’s contextualization cue in (48),
Merav’s statement lets her interlocutor know that the utterance that follows is a conscious
report of her ideologies regarding this specific issue.  She is performing as well as
narrating her stance on language in a feminist context.
As I reported earlier, Merav and I had a relationship outside the interview context
and I knew the story of her marriage.  Merav could have simply stated I use the word
ba’al [‘husband’], and I would have understood her linguistic practice.  Her more
complicated and detailed answer indexes a consciousness of the feminist attitudes
towards the conventional term.  As noted, Merav never actually used the term ba’ali
directly in any of her utterances during the interview.  Table 8.1 shows the quantitative
                                                 
105 The use of the term mention in this context refers to the semantic differentiation between “use” and
“mention”.  See (Lyon 1977, pp. 5-7) for reference.
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partner man of mine
direct usage 0 4 0 0 2
mention 1 0 1 0 0
reported usage yes no
attitude negative mixed
Table 8.1 Merav’s usage and assessment of lexical variants for ‘husband’
Certainly, one explanation of the gap between Merav’s claim and her actual use of
language in the context of the interview can be understood as an audience-designed
strategy to reinforce her status as a feminist.  The immediate context of her discourse was
a conversation about feminist language practices with a feminist researcher.  Thus, her
language use was means of indexing both her feminist identity and her awareness of the
meaning of the term baali in feminist contexts.
Indeed, Merav explicitly mentioned that her use of the word was problematic
within the communal context of the feminist organization where she worked.  However, I
will demonstrate that, examined together, the data on her use of lexical terms in the
interview and her metalinguistic discourse also index Merav’s struggle to use the
sociolinguistic resources available to her to perform a coherent self.  Merav continued her
commentary on the use of ba’ali with the utterance presented in (53).  She explained why
for her this word exemplified the problems between language use and women’s status
and specifically her problem as a feminist woman married to an Arab man.
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53. az ani mishtameshet harbe bamila hazot, velo noax li ita.
so, I often use this word, and I am not comfortable with it(the word).
bemeyuxad lo noax li ita bamerkaz siyua
I am especially uncomfortable with it in the crisis center106
ki ze mila shemamash af axat lo mishtameshset sham.
because this is a word that really no one used there
kulan omrot ben hazu sheli vekaxa.
everyone(F) says(F,P) ben hazug sheli (my partner) and such.
In (53), Merav’s juxtapositioning of her own reported practice with that of the other
women at the feminist center highlights one reason why she claimed to be uncomfortable
with the conventional term.  As discussed in chapter three, the negative feminist attitude
towards the use of the word is based on the literal meaning of baal ‘owner,’ which is
productive in CIH.  The semantic duality of the term in CIH is interpreted as an index of
the patriarchal nature of marriage in the Israeli context.  Thus from a feminist standpoint,
Merav’s use of the term might be interpreted as either her discomfort with feminist
communal practices and/or the characterization of her marriage as an unequal
relationship dominated by her male partner.107  These two indexical meanings are related
and mutually supportive in the feminist context.
Merav clearly stated that she was generally uncomfortable using the term, not
only at the women’s center.  Earlier in our conversation, she had discussed her
                                                 
106 At the time of the interview, Merav worked at a feminist organization that supported a center for
victims of sexual assault.
107 The fact that she is married to an Arab man further complicates this issue because in feminist
communities, anti-Arab attitudes often take the form of highlighting the way Arab women are treated by
husbands and other male relatives.  Thus despite Merav’s Jewish identity, the fact that she is married to an
Arab is likely to raise suspicions about her status within their relationship.  It in not within the scope of this
dissertation to elaborate on the way racism interacts with sexism in the Israeli context beyond what has
already been discussed.  For a discussion of these issues from a feminist perspective, see Hassan (1993) and
Shaloufeh Khazan (1993).
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relationship with her husband and their plans for domestic partnership as one of the
primary places where she enacted a feminist resistance to patriarchal norms for domestic
division of labor.  Thus, Merav’s stated discomfort with the term may be seen as
evidence that her discomfort is not simply related to performing a feminist identity for the
sake of other feminists.  She agrees with the feminist analysis of the term and has
difficulty with way that MIH and conventional practices of use connect the concept of
ownership to the concept of the HUSBAND.  Merav’s metalinguistic discourse highlights
her dilemma vis-a-vis the use of contemporary Israeli Hebrew to perform a unified social
identity in every context.  The facts of her life made her reported use of the conventional
term ba’al a form of resistance to laws that oppress ethno-religious inter-married couples.
However, her discourse demonstrates that she felt forced to use it because the preferred
feminist alternative, ben zu obscured, most likely by design, the difference between
domestic partnerships and legal marriages.
Therein lies one of the most interesting aspects of Merav’s actual language use
during the interview in contrast to her reported use, what I referred to in the title of this
section as “innovative accommodation.”  As shown in table 8.1, Merav referred to her
husband six times throughout our conversation, three times in the metalinguistic
discourse about baal, but she never actually used either the conventional term or the
preferred feminist term.  The term she used the most, was ish ‘man/husband’ or haish
sheli ‘my man/husband.’  Speakers might understand the use of this term, literally ‘my
man,’ as ‘husband’ in the context of a conversation about marriage and domestic
partnership, because it is the term used in the Hebrew Bible and classic Israeli literary
texts.  From a feminist perspective, the term would also be acceptable because it is the
grammatical parallel of the conventional term for ‘wife/woman,’ isha.  It is not clear that
Merav intended to use this third alternative, indeed given her commentary it seems
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unlikely, but her lexical choice in the context of the sociolinguistic interview does
preserve all the relevant elements of her social identity.  Her use of the term also points to
the fact that the communal feminist practice of using ben zug to refer to all male domestic
partners may index an overall issue with the institution of marriage.  The availability of a
third option to index both gender equality and legal marriage supports my analysis of an
additional social meaning indexed by the feminist term.  The additional indexical
meaning would also conflict with Merav’s expressed need to legitimize her
unconventional domestic situation by highlighted its status as a legal marriage.
Merav concluded her commentary on why the use of a term to refer to her
husband exemplified issues of language use and women’s status with the following
comment.
54. az ani xoshevet shebaroved haxi besisi
so I think that on the most basic level
yesh paar meod adol bein hatefisat olam sheli,
there is a very big gap between my world view
levein hakelim shehasafa meafsheret karea
and the tools that the language allows me right now
o sheani reila lehishtamesh bahem.
or that I the way I am used to using them.
The language Merav used to describe her sociolinguistic problem, baroved haxi basisi
yesh paar adol ‘at the most basic level there is a very big gap,’ seems to indicate a real
frustration with the way some aspect of her self-definition is erased with either term.  Her
story also points to the way that even in her community of choice, the feminist
community, she felt “othered” by the way both linguistic choices indexed particular
stances towards the concept of MARRIAGE.  Merav’s story is an example of one way
Israeli feminists use language to negotiate double consciousness.  Her story also
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illustrates the way that feminist consciousness in the Israeli context often includes a
consciousness of the way the “tools” available in the contemporary Israeli sociolinguistic
repertoire are use to reproduce sexist practices and ideologies.
8.5  THE SOCIOLINGUISTIC MAKINGS OF ISRAELI FEMINISTS
All language use by an overtly feminist-identified women might constitute a form
of resistance because the label ‘feminist’ carries with it the assumption of alternative,
counter-hegemonic values.  Both accommodation and resistance have advantages and
disadvantages for the women of the Israeli feminist community and for the larger overall
goal of creating social change within Israel.  Linguistic innovation as a form of resistance
can bring about change, but it can also result in the marginalization of a new practice or
lexical item.  Just as existing practices of language use encode layers of cultural
meanings, so too new practices are invested with cultural meanings that can influence the
interpretation of a given practice.  Innovators do not have control over the meanings that
others attach to their practices.  Often the mainstream society invests new lexical items
and language practices with indexical meanings that misinterpret the intentions of the
innovators (Silverstein, 1985). Na’ama and Merav’s stories illustrate their consciousness
of these sociolinguistic facts.
In Na’ama’s case, the fact that neither the other women on city council nor the
institution itself adopted her linguistic practice, relegated it to the actions of a lone
feminist pedant.  Na’ama reported that it became something of a joke.  Despite the
institution’s implicit disapproval of her choice, acutualized by its practice of refilling
orders for the paper slowly so that she often ran out, Na’ama was not deterred.  She
reported,
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batkufa shebein hadpasa lehadpasa kesheein niyar kaze, ani beadom osa
et hataf haze al haxaver moetsa. veein, ze meod  ani kotevet  (makes slash
sound) vemosifa po taf laxaver moetsa.  az ze kvar ole lehem al haatsabim
az hem madpisim od paam
in the interim period between printings when there is not stationary like this, in
red I add the taf (which makes it FEMININE) on the MASCULINE title.  And
there isn’t, this is a lot (that) I write (makes slashing motion) and add the taf to
xaver moetsa.  So this becomes an irritation for them and so they print (it)
again.
When I presented this story in the context of classes on feminist language practices at
universities in the United States, many of the students evaluated Na’ama’s actions as
“over-the-top” and not necessarily central to enacting feminist political change.
However, I believe it is possible to understand her actions as feminist acts in and of
themselves.  Na’ama succeeded in using language to index her whole social identity in a
context that she felt was forcing her to choose between POLITICIAN and WOMAN.
Her use of the term, even if it only served to index her feminist identity, nonetheless
joined the two concepts through the FEMINIZATION of the title.
The meanings of the various ideologied terms examined in this chapter are
socially constructed through their use and speakers’ experiences with the ways they have
been used in the past.  As McConnell-Ginet (1989) noted, “the reproduction of meaning
refers to our dependence, in producing meanings, on previous meanings or
interpretations, to our dependence in particular on one another’s experience with the
linguistic forms being used.” (p. 37).  Na’ama’s story makes evident that the use of the
MASCULINE grammatical forms for the official title of city council members linked the
office itself with the concept of MAN.  Her use attempts to create a vehicle for disrupting
this linguistically socialized association.  Merav’s story also speaks to the issue of why
meaning is dependant on our and our interlocutors’ previous experiences with language.
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Her difficulty in finding a satisfying term for that would index her relationship to her
Arab partner as a marriage is very much about her experiences with language in both the
feminist and mainstream contexts.  In the context of the interview, she used an alternative
that accomplished both tasks, but it is likely that this was a coincidence.  Given that she
did not overtly refer to this strategy in her metalinguistic discourse, it would seem that the
term ish did not figure in her considerations for finding, mila sheyexola lehasbir et ze,
betsura haxi peshuta ‘a word that can explain this in the most simple way.’  This is not
surprising considering that within the feminist community debate surrounding the term to
use for a male spouse centers on the terms baal ‘husband/master’ and ben zu
‘partner(M).’  Furthermore, the alternative term ish ‘man,’ is not generally associated
with the meaning ‘husband’ by most speakers of CIH because their experiences with
language do not regularly include biblical or literary uses of the term ish to mean
‘husband.’
The conflict between external and internal values regarding feminist ideology is
played out in Na’ama’s and Merav’s linguistic choices and their metalinguistic discourse
about the difficulty of having their meanings understood.  In their own ways, both of
these women are cognizant of the relationship between practices of language use and the
status of women. Their understanding of this connection and their ideologies about
language direct their choices in the interview itself as well as in the narrated contexts.
The women discussed in this chapter take predictable stances as members of a
marginalized community.  Na’ama, who from an external position appears to fit
comfortably within the construct of WOMAN, took her battle with sexist practices into
every social context.  As a grassroots activist and feminist politician, she refused to obey
the rules of convention, even when her behavior resulted in her further marginalization.
She was a leader in the feminist community, and her behavior, accorded her significant
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respect within her chosen community.  (The IWN campaign to encourage more women to
run for elected office made use of Na’ama’s story.  The posters printed the word xaver
mo’etsa with the MASCULINE title crossed out and replaced in red by the FEMININE
title.)  Merav, who we might say has a triple consciousness as a woman, a feminist and as
a Jewish woman married to an Arab man, chose to locate one of her linguistic struggles
against Israeli social norms elsewhere.  Her commitment to feminist principles is evident
in the work she chooses and in her desire challenge sexism within her family, but her
primary concern regarding the linguistic element ba’al was combating the racist ideology
and practices that would negate the legitimacy of her relationship with her Arab husband.
Though they employ different means, each of these women acts with agency to assert an
alternative vision for Israeli society.
The trap of double consciousness, as DuBois (1903) expressed it, is that members
of a marginalized community do not have the power of agency in the development of
their own identities.   If individuals or communities do not have the power of agency in
defining themselves or their experiences, then their experiences cannot be used as
evidence to support social change.  The women in my study refused to relinquish the
power of agency.  Na’ama refused to allow conventional practices of language use to
curtail her ability to act and identify herself as a feminist politician.  For Merav, several
aspects of her identity demanded that she carefully negotiate her status as a Jewish
woman, a feminist, and someone married to an Arab.  By examining her whole
experience, we understand that her claimed rejection of certain feminist practices did not
negate her ideological commitment to feminist principles.  She was an example of a
woman who contradicted my former coworker’s assertion that a women who referred to
her husband as ba’ali relegates herself to the position of being another’s property. (See
chapter three.)  Merav did not allow either the feminist community or mainstream society
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to dictate her language practices or how she performed her social identity.  Instead, she
used her experiences and her status in these two social frameworks to bring attention to
yet another community of people whose identities and experiences are outside the norms
of both.  The issue of double consciousness is a negotiation between two sets of cultural
norms; it is a person’s struggle to create an individual identity that incorporates all of her
experiences and allows her to maintain agency in her own life.  Thus, feminist language
practices are not simply intentional feminist acts of resistance; they are also linguistic
behaviors through which speakers engage in the performance of a unified feminist self.
258
Chapter IX: Feminism and feminist language: Intertwined
phenomena of social change
9.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The primary theoretical issue I sought to address in this dissertation
concerned the relationship between language, thought and reality, specifically
grammatical gender, practices of language use, gender identity, and ideologies
about gender and language.  My research began with the following question: how
do Israel feminists make use of the elements available in the contemporary Israeli
Hebrew linguistic system to negotiate the construction and performance of
coherent feminist social self in the context of male-dominated and highly
militarized mainstream Israeli society?  To answer this question, I examined both
conventional and feminist practices of language use in Israel. I argued that to
answer this question in a meaningful way, I needed to provide a contextualized
analysis of the data, which included both the linguistic behavior and
metalinguistic discourse from women associated with the Israeli feminist
community.
In “An introduction to language and gender ideology among Israeli
feminists,” the dissertation was located within the larger body of feminist research
that examines the manner in which rigid patriarchal concepts of gender and
gendered social roles are continuously reproduced in various socio-cultural
contexts, including the cultures of “liberated” Western societies.  I presented the
two-part approach, based on McConnell-Ginet’s (1988) definition of language,
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that I used to investigate variation in CIH speakers’ use of grammatical gender to
convey meaning in a variety of socio-cultural contexts and provided the readers
with the overall theoretical goals of the dissertation.  Chapter two began with a
discussion of the theoretical perspective that gender is a socio-culturally
constructed concept used to classify male and female humans beings as MEN and
WOMEN and that the dissertation would address this issue from a sociolinguistic
perspective.  I explained that McConnell-Ginet’s (1989) theoretical claim that
gender inequality is reproduced by the prescribed use of MASCULINE forms for
generic or inclusive reference was the starting point for both my research and
analysis of the data.  Using the theoretical concept of “community of practice”
(Holmes and Meyerhoff 1999) and relevant details about Israeli social, cultural,
and linguistic practices as well as dominant ideologies about language and gender,
I presented a scheme to illustrate the complexity of the context(s) within which
my informants used language to negotiate their social identities and engage in
feminist social change work.  The schema described three levels of community
relevant to my informants use of language and my investigation of the social
indexical meanings of the feminist variety of CIH (mainstream Jewish Israeli
society, the larger feminist community, and local feminist organizations or
communities) and defined each as a community of practice.  I also related my
research to the larger body of scholarly literature on language ideology and
argued that we should not surprised to find that speakers with a feminist
consciousness use language to enact an ideology that values gender equality
and/or attempts to address the second-class status of women in the dominant
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socio-cultural milieu.  Chapter three described the sociolinguistic and
ethnographic methods used to investigate the CIH speakers’ variable use of
grammatical gender for reference to male and females.  In chapters two and three,
I also presented some of my preliminary findings on language use in the
mainstream Israeli and feminist communities of practice.
The second major section of the dissertation, entitled “Grammatical
gender in use: Feminist Israeli Hebrew,” presented findings from the quantitative
and qualitative sociolinguistic analysis of my informant’s linguistic behavior. In
chapters five and six, the parameters of feminist Israeli Hebrew were defined
through my analysis of variables that distinguished feminist language practices
from prescribed or conventional practices of language use.  I also evaluated the
relative value of these variables as indexical markers of feminist identity or
ideology and explained how my informants negotiated the meaning of linguistic
elements in various contexts to convey referential and indexical meanings.  The
analysis of my informants’ linguistic behavior showed that several linguistic and
social factors related to the production of language, including some below the
level of consciousness, shaped their discourse and contributed to both inter-
speaker and intra-speaker variation in the use of feminist and conventional
variants in five morpho-semantic contexts.
In chapters seven and eight, located in the final major section,
“Negotiating identity and the use of feminist Hebrew,” I used the theoretical
concept of indexicality (Ochs 1992) to present an integrated analysis of the
behavioral and metalinguistic data.  This integrated analysis accounted for my
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informants’ variation in language use by demonstrating that each speaker used the
linguistic elements of CIH according to her individual assessment of how
particular practices would enable her accomplish the two primary goals associated
with her language use: (1) accomplishing the specific work of the sociolinguistic
interaction and (2) performing her unique social identity, which usually included
enacting a feminist stance vis-à-vis mainstream Israeli culture.  In these chapters,
I also showed the importance of evaluating feminists’ efforts at language reform
on both the individual and communal levels to accurately assess the meanings of
their linguistic practices.  Finally, I provided evidence for the theoretical and
methodological arguments that sociolinguistic investigations of language use must
examine both linguistic behavior and metalinguistic discourse to explain the
relationship between practices of language use and the social identities of
speakers.
9.2 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
The major theoretical implications of the findings presented in this
dissertation can be summed up as follows: the sociolinguistic and ethnographic
analysis of empirical data on Israeli feminist language use yielded valuable, and I
would even argue crucial, information about the way that speakers use
grammatical elements to convey both semantic and social meaning. Furthermore,
to dismiss or separate out the linguistic behavior of speakers who are consciously
motivated to engage in innovative uses of language from the behavior of speakers
whose innovative or unconventional use of linguistic elements appears more
“unconscious” or “spontaneous” is to miss an opportunity to examine how these
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two phenomena might be related on a cognitive level as well as what a
comparison of them might tell use about language as a social semiotic system.
The specific findings of my analysis can be roughly divided into four major points
or conclusions.
The first major conclusion is that speakers are generally members of
multiple communities of practice and the norms or values of all or some of those
communities are available and possibly active in any given sociolinguistic
interaction.  The social meaning of inter-speaker and intra-speaker variation with
respect to the use of a particular set of linguistic variables can thus more
accurately be accounted for by using the concept of indexicality (Ochs 1992) in
combination with more traditional methods of quantitative and qualitative
sociolinguistic analysis.  In the analysis of my informants’ use of different
variants to express the “same” semantic content, I demonstrated that the relative
indexical value of different forms had implications for the linguistic choices of
my speakers and how they rationalized those choices in metalinguistic
commentary.  Na’ama’s behavior in city council, Merav’s dilemma over what
word to use for reference to her spouse, the conflict over language use on the
voicemail message of the Israel Women’s Network, and the overall inter-speaker
and inter-speaker variation observed throughout the data set index these women’s
membership in the feminist community but they also give us important
information about the norms and values of the multiple communities within which
these women negotiate their social identities.  By examining the variability of
indexical meaning in the different communities of practice, we have a more
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complete picture of the different and often conflicting communal norms that
condition linguistic variation.  The theory of indexicality gives us more resources
for explaining, rather than just describing, how speakers make use of their
linguistic repertoires when negotiating issues of identity and ideological stance,
particularly when applied to the analysis of language use in multi-layered
societies with a prescribed standard variety.  This method also allows us to
incorporate into our analyses the theoretical position that language use is a social
act not a reflection of a social reality and that speakers must use language to
accomplish specific tasks, only one of which is the performance of a social
identity.
The second major theoretical point that is substantiated by the findings in
this dissertation concerns the importance of considering language typology when
developing models to explain how grammatical forms function at different levels
of social meaning.  For example, the existing models used to describe the
relationship between grammatical gender forms and markedness cannot fully
account for the complex and interactive nature of this relationship, because they
were primarily based on the analysis of uses of the English language.  My
analysis of both conventional and feminist Israeli practices for the use of
grammatical gender to convey referential and social indexical meaning
demonstrates that the ideological level of meaning interacts with the formal
structure of semantic hierarchies, such that the referential scope of both
MASCULINE and FEMININE gendered forms are limited through habitual
practices of use.  The habitual association of both nominal and predicate forms
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with a specific gender category creates more opportunities for linking the
categories themselves with socio-cultural concepts of gender and gender
distinction.
In one of the many stories that Na’ama told me about her “struggles” with
language use in governmental institutions, she analyzed the reluctance to change
from the MASCULINE to the FEMININE plural predicate on the automated
message alerting callers that the phone operators, all women, were busy ‘taking
care” of previous calls. We may look at this story as an example of feminist
hyperbole.  Surely, Na’ama knew that the plural form of the predicate “taking
care of” was interpreted to represent all the workers at the municipality, not
simply the phone operators.108   Her actions indicate that Na’ama understood this
fight to be about the relationship between the gender of these workers and their
status within the municipality.  The change in language use was on one level a
symbolic gesture of respect towards the female operators, whose job was one of
the worst and lowest paid in the institution.  However, it was also a means of
raising their consciousness about the relevance of their gender to their treatment
as workers.  Na’ama claimed that her tactic was successful and the telephone
workers became more active in arguing on their own behalf for better working
conditions.
Her metalinguistic analysis of this incident pointed to the way cultural
concepts of masculine and feminine work constrained the range of possible
meanings of the predicate letapel ‘to take care of.’  In the FEMININE plural form,
                                                 
108 Indeed, the first line of resistance she met was the administrators response that most of the
workers at the municipality were male, which Na’ama pointed out was not in fact true.
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the predicate could pixitut kavod ‘lower the respect’ of callers for the municipality
because it would associate the institution with women’s ways of “taking care.”
The MASCULINE plural, by covert contrast, (covert rather than overt since there
was no FEMININE form with which to contrast) signals masculine ways of
“taking care” (i.e. professional business).  Despite the reluctance of the municipal
administrators, she succeeded in having the language changed and reported that
the change in language was so salient to that “every third” caller asked the
telephone operators what was going on with the language.  Na’ama summed up
the implications of this story in the following comment:
You really get into some of these people saying ma ze anu metaplot.
It’s unique, it’s unique.  And what is this pxitut kavod?  Why did the
people the higher in the echelons feel that the word metaplot is much
less eh worthy than metaplim?  metaplot bema metaplot bekaki
bepipi bezkeinim bexitulim, aval metaplim ze metaplim bebaayot
shel hairiya.  But what does this iriya do?  Garbage and sewage and
water and lighting and bediyuk kaki vepepi and all that bediyuk that’s
what we do.109
You really get into some of these people saying what is this we are
taking care [in the FEMININE].  It’s unique, it’s unique.  And what is
this “lowering of respect”?  Why did the people the higher in the
echelons feel that the word “take care of [in the FEMININE]” is much
less eh worthy than “take care of [in the MASCULINE]”?
[FEMININE] takes care of what?  [FEMININE/feminine] takes care of
shit and pee and old people and diapers, but [MASCULINE/masculine]
taking care of, this is taking care of the problems of the municipality.
                                                 
109 Na’ama was fluent in English and code-switched several times throughout our conversation.  It
is not within the scope of this dissertation to examine the meaning of her code-switching behavior.
However, I would suggest that Na’ama’s close relationship with several American feminists, my
identity as a native English speaker and American feminist, and her desire to index a strong pan-
national feminist stance are factors that most likely contributed to this aspect of her linguistic
behavior.
266
But what does this municipality do?  Garbage and sewage and water
and lighting and exactly shit and pee and all that.  Exactly that’s what
we do.
We may look at this story as an example of feminist hyperbole.  Surely,
Na’ama knew that the plural form of the predicate “taking care of” was
interpreted to represent all the workers at the municipality, not simply the phone
operators.110   Na’ama’s explanation of the incident was that she understood this
fight to be about the relationship between the gender of these workers and their
status within the municipality.  Her analysis of the municipalities reluctance to
change the language and the salience it apparently had the callers to the
municiplaity points to the way that social gender distinctions become linked to the
referential meanings of any grammatical form that is marked for gender.  The
combination of the morphological structure of Hebrew and its binary system of
gender classification seem to make the connections between social, biological,
and grammatical categories more “real” for speakers.  The change in language use
was on one level a symbolic gesture of respect towards the female operators,
whose job was one of the worst and lowest paid in the institution.  However, on
another level it was a means of raising the consciousness of both the public and
the municipality about the relevance of gender in the context of workers rights.
Na’ama claimed that her tactic was successful and the telephone workers became
more active in arguing on their own behalf for better working conditions.
Variation in language typology has significant implications for the way
that grammatical forms become habitually linked to semantic and social indexical
                                                 
110 Indeed, the first line of resistance she met was the administrators response that most of the
workers at the municipality were male, which Na’ama pointed out was not in fact true.
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meaning.  The analysis of feminist and conventional uses of CIH, as well as
speakers’ metalinguistic rationalizations of these practices, illuminates the
relationship between the different grammatical and social meanings indexed by
the use of linguistic forms in specific contexts in a way that the analysis of
English discourse cannot.  Models that posit a universal system of relationships
between grammatical, notional, and social systems of classification based on the
way the system of grammatical gender works in standard American English
ignore the value of comparative linguistic analysis for strengthening the
explanatory power of such models and create a misleading picture of the
relationships between markedness, gender classification, and plurality as types of
grammatical categories.
Additionally, theoretical models that posit the MASCULINE as the
underlying and universally unmarked grammatical category can only account for
the generic use of FEMININE forms by describing them as socially conditioned
exceptions.  The relationship between the grammatical categories of gender and
markedness is significantly effected by practices of use and socio-cultural
concepts of normative masculine and feminine social behavior.  All generic forms
are unmarked because of their association with culturally or socially conditioned
relationships between the linguistic form and the typical representative of the
class of individuals represented by the linguistic element.  Thus, just as axot
‘nurse’ has a FEMININE generic form because speakers’ real life experiences, in
Israel (and in the United States), reify the association of nursing with feminine
roles in the medical profession, so too rofe ‘doctor’ has a MASCULINE generic
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form because the association is reified by speakers’ real life experiences in Israeli
society (and likewise in the United States).  Theoretical models that insist on
positioning the MASCULINE as the unmarked grammatical category ignore the
possibility that its unmarked status may be an artifact of the socio-cultural
conditions of language use.  Theories that seek to describe the function of gender
as a system of noun classification and more generally the relationships between
the meanings of different grammatical categories must find ways to account for
these facts.
The limitations of existing models for describing variability of the
meaning of grammatical categories is also related to the ideological privilege that
linguistic theories grant to “unconscious” linguistic variation over “conscious” or
overtly ideologically motivated variation and lead us to my third theoretical
conclusion.  Throughout this dissertation, I argued that the innovations of feminist
Hebrew are a cultural phenomenon related to feminist women’s efforts to
negotiate a coherent social identity in the context of a male-dominated social
hierarchy.  Israeli women who engage in feminist social-change work use
language to express alternatives to the social indexical meanings that are
associated, overtly and covertly, with conventional uses of MIH.  It seems overly
simplistic to state that innovative feminist linguistic behavior and feminist social-
change work are mutually supportive socio-cultural processes.  However, for me,
the statement implies a set of intertwined ideological and practical stances on the
relationship between language (both structure and use), gender (as social and
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linguistic referential categories), consciousness, and the socio-cultural
construction of “reality.”
Feminist language practices and metalinguistic analysis of sociolinguistic
behaviors allow us to see how these relationships work or at least why
prescriptive uses of the MASCULINE as generic have licensed sexist meanings
and continue to do so.  Israeli feminist linguistic behavior is inherently linked to
feminist consciousness and the development of a feminist gender identity, which I
believe entails liberating oneself from sexist ideologies that posit masculine =
subject/self and feminine = object/other.  These ideological associations are
naturalized by practices of language use that erase the sexist contexts within
which they are produced.  Feminist language practices unerase the sexist context
and “denaturalize” the symbolic relationships between the
MASCULINE/FEMININE binary distinction and the other binary sets such as
subject/object, self/other, agent/recipient that are metaphorically and categorically
linked to the meanings of the gender based grammatical systems of noun
classification.  By using language in unconventional ways the feminists in my
study expose or raise to the level of consciousness these submerged relationships,
thus making more apparent or clearer the variety of meanings, both grammatical
and social, that are associated with the linguistic category of gender.
Furthermore, the sociolinguistic and semiotic processes related to feminist
language use are the same as those that condition other behaviors that linguistic
theory “naturalizes.”  The ideology of a distinction between “natural” processes of
language variation and “ideologically motivated” processes prevents us from
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seeing the similarities and thus developing a more comprehensive description of
the relationship between identity, world-view, and language use.  The analysis of
ideologically motivated language practices gives us important insight into the
semiotic and cognitive processes by which grammatical forms or elements
become linked to specific social indexical and semantic meanings.
Within feminist communities, the phrase “consciousness raising” has been
used over the past thirty-five years to refer to the process by which women
become aware, conscious, of the cultural ideologies and practices that collude to
prescribe specific social roles to males and females in society.  I would argue that
the meaning of the phrase “consciousness raising” is quite literal and that feminist
innovative practices are social acts that raise to the level of consciousness the
processes by language (use) reproduces social inequalities.  There are several
examples through my data, both metalinguistic and behavioral, that point to the
way that innovative uses of language make salient the habitual and covert
associations between MASCULINE as unmarked and masculine as normative
human.  They denaturalize naturalized behaviors.
Osnat’s pedagogical use of feminist Hebrew in university classes was a
particularly concrete example of how feminist language use practices are
consciousness raising acts.  She reported that each year when she began her
practice of using FEMININE forms to address classes of mixed gender, she
encountered different types of resistance.  She guided her students through several
extreme examples of the way men and the male perspectives are privileged by
conventional practices of language use.
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ani omeret lahem yoshev kahal shel nashim veever exad betoxo,
vetsarix ledaber eleihen bezaxar.  ma ze omer? ma ze omer? ze omer
shelo meshane im yesh elef o aseret alafim nashim, mi shekovea et
hamin shel hakolektiv ze hazaxar hayaxid shenimtsa sham.  ze omer
shekvodo shel hazaxar haexad haze shakul keneed kvoday shel ein
sof nashim shetihiyena sham.  ein dover ivrit shelo yavin et ze miyad.
klomar shei efshar lehavin et ze axeret, ze pashut kax.
I say to them, an audience of women sits with one man in its midst and
one must speak to them in the MASCULINE.  What does this mean?
What does this mean?  It means that it does not matter if there are one
thousand or ten thousand women, the one who determines the gender of
the collective is the single male that is there.  This says that the honor of
this single male is equal to the honor of an infinity of women that would
be there.  There is not a Hebrew speaker that would not understand this
immediately.  That is to say, it is not possible to understand it differently,
it is simply so.
Osnat claimed that in light of this example no Hebrew speaker would be able to
ignore the connection between sexist, or male-centric, practices of language use
and a male-dominated system of legal and social Israeli institutions.  Indeed, the
reactions of her students to her practice of using FEMININE plurals to address the
mixed gendered audience included discomfort, on the part of males and females,
with the inverted relationships between the collective and the social gender
categories.  I believe her metalinguistic explanation of the social meaning of the
MIH prescribed rules for gender agreement is not a comment about the language
itself but rather a sophisticated feminist analysis of the underlying metaphorical
relationships between language structure, language use, and the construction of
social reality.
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Benjamin Whorf, in his essays on “Language, Thought and Reality,”
stated that there were two types of categories in language, overt and covert.  The
meanings of overt categories, phenotypes, are more readily accessible to speakers
upon reflection.  However, according to his theory, speakers are generally
unaware of the meanings of covert categories, cryptotypes, and their relationships
to the meanings of overt categories.
A covert concept like a covert gender is as definable and in its way as
definite as a verbal concept like ‘female’ or feminine, but is of a very
different kind; it is not the analogue of a word but of a rapport-system, and
awareness of it has an intuitive quality; we say that it is sensed rather than
comprehended. (1956, 69-79)
Using Whorf’s language, we can see that the cryptotype of Hebrew gender is its
relationship to the covert category of markedness.  Thus, this is the meaning that
is primarily “sensed” rather than comprehended.  I believe the data analyzed in
this dissertation demonstrate that for feminists, the cryptotype of markedness and
its relationship to the phenotype of referential gender is keenly sensed and
comprehended.  Furthermore, this relationship and its meanings have clearly
visible consequences for the flexibility of cultures to recognize the social reality
of gender identities, sexualities, and social behaviors that are not succinctly
represented by “naturalized” communal practices.  The cultural phenomenon of
feminist ideology raises to the level of consciousness the “submerged state” of
these types of relationships.  Feminism is the “pronounced consciousness” that
gives speakers access to a clearer understanding of the phenotype of gender.
Feminist language use is the social practice that provides one means of exorcising
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the hold of the habitual association between gender and markedness that
contributes to the reproduction of sexist social practices.
We find similar innovative practices of language use with respect to the
use of grammatical gender and the expression of gender identity in the gay
community of Israel and elsewhere.  Certainly in the feminist context there is an
ideological stance regarding gender inequality that informs and conditions
language use of some members of the community.  In my dissertation, I argue (a)
that we should expect this type of linguistic innovation in the feminist community
and in the queer community because members of these communities are using
their linguistic (or sociolinguistic) repertoire to enact their social identities which
include aspects that are not necessarily indexed by conventional practices of
language use in the contemporary Israeli context and (b) that the innovative uses
of language are also a reflection of an alternative conceptualization of gender as a
system of social classification.   Thus, their linguistic innovation is not simply an
ideological statement; it is also evidence of how speakers use their resources to
express meaning and identity in language.   In my data, I have found evidence of
both habitual and intentional uses of language by feminists.  I used these data to
argue that feminist (and by extension queer) innovative practices have more in
common with “natural” or “unconscious” phenomena of language variation, such
as those described in Tobin (2001), than the existing literature on language
variation leads us to expect.  Thus, the ideological distinction between “natural”
or “unconscious” linguistic behavior and “ideologically” motivated linguistic
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behavior hinders our continuing research on the relationship between language
and the socio-cultural construction of reality.
It for these reasons that I believe research on ideologically motivated
linguistic innovation has crucial implications for those who research language and
language variation in speech communities or communities of practice with a
prescribed standard variety of the communities’ languages.  As I stated in chapter
two, most descriptive grammars of languages with standard varieties present the
standard as the only variety.  Subsequent theoretical discussions of the
relationship between linguistic elements, grammatical categories, and speakers’
use of these resources to convey referential and indexical meaning are thus shaped
by the erasure of the socio-cultural contexts within which the standard variety is
produced.  (See Irvine and Gal (2000) for a discussion of how linguistic research
is susceptible to the same processes that “plague” native speakers ideological
rationalizations of their language.)  The legacy of Whorf’s writings has been a
focused exploration of the ways that linguistic and anthropological researchers
could learn more about the manner in which language shapes and is shaped by
cultural phenomena.  It is clear that social change movements such as feminism in
which individuals “break” rules of normalized behavior because existing social
practices (including practices of language use) do not allow them to express their
sense of self are precisely the socio-cultural contexts that provide researchers with
data on how meaning is associated with grammatical forms.  The analysis of this
rule breaking behavior helps to make visible for speaker and linguists alike some
of the covert associations that otherwise we only “sense.”
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9.3  AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
My research into Israeli feminist practices of language use raised several
theoretical questions that were left unexplored in this dissertation.  There are four
issues I will discuss in this final section: (1) gender agreement errors in the use of
CIH to refer to the social behavior of speakers with both animate and inanimate
nouns; (2) my informants’ discursive presentation of the relationship between the
development of feminist consciousness and practices of language use; (3) the
relationship between feminist practices of language use and innovative practices
of language use found in other communities of practices engaged in social change
work, (particularly the use of grammatical gender within LGBT communities);
and (4) the innovative practices adopted by the women in my study might be used
as typological examples of how speakers in other contexts deal with asymmetrical
relationships between other grammatical categories.
Within the corpus of my data, I found several examples of agreement
errors between nouns and coordinated pronominal and predicate forms.
According to the rules of MIH, the gender agreement marked on pronouns and
predicates (including both adjectives and verbs) must agree with the noun they
modify.  In chapters five and six, I presented examples of agreement errors in
utterances where the nouns did not directly refer to animate referents but were
related to the social actions of males and females.  For example, in two different
utterances my informants referred to the “majority” of a group of social actors.  In
these utterances, my informants used two of the nouns that refer to a “majority.”
Each noun is marked for gender: rov is MASCULINE and marbit is FEMININE.
276
The phonological shape of each noun determines its gender and, according to
descriptions of the MIH system of noun classification, the gender of these nouns
carries no semantic information.  Nonetheless, I found that the use of these forms
to refer to women as the majority of gender-neutral group of social actors,
regardless of whether they used the FEMININE or MASCULINE noun for
“majority,” resulted in agreement errors.  I also found several examples of
agreement errors between predicates and their implied referents.  In chapters five
and six, I presented some possible explanations for these errors related to issues of
speech production and the salience of the social meaning of gender in particular
utterances.  (Recall my analysis of Neta’s variation between MASCULINE and
FEMININE second-person impersonal pronouns in 6.3.)  I believe the analysis of
these types of agreement errors, from my data, as well as data collected from
other segments of the Israeli native Hebrew-speaking population, might provide
important insight into the relationship between grammatical and social systems of
gender classification  Furthermore the finding of this research could contribute to
developing an enhanced model of language as a cultural system of meaning
making.
The second area of investigation raised by my data concerns the way
speakers use language, particularly narrative, to enact an ideological stance and
invest it with the power of “truth,” (i.e. the power to shape their sense of social
“reality”).  The focus of this dissertation was my speakers’ use of specific
linguistic practices to enact a feminist identity.  However, throughout the
sociolinguistic interviews, all of my informants created narrative texts that
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interwove themes of gender identity, feminist consciousness, and their
experiences of language use.  I am interested in combining methods of critical
discourse analysis and sociolinguistic analysis to examine how these three themes
emerge in my informants’ narratives about feminism and language use.  I believe
an examination of this type would provide insights into the ways in which
language use, identity construction, and ideological beliefs become intertwined
and shape our experiences of “reality.”
I also believe in would be fruitful to compare how shifts in ideological and
personal concepts of social identity and the processes of social distinction are
manifested in the language use practices and metalinguistic discourse of speakers
from variety of social change oriented communities of practice.  In section 9.2 of
this chapter, I argued that feminism can be understood as a cultural phenomenon
that literally raises speakers’ consciousness of embedded or, to use Whorf’s term,
submerged meanings of grammatical forms.  Members of communities organized
around movements for social change often use language in unconventional ways
because the habitual associations between linguistic forms and social meanings
erase their own sense of reality (or the reality they are working to create).  It is
likely that examining language use practices from a variety of ideologically
defined communities can bring insight into the processes of both consciously and
unconsciously motivated language variation and change.  Members of these
communities are often more conscious than other speakers of the ways that
language use conveys and contributes to the reproduction of cultural belief
systems, thus I believe a comparative study of this sort would further illuminate
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the mutually constitutive nature of the relationship between language, thought,
and the situated construction of “reality’ within discreet and multi-layered
communities of practice.
Finally, data on innovative practices from the feminist community could
be used to predict the ways that speakers might use language to accommodate for
other types of asymmetries that are encoded by linguistic categories.  For example
the use of singular and plural forms together, marked by the SLASH, is often used
by speakers who want to index an awareness of some kind of multiplicity that is
has historically been represented as a singularity.  Another example is the use of
‘and’ and ‘or’ together in American English legal documents, which illustrates
how a language practices encode a whole system of legal distinctions that are
relevant to those who sign contracts.  In both contexts semanticists would likely
argue that one grammatical form or category includes the other, the plurality
should imply multiple singularities, and “or” should include “and;” nonetheless
speakers develop elaborate explanations for why it is salient to use the SLASH
convention in these contexts.  The social motivation in these cases is similar to the
motivation for the feminist use of the SLASH gender forms; the practice makes
visible the ideological and social consequences of asymmetrical relationships that
are prevalent in linguistic systems.
Additional research on these topics will contribute our growing
understanding of the multiple ways that the formal structures of linguistic systems
relate to other cultural phenomena, particularly those systems that humans use to
create and negotiate socio-cultural distinctions.  Questions first put forth by Boas,
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Sapir, and Whorf remain central to our ongoing investigation of the relationship
between language and culture.  The rigidity of language is linked to oppositions
that exist in the structure of language and the ways that grammatical elements are
associated with specific meanings.  At the same time, I think this dissertation and
additional research in the areas outlined above, can illuminate the resourcefulness
of speakers in adapting and changing aspects of their languages and language
practices to meet their communicative needs.  Investigating how speakers
intentionally and unintentionally change language to accommodate to changes in
ideology, communal practice, and socio-cultural contexts can ultimately help us to
better understand the nature of language itself and what makes human language




APPENDIX A:  LEXICAL VARIABLES RELATED TO ISRAELI FEMINIST LANGUAGE
PRACTICES
MIH Hebrew lexical item English gloss(es) Feminist attitude
baal ‘husband/owner’ negatively ideologized
ben zu
 ‘partner (male)’ positive/preferred
ish ‘man/husband’ positive





meshivon ‘answering machine’ positive
(new term created by HLA
at request of IWN)
mazkira elektronit ‘electric secretary/
answering machine’
negatively ideologized
mankal acronym for ‘general
manager (M)’
neutral




literally ‘son of Adam’
mixed neutral and negative
bat adam ‘person/human’
literally ‘daughter of Adam’
neutral
Table A1: Sample of conventional and feminist lexical variables
Each section of the above table (separated by double lines) presents the
conventional MIH lexical item and the feminist alternatives.  In column three of the table,
I present information regarding the attitudes of my informants to the various terms.  This
table does not represent a comprehensive list, only a sample of those lexical items that
occurred in my informants’ speech or metalinguistic discourse.
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Dafna 6 plural 0 plural 0 singular 0 singular
Edit 10 plural 0 plural 1 singular 0 singular
Einat 16 plural 0 plural 5 singular 0 singular
Eti 14 plural 0 plural 4 singular 0 singular
Iris 15 plural 0 plural 4 singular 0 singular
Meital 9 plural 0 plural 3 singular 0 singular
Merav 10 plural 0 plural 3 singular 0 singular
Michal 4 plural 0 plural 1 singular 0 singular
Na’ama 11plural 0 plural 4 singular 0 singular
Neta 7 plural 0 plural 1 singular 0 singular
Nitsan 14 plural 0 plural 2 singular 0 singular
Nurit 3 plural 0 plural 6 singular 0 singular
Ofra 7 plural 0 plural 2 singular 0 singular
Ora 14 plural 0 plural 4 singular 1 singular
Osnat 12 plural 0 plural 6 singular 1 singular
Table A2: Quantitative data on research subjects’ use gramamtical gender agreement on
“dropped-subject” predicates
The table above presents the data on my informants’ use of grammatical gender
agreement on predicates with dropped impersonal or generic subjects.  I did not include
these in the analysis of other generic forms because the utterences in which they occurred
did not always clarify whether the subjects of these predicates were previously mentioned
agents or impersonal and somewhat abstracted agents, such as “the people” in the
statement “here the people say …”.  In conversational Hebrew, speakers will often drop
the pronominal agent because the information can be conveyed through agreement
markers on the predicates.  However, in the present tense only gender and number is
conveyed, not person.  The data presented above are tokens of gender marked present
tense predicates that lacked overt subjects.  Although the utterances in which they
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occurred and the contexts of use did not allow for a clear identification of the agents of
these predicates, I felt it was important to account for the use of gender on these forms.  I
have included these data in the dissertation because they demonstrate a practice of using
MASCULINE predicate forms to co-occur with “dropped-subject” predicates.
The two occurances of the FEMININE form in this syntactic context stand out as
exceptions.  Ora used the FEMININE singular predicate roa ‘see’ as an active verb and it
appeared immediately after several uses of the same predicate in that form with the overt
second-person pronoun as the impersonal.   As such, we can probably assume that Ora
had simply dropped the pronominal element in this case but intended it to be the
impersonal second-person with the same referent(s) as the preceding uses.
In Osnat’s utterance, the predicate that appeared in the singular FEMININE form
was yexola ‘can’ as the model verb preceding the predicate limtso ‘to find.’  The context
of the utterance was her description of efforts to change the publishing standards for
Hebrew academic journals and to allow for alternation between MASCULINE and
FEMININE as generics.  Osnat’s use of the FEMININE predicate with no overt subject
occurred in a larger utterance the topic of which was the use of generics in Israeli
academic journals.
ze   lo kol hamaamarim kaxa  veet      hakol yexola    limtso,
that no all    the articles      such  and D.O. all  can(F,S) to find,
Not all the articles are this way and one can find everything
In the larger utterance within which the variable appears, there were no other uses of the
FEMININE second-person impersonal or other FEMININE generic agents.  It is possible
to interpret her usage as a direct address to her female interlocutor or as an impersonal
generic.  If her usage is interpreted as a FEMININE generic there are a few ways to gloss
it: (1) “not all the articles are as such, and one can find it all;” (2) “not all the articles are
as such and you can find it all;” or (3) “not all the articles are as such and all can be
283
found.”  If we were to substitute the predicate efshar for yexola then there would be no
need for an overt subject at all.  The predicate efshar only appears in this aspect as the
default MASCULINE singular in the present tense.
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